Trial judges have discretion to determine "what evidence should be admitted on the subject of valuation," as well as "whether special conditions exist so that methods other than comparable sales can be used in establishing value." Lic, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816, 406 N.E.2d 397 (1980). Here, there was evidence that there were no comparable sales of residential condominium units originally constructed on contaminated land.

Trial judges have discretion to determine "what evidence should be admitted on the subject of valuation," as well as "whether special conditions exist so that methods other than comparable sales can be used in establishing value." Lie, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 815, 816 (1980) .

The YMCA decision restated the longtanding Massachusetts rule of increased compensation for land enhanced by marketable water capacity. See Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163, 167 (1884) (dictum); Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 174 (1907) ("special adaptability for water supply purposes" may create added value by reason of the "chance" of future use as a water supply); Lic, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 815-816 (1980) (taken land "exceptionally fitted for a municipal water supply" may warrant a heightened fair market value even if it had not served previously as a water source). The landowners' evidence abundantly satisfied that standard.

There is also no question that the judge, within his discretion, could consider evidence of the value of the gravel deposits in the ground based upon the income- capitalization method of valuation in arriving at the value of the land. Lic, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816 (1980). Young Men's Christian Assoc. of Quincy v. Sandwich Water Dist., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 668-669, 670-673 (1983).

As the relevance of the allegedly overfilled bottle was seriously questionable, the judge was well within his discretion in excluding it. Cf. Lic, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816 (1980) (judge has wide discretion in determining whether evidence is sufficiently similar to assist the jury). There was no direct evidence that the bottle involved in the accident was actually overfilled.

III. Despite the admissibility, as an abstract proposition, of opinions of value based on income capitalization (compare, in this respect, Lic, Inc. v. Hudson, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 815), the Coleman opinion was based on a misapplication of the income-capitalization method of valuation and lacked, for that reason, the theoretical reliability which would justify its being submitted to the jury for their assistance in determining damages. If the deficiencies in the opinion were not at first apparent, they had become so by the conclusion of his testimony, and the judge erred in not allowing the defendant's motion to strike the opinion at that point. The principal defect in the Coleman opinion is that he capitalized gross, rather than net, income.