While we agree that these are important considerations in determining the constitutionality of a statute like § 2817(1), they are not alone determinative. ¶ 3 In Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, ¶ 23, 180 P.3d 1191, 1201, this Court recently confirmed that "The Legislature, in the exercise of its authority to categorize property by use, may recognize . . . a specialized means of determining [such property's] fair cash value." This Court cautioned, however, that "What [the Legislature] may not constitutionally do . . . is to potentially divorce the [specialized means of] valuation . . . from the fair market value of [property in the class].
The Constitution is the bulwark to which all statutes must yield." Liddell v. Heavener , 2008 OK 6, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d 1191, 1199. ¶12 The objective of construing the Oklahoma Constitution is to give effect to the framers' intent, as well as the people adopting it.
termines the constitutional validity of a legislative enactment: (1) This Court must give effect to the intent of the Constitution's framers and the people adopting it without regard to our own view of a provision's propriety, wisdom, desirability, necessity, or practicality as a working proposition;(2) This Court's search for the framers' and electorate's intent is to be conducted by examining the text of the instrument itself and when the text is not ambiguous, the Court may not look for a meaning outside its bounds; (3) The Court may presume the Legislature conducts its business with due regard for the framers' and people's intent; (4) A duly-enacted statute will be presumed to conform to the state and federal Constitutions and will be upheld unless it is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution; and (5) The party challenging a statute's constitutionality possesses a heavy burden to establish the statute is in excess of legislative power.Liddell v. Heavner , 2008 OK 6, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d 1191, 1199. ¶ 30 Plaintiffs argue 23 O.S. 2011 § 61.2 is a constitutionally prohibited special law violating Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 46. I have explained herein Art. 5 § 46 does not contain a limitation on the Legislature's power to define one of the elements to a tort cause of action, i.e. , the damages element.
However, in a proceeding in District Court, because it is a non-jurisdictional issue, failure to assert that the Plaintiff is not the real party in interest may be waived. See Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, n. 5, 180 P.3d 1191 (Opala, J., Majority Op.); see also12 O.S.2012 § 2008(D). ¶ 4 In this case, the facts demonstrate that the Defendants did not raise the issue of “standing” until after the property was sold at sheriff's sale.
However, in a proceeding in District Court, because it is a non-jurisdictional issue, failure to assert that the Plaintiff is not the real party in interest may be waived. See Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, n.5, 180 P.3d 1191 (Opala, J., Majority Op.); see also 12 O.S. 2012 § 2008(D). ¶4 In this case, the facts demonstrate that the Defendants did not raise the issue of "standing" until after the property was sold at sheriff's sale.
See, County Board of Equalization v. Frontier Grain, Co., 1969 OK 82, 454 P.2d 317. Bliss Hotel's fair market value definition has been modified only when applied to assessment of real property, to take into account Constitutional amendment based on use of the property. See, Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, 180 P.3d 1191, and Tulsa Co. Bd. Of Equalization v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa Co., 1987 OK 83, 743 P.2d 1076. Here, personal property is being assessed, and the amendment to Art. 10 § 8 Oklahoma Constitution based on use of real property does not apply. See, Liddell, 2008 OK 6 ¶ 11, 180 P.3d 1191.
OPALA, J. ¶ 1 Two issues are raised in this appeal. First, Assessor challenges the constitutionality of 68 O.S. Supp.2004 § 2817(1) to the extent that provision requires Taxpayer's lots to be valued at the developers' acquisition cost. From a review of the record and briefs submitted, the court finds that today's decision in Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, 180 P.3d 1191, disposes of this issue. Liddell holds that the valuation method authorized by the provisions of 68 O.S. Supp. 2004 § 2817[ 68-2817](1) for platted lots in additions or subdivisions is inconsistent with the fair cash value standard of Article X, § 8(A)( 2) of the Oklahoma Constitution. To avoid placing an undue hardship on county assessors and property owners who have acted in justifiable reliance on the tainted provision's conformity to the Constitution, we restricted the effect of Liddell "t property valuations made after the date this opinion becomes final."
The language of Okla. Const. Art. 13 § 1a does not give school districts a constitutional-appropriation exemption from applying Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 55.Liddell v. Heavner , 2008 OK 6, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d 1191, 1199 (absent ambiguity the plain language of the Constitution is applied as an expression of intent from the Framers proposing it and the People adopting it); Oklahoma Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. , 1999 OK 35, ¶ 7, 982 P.2d 512, 514 (same).See , e.g. , Oklahoma State Department of Education, 2013-2014 Annual Report: Statistical Report on Oklahoma Schools and the State Department of Education (April 2015), at p. 3, stating State-Appropriated 2013-2014 Revenue (non-dedicated) ($2,299,245,013.00), and State-Dedicated Revenue 2013-2014 ($474,946,865); Actual 2013-2014 Average Daily Attendance (ADA) (639,376.
We are guided by well-established principles in assessing the conformity of a challenged state statute to our fundamental law. Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d 1191, 1199-1200. Our state constitution is a bulwark to which all statutes must yield.
We are guided by well-established principles in assessing the conformity of a challenged state statute to our fundamental law. Liddell v. Heavner, 2008 OK 6, ¶ 16, 180 P.3d 1191, 1199-1200. Our state constitution is a bulwark to which all statutes must yield.