McGroarty responded to the argument that his claims were time barred by stating that, at the time Florida notified him of his continuing sex offender registration requirements in 2012, Florida caselaw held that "the registration requirements of § 943.0435 were continuing in nature for statute of limitations purposes ...." See Lieble v. State , 933 So.2d 119, 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). McGroarty also argued that his cause of action had not accrued until the Supreme Court issued Nichols v. United States , which held that a registered sex offender who moved out of the United States without notifying state authorities of his new address could not be convicted of failure to update his sex-offender registration under federal law.
Not only is Failure to Register a continuing offense, but the instant offenses are clearly connected in an episodic sense and "linked in a significant way." See Lieble v. State, 933 So. 3d 119, 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Here, Defendant committed the instant offenses by staying at the same apartment without registering that address as a temporary residence for two consecutive registration periods.
We do not agree. Appellant was obligated to report upon release from incarceration under section 943.0435(2) and on the month of his birth and every six months thereafter under section 943.0435(14). Even if failure to report is considered a continuing offense, see Lieble v. State, 933 So.2d 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), each failure to report constituted a new violation of the applicable reporting statute and a separate offense, not part of "one criminal episode or transaction." § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006); compare People v. Meeks, 123 Cal.App.4th 695, 705-06, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 445, 452-53 (Cal.Ct.App. 2004) (explaining each failure to report on a sex offender's birthday is a separate offense and the failure to punish an offender for each failure to report as required frustrates the purpose of the sex offender reporting law).
In the absence of any New York precedent, the People rely on out-of-state decisions that identify failure to register as a sex offender under a state's Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) as a continuing offense, arguing that SORA and GORA violations are similar. The People rely in particular on Lieble v. State, 933 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006). There, the court construed a Florida statute requiring a sex offender to register within forty-eight hours after establishing a permanent or temporary residence in that state, and to re-register within forty-eight hours of any change of address.