[2] In reaching this conclusion, the Court used a two-pronged test: (1) whether defendants purposefully availed themselves of conducting business in New York and (2) whether there was a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted. As to the first prong, the Pictet Court relied primarily on two Court of Appeals cases that outlined the conduct necessary to establish that the use of correspondent bank accounts constitutes “purposeful availment” of the New York banking system: Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-NY 39 NY2d 391 (1976) and Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank SAL. 20 N.Y.3d 327 (2012). The Amigo court had rejected the use of New York correspondent bank accounts as a basis for establishing jurisdiction, finding that the foreign bank was merely the “passive” recipient of funds via its correspondent bank in New York.

There must be a relatedness between the transaction and the legal claim being asserted. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 NY 3d 327, 339 (2012); Gottlieb v. Merrigan,170 AD 3d 1316, 1317 (3rd Dept. 2019).It is well settled that the party asserting jurisdiction bears the ultimate burden of proof to establish the same. Urfirer v. SB Bldrs., LLC, 95 AD3d 1616 (3d Dept. 2012); Daniel B. Katz & Assoc. Corp. v. Midland Rushmore, LLC, 90 AD3d 977, 978 (2d Dept. 2011).

In its factual examination, the court determined that the contract was negotiated in Ohio and Connecticut, the defendant’s work was performed solely in Ohio, and that its only connection to New York was that it agreed to release the aircraft from its care to MacArthur Airport. The court also relied on the New York Court of Appeals’ personal jurisdiction analysis in Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 338 (2012), in finding there was no course of dealing or repeated use of New York facilities for the maintenance of the aircraft that would render New York’s long-arm statute applicable.It is notable that the court also relied on an affidavit from the defendant’s chief executive officer in rendering its decision.

Both the Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals have confronted jurisdictional disputes concerning whether a correspondent bank account provides a sufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank. See generally,Licci v. Am. Express Bank, Ltd., 704 F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Licci I”); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.2012) (“Licci II”); Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012) (Licci III); Licci IV, 732 F.3d 161. The Licci litigation has yielded several rules on the topic, one of which is that “the use of a correspondent bank account, even if the defendant has no other contacts with New York, satisfies the first prong of New York’s long-arm statute so long as the use was purposeful and not coincidental or adventitious.”

The Appellate Division dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the bank had acted only passively, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Rushaid, the Court of Appeals also analyzed its prior decision in Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327 (2012). In Licci, the Court, answering a certified question from the Second Circuit, ruled that a foreign bank’s maintenance of a correspondent bank account in New York and use of that account to effect “dozens” of wire transfers on behalf of a foreign customer linked to terrorist activity was sufficient to constitute transacting business under CPLR 302(a)(1).

11Id. at *15 (Pigott, J. dissenting).12Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y. 3d. 327, 322 (N.Y. 2012). The decision was the result of two certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.13Id.