Supervised visitation is not a de facto termination of reasonable visitation rights. Id. at 1278 n. 1 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting); Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562, 578 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1992). Based on these provisions and on the statutes dealing with child custody, we infer that the best interests of the child standard normally requires unrestricted visitation with the noncustodial parent.

urt to make an informed determination regarding the appropriateness of placing interim restrictions on the father's visitation rights pending a final determination ( see Matter of Vanjak v Pesa, 26 AD3d 512, 513). Where, as here, the court possessed adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed determination with respect to the best interests of the children, an evidentiary hearing, complete with expert testimony, sworn witnesses, and an in camera interview of the children, is not necessary to render a temporary custody determination ( see McAvoy v Hannigan, 41 AD3d 791, 792; Assini v Assini, 11 AD3d 417, 418; Matter of Levande v Levande, 10 AD3d 723). Here, there was a sound and substantial basis for the court's determination to temporarily order supervised therapeutic visitation ( see Matter of Sinnott-Turner v Kolba, 60 AD3d 774; see also Zafran v Zafran, 28 AD3d 753) and this arrangement would not deprive the father of meaningful access to the children ( see e.g. Lightbourne v Lightbourne, 179 AD2d 562). This father's remaining contentions either concern matter dehors the record which cannot be reviewed ( see generally R J Yorek, Inc. v MCL Constr., 173 AD2d 531) or are without merit.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. The Family Court's determination that the father's visitation with the subject children should be supervised has a substantial basis in the record and should not be disturbed ( see Matter of Morash v. Minucci, 299 AD2d 486). Contrary to the father's contention, supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to his children ( see Matter of Ramazan U., Jr., 303 AD2d 516; Matter of Licitra v. Licitra, 232 AD2d 417; Matter of Carl J.B. v. Dorothy T., 186 AD2d 736; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 AD2d 562).

There is no basis to alter the court's award of custody to the father in this case (see Matter of Hartsough v. Hartsough, supra; Matter of Morse v. Mignone, supra; Canazon v. Canazon, supra at 653). Supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to the child (see Matter of Licitra v. Licitra, 232 A.D.2d 417, 418; Matter of Carl J. B. v. Dorothy T., 186 A.D.2d 736, 738; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562), and the provision of the dispositional order directing supervised visitation is supported by the record. The mother's remaining contentions are without merit.

The mother's inappropriate use of visitation time is likely to result in emotional harm to the children. Supervised visitation is not a deprivation of meaningful access to a child ( see, Matter of Carl J. B. v Dorothy T., 186 AD2d 736, 738; Lightbourne v Lightbourne, 179 AD2d 562). However, given the mother's limited resources, the Family Court erred in directing her to pay the costs associated with supervised visitation.

Similarly unavailing is the father's challenge to the visitation schedule fashioned by the court. The visitation granted herein insures meaningful contact between the father and his child (De La Torre v De La Torre, 183 A.D.2d 744; Matter of Thomas S. v Kathleen Z., 149 A.D.2d 599). Supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation to meaningful access to a child (Lightbourne v Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562), and in this case has a sound and substantial basis in the record (Matter of Thomas S. v Kathleen Z., supra). The father's remaining contention does not require reversal.

Notably, supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to children (see Matter of Graham v White, 16 A.D.3d 583 [2d Dept 2005]; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562 [1st Dept 1992]). In Zappin v Comfort, 155 A.D.3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2017]), the First Department affirmed an order granting the father supervised visitation in circumstances similar to those presented in this matter.

Notably, supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to children (see Matter of Graham v White, 16 A.D.3d 583 [2d Dept 2005]; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562 [1st Dept 1992]).

In sum, limited supervised visitation is appropriate and necessary for the children's safety. Notably, supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to children (see Matter ofGraham v White , 16 AD3d 583 [2d Dept 2005] ; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne , 179 AD2d 562 [1st Dept 1992] ). In Zappin v Comfort , 155 AD3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2017], the First Department affirmed an order granting the father supervised visitation in circumstances similar to those presented in this matter.

Notably, supervised visitation is not considered a deprivation of meaningful access to children (see Matter of Graham v White, 16 A.D.3d 583 [2d Dept 2005]; Lightbourne v. Lightbourne, 179 A.D.2d 562 [1st Dept 1992]). In Zappin v Comfort, 155 A.D.3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2017]), the First Department affirmed an order granting the father supervised visitation in circumstances similar to those presented in this matter.