The court finds this terminal to Ameritox's chances of succeeding with respect to the '895 patent. See, e.g.,Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed.Cir.2007) (holding that the patentee must provide a “reasonable enablement of the scope of the range ” of the patented embodiments (emphasis added)); Gen. Elec. Co. v. SonoSite, Inc., 641 F.Supp.2d 793, 817 (W.D.Wis.2009) (explaining that although a patentee need not describe “how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention,” where claims are “open-ended,” the patent would need to be supported by “reasonable enablement of the scope of the range”). In basic patent parlance, the teaching of how to practice the claimed invention supplies the “ quid pro quo of the patent bargain.”

(Doc. 286 at 48.) In support, J J cites Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243-45 (Fed. Cir. 2003). J J cites to this case precedent for the proposition that when "the asserted claims are broad enough to cover [two embodiments], the patents must enable both embodiments."

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a patent is invalid if a prior art reference discloses, either explicitly or inherently, every limitation of the claimed invention. Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if no reasonable jury could find, as the one here did, that the prior art did not anticipate, and thus invalidate, the patent.

(Doc. 193 at 7.) In support, J J cites two cases, Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Automotive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. America, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007). InLiebel-Flarsheim, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the accused finding that the patent claims directed to a front-loading fluid injector with replaceable syringe for delivering a contrast agent to a patient, were invalid for lack of enablement. 481 F.3d at 1380.

Cross-Appellant’s Br. 60. We disagree. Our precedents make clear that the specification must enable the full scope of the claimed invention. E.g. , Sitrick , 516 F.3d at 999 ("The full scope of the claimed invention must be enabled."); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. , 481 F.3d 1371, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("That full scope must be enabled ...."); AK Steel , 344 F.3d at 1244 ("[T]he applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention."); Genentech , 108 F.3d at 1365 (similar); see Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc. , 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The enablement requirement ensures that the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims. The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement.").

Here, the evidence dictates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been required to engage in undue experimentation to develop non-osmotic oral dosage forms with ascending release rates. As we stated in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and repeated in Automotive Technologies, "The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet." Auto. Tech. 501 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380).

Zenith responds that the district court properly dismissed all of PDI's counterclaims for inequitable conduct. Zenith argues that our decision in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), precludes PDI from continuing to pursue inequitable conduct with respect to claims that have been held invalid. Further, Zenith maintains that the district court correctly dismissed inequitable conduct with respect to claims 2-8 of the `513 patent because PDI failed to offer any evidence that the J20525 television was material to the prosecution of those claims.

In this case, Par sought extremely broad claims in a field of art that it acknowledged was highly unpredictable, therefore, Par has set a high burden that its patent disclosure must meet to satisfy the requisite quid pro quo of patent enablement. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The motto, `beware of what one asks for,' might be applicable here."). The scintilla of evidence put forward by Par to suggest that the claims are enabled, most of which actually conflicts with the intrinsic evidence in this case, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Evolve survives summary judgment on infringement in part because of its success in obtaining, first in other rulings and again here, what amounts to a broad claim construction. That turns out to be a “Pyrrhic victory.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

The cases on which BGI relies are distinguishable because the courts in those cases had construed the claims to require the elements at issue; in this case, the claims do not require the allegedly inoperable element (the simultaneous addition of unlabeled nucleotides). In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the invention concerned a method for loading a syringe into a high pressure power injector to inject fluid into an animal. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1373.