In light of its decision, the court did not address defendants' alternative grounds for dismissal. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that personal jurisdiction existed under the reasoning of Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL , 20 N.Y.3d 327, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012). The Appellate Division affirmed, and distinguished Licci as requiring deliberate acts which were absent in plaintiffs' case because the defendants merely carried out their clients' instructions and did not "purposefully avail[ ] [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities in New York" (127 A.D.3d 610, 611, 9 N.Y.S.3d 16 [1st Dept.2015] ).
The Court of Appeals accepted our certified questions, and, in response, explained that a foreign bank's use of a New York correspondent account to execute dozens of wire transfers is sufficiently purposeful conduct to constitute a “transaction of business” within the meaning of that section. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339, 984 N.E.2d 893, 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 702 (2012) ( “Licci III ”). The Court of Appeals also concluded that the allegations contained in the complaint, taken as true for these purposes, establish the requisite “nexus” or “relationship” between the foreign bank's New York business activity and the plaintiffs' claims to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
In a series of opinions, this Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals all confronted a jurisdictional dispute similar to the one now before this Court on appeal: whether the use of a correspondent bank account provides a sufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank. See generally, Licci v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd. , 704 F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ("Licci I"); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL , 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.2012) ("Licci II"); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL , 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012) (Licci III ); Licci IV , 732 F.3d 161. Although the factual circumstances of the instant actions are not identical, the reasoning contained within the opinions guides the resolution of the instant appeal.
Without correspondent banking . . . it would often be impossible for banks to provide comprehensive nationwide and international banking services—among them, the vital capability to transfer money by wire with amazing speed and accuracy across international boundaries." Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 56 n.3 (2d Cir. 2012) (Licci II) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Davidson, 175 F. App'x 399, 401 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order); Sigmoil Res., N.V. v. Pan Ocean Oil Corp. (Nigeria), 234 A.D.2d 103, 650 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (1996)), certified question answered 20 N.Y.3d 327, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 2012) (Licci III). On January 4, 2021, the U.S. Department of Treasury ("the Treasury") announced an approximately $8.5 million settlement with UBAF for 127 violations of Syrian sanctions.
Id. (quoting Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank ("Licci II "), 20 N.Y.3d 327, 338, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012) ).
“By this single act statute ... proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction ... so long as the defendant's activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” ( Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, 850 N.E.2d 1140 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted], cert. denied 549 U.S. 1095, 127 S.Ct. 832, 166 L.Ed.2d 665 [2006] ). Determining whether long-arm jurisdiction exists under the “transacts business” provision of CPLR 302(a)(1), therefore, is a two-pronged inquiry: “a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether [the] cause of action aris[es] from such a business transaction” ( Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 334, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516, 519, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 829 N.E.2d 1201 [2005] ). Both prongs must be met in order for personal jurisdiction to attach ( Johnson, 4 N.Y.3d at 519, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 829 N.E.2d 1201).
. The New York Court of Appeals answered both questions in the affirmative, Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank , 20 N.Y.3d 327, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012) ("Licci III "), and the Second Circuit utilized the New York Court of Appeals' analysis in its subsequent decisions in this case, see, e.g.,Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Licci IV "); Licci V , 834 F.3d 201. Where the jurisdictional analysis concerns the question of whether a foreign nonparty should be required to comply with a Rule 45 subpoena, the Second Circuit has narrowed the second prong of the statutory inquiry to a focus on "the connection between the nonparty's contacts with the forum and the discovery order at issue."
. In Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“Licci II ”), 20 N.Y.3d 327, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012), the New York State Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) answered questions certified from the Second Circuit concerning the reach of § 302(a)(1) in the context of an action, like the instant one, alleging that a foreign bank violated the ATA by knowingly transferring funds that supported an FTO. Notably, the defendant bank in Licci II “did not operate branches or offices, or maintain employees, in the United States.”
In Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“Licci II ”), 20 N.Y.3d 327, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893 (2012), the New York Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) answered questions certified from the Second Circuit concerning the reach of § 302(a)(1) in the context of an action, like the instant one, alleging that a foreign bank violated the ATA by knowingly transferring funds that supported an FTO. Notably, the defendant bank in question “did not operate branches or offices, or maintain employees, in the United States.” Id. at 332, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 984 N.E.2d 893.
) In their pre-motion letter opposing the Defendants' request to file this motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs relied solely on defendants' use of a correspondent banking account in New York pursuant to a conspiracy, a legal theory founded in C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), see Lied ex ret. Lied v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339 (2012); Lied, 732 F.3d at 165; they made no mention of personal jurisdiction under section 2334(a) or Rule 4(k), or on the basis of any tortious acts.