Opinion
2021–00691 Index No. 506242/18
04-05-2023
Marvin LIBURD, appellant, v. Mohammed MONDAL, respondent.
Leav & Steinberg, LLP, New York, NY (Regina Koyfman of counsel), for appellant. Baker, McEvoy & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondent.
Leav & Steinberg, LLP, New York, NY (Regina Koyfman of counsel), for appellant.
Baker, McEvoy & Moskovits, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, BARRY E. WARHIT, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lara J. Genovesi, J.), dated December 3, 2020. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. In an order dated December 3, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendant's submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ; Rouach v. Betts, 71 A.D.3d 977, 897 N.Y.S.2d 242 ; see also Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). Additionally, the defendant failed to address the plaintiff's claims of the exacerbation of preexisting injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine, his left shoulder, and his left knee (see D'Augustino v. Bryan Auto Parts, Inc., 152 A.D.3d 648, 650, 59 N.Y.S.3d 104 ; Sanclemente v. MTA Bus Co., 116 A.D.3d 688, 689, 983 N.Y.S.2d 280 ; Edouazin v. Champlain, 89 A.D.3d 892, 895, 933 N.Y.S.2d 85 ).
Since the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden, it is not necessary to determine whether the submissions by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ; Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d at 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, DOWLING and WARHIT, JJ., concur.