A general demurrer to the petition was overruled and on appeal to this court the judgment was reversed. Life Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344 ( 145 S.E.2d 63). The petition was then amended to meet our ruling. Upon the trial of the case the jury returned a verdict for the heirs, and the court entered a judgment for the amount shown to be due under the policy, together with interest thereon.

]" (Emphasis in original.)Life Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 347-348 ( 145 S.E.2d 63) (1965). See also Linder v. Rowland, 122 Ga. 425 (2) ( 50 SE 124) (1905).

This statute was enacted as part of the 1960 Georgia insurance code, Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 669, Code Ann. § 56-2424, but the meaning of the phrase at issue here has never been construed by this court or the Georgia Supreme Court. We have found only two decisions that have construed this statute: JCS Enterprises v. Vanliner Ins., 227 Ga. App. 371, 375 (4) ( 489 SE2d 95) (1997), and Life Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344-345 (2) ( 145 SE2d 63) (1965). Neither is applicable here.

The cause of action constitutes the entire set of facts which gives rise to an enforceable claim. ( Life Casualty Insurance Company of Tenn. v. Webb (1965) 112 Ga. App. 344 [ 145 S.E.2d 63, 67]; Elliott v. Mosgrove (1939) 162 Or. 507 [ 93 P.2d 1070, 1072-1073]; Black's Law Dict. (4th ed.) pp. 279-280.) The foregoing definitions compel this conclusion: the term "cause of action" is not limited to the plaintiff's right to recover in a court proceeding.

Estoppel by judgment occurs only when the issue determined in the prior proceeding is the same as that in the subsequent proceeding. Smith v. Wood, 115 Ga. App. 265, 266 ( 154 S.E.2d 646); Life c. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 348 ( 145 S.E.2d 63); King Sales Co. v. McKey, 105 Ga. App. 787 ( 125 S.E.2d 684). The determination of total disability as found by the board under the workmen's compensation laws is a finding of total economic disability, which is the same as defined in the contract sued upon.

Latine v. Clements, 3 Ga. 426, 429. Of course, parties includes privies, usually defined as all persons who are represented by parties and claim under them, the term privity denoting a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property ( Latine v. Clements, supra; Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ga. App. 149 (1) ( 6 S.E.2d 126); Morris v. Georgia Power Co., 65 Ga. App. 180 (1a) ( 15 S.E.2d 730); Roberts v. Hill, 81 Ga. App. 185 ( 58 S.E.2d 465); Morris v. Murphey Co., 95 Ga. 307 ( 22 S.E. 635, 51 ASR 81)), but not different rights in the same property. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens Southern Nat. Bank, 68 Ga. App. 393 (1) ( 23 S.E.2d 198)." Life Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 346 ( 145 S.E.2d 63). 2. "Either the bailor or bailee, except in the case of gratuitous bailment may bring an action against a stranger to recover for damages to the bailed property and if the action is brought by the bailee he may recover the full damages and hold the balance, beyond his special interest, for the bailor.

The facts and issue of liability in this case are the same as the former case, but the cause of action is different. In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be applied, the parties to the two suits must be identical or "privity" must exist with a former party so as to provide for mutuality of application of the former suit. E. g. Life Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 145 S.E.2d 63 (1965); Ritchie Gas of Cornelia, Inc. v. Ferguson, 111 Ga. App. 187, 140 S.E.2d 925 (1965). The question in this case is whether there is sufficient identity or privity of parties in the two suits by Jack Forrester, one for the death of his wife, the other for the death of his son, so that the requirements of estoppel by judgment are met. The recent case of Smith v. Wood, 154 S.E.2d 646, decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals on February 17, 1967, is almost directly in point.

Morrison, supra, 284 Ga. at 116 (3), 663 S.E.2d 714. See also Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 112 Ga. App. 344, 347-348, 145 S.E.2d 63 (1965) ; Linder v. Rowland, 122 Ga. 425, 50 S.E. 124 (1905).When one takes a closer look at the outcomes of our cases, however, it appears that, although we have occasionally been imprecise and inconsistent with the terms "subject matter" and "cause of action," we have actually been looking to the "entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim" to determine whether res judicata has been triggered.For example, in Lawson, supra, the majority relied on what it called an "identity of subject matter" test for the application of res judicata.