The trial court sustained Van Avery’s demurrer to the operative second amended complaint with leave to amend. Among other things, the court concluded Ray did not have standing to pursue an elder abuse claim pursuant to Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712. Ray did not amend the second amended complaint and the court dismissed the action with prejudice. On appeal, Ray contends the court erred by sustaining the demurrer to the second amended complaint with leave to amend because she “pleaded sufficient facts to achieve standing” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3, which identifies individuals eligible to bring elder abuse claims on behalf of a decedent.
The court properly grants summary judgment when the moving party establishes it is entitled to the entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant may do so by establishing the plaintiff does not have standing as a matter of law to bring the asserted claims. (Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 736 (Lickter). We review an order granting a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.)
With some exceptions, "a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person's death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period." Cal. Code Civ. P. § 377.20; Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018); Lickter v. Lickter, 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 (2010). A "survival action" under § 377.
In fact, the California Court of Appeals discussed that limitation on the doctrine of the last antecedent in the context of an almost identical statutory construction question under California's probate code. In Lickter v. Lickter , 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 725, 118 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 133 (2010), the plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of the last antecedent, asserted"that the closing phrase in subdivision (a)(1) of Probate Code section 48—‘having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding’—cannot be read as qualifying all of the terms that precede it—that is, ‘heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person.’
Gong Hua's interest was thus both evident and acknowledged. Relying principally on Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712 (Lickter), an elder abuse case, Buwei now argues that Gong Hua was not an "interested person" because at the time of the trial on the Petition, Gong Hua had no direct interest in Yang Hua's estate. Buwei interprets Lickter too narrowly.
The cases mainly involve the interpretation and application of section 15647.3, subdivision (d), which delineates the persons who may pursue a claim on a deceased elder or dependent adult's behalf. (E.g., Lickter v. Lickter (2011) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 716 (Lickter) [standing to commence action on behalf of deceased elder]; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1284 [standing to bring claim on behalf of deceased dependent adult]; see also In re Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 804-805 [discussing whether widow who allegedly abused her elderly husband is entitled to a portion of his estate].) The question here is more fundamental.
The trial court correctly sustained Dr. Simon's demurrer to Edlyn's elder abuse causes of action. As a matter of law, Edlyn lacked standing to pursue those claims on behalf of her deceased mother because she was not an "interested person" under subdivision (d)(1)(C) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.3. (Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 717 (Lickter).) After the death of an individual protected by the elder abuse statutes, the right to commence or maintain an action for elder abuse rests with the decedent's personal representative.
A defendant may defeat an action on a motion for summary judgment without attacking each cause of action separately by showing the action has no merit because the plaintiff lacks standing. (See Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 736 (Lickter).) That is the approach the Hammer Defendants take here.
An “other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action” is “the person to whom a particular cause of action that once belonged to the decedent passes under the laws governing the passage of a decedent's property.” Lickter v. Lickter, 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 733 (2010). 3.2 Trustees as Successors in Interest
Where the decedent was the plaintiff, an “other successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action” is “the person to whom a particular cause of action that once belonged to the decedent passes under the laws governing the passage of a decedent's property.” Lickter v. Lickter, 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 733 (2010).