Opinion
02 Civ. 2626 (JSM)
October 9, 2002
Christopher P. Kelly, Warren, New Jersey, For Plaintiff.
Brendan Sweeney, New York, NY, For Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Susan Lichtenstein brings this action against her former employer, alleging gender or religion discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") prematurely issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter. At issue is the validity of a regulation adopted by the EEOC in 1977, authorizing the issuance of a right to sue letter prior to the conclusion of the 180-day administrative review period provided in the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
The validity of the regulation in question has divided the courts that have considered the issue, compare, e.g., Huang v. Gruner Jahr U.S.A. Publ'g, 99 Civ. 5058, 2000 WL 640660, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000) (early right to sue letter is valid); Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1061-63 (11th Cir. 1994) (same) with Olzewski v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 96 Civ. 3393, 1997 WL 375690, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1997) (early right to sue letter is invalid); Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1340-48 (C.A.D.C. 1999) (same), and little would be gained by a detailed discussion of the issue here. Suffice it to say that, while one may regret the fact that Congress failed to provide the EEOC with a sufficient budget to do the tasks assigned to it, there is no benefit to be gained by delaying for 180 days the inevitable federal court action. Thus, while this court is firmly convinced that employment discrimination claims could be more appropriately resolved by an adequately funded EEOC than they can be by a jury trial in the district court, there is no reason to impose a meaningless 180-day waiting period. This Court therefore joins those Courts that have refused to invalidate the regulation.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied.