Under the first proposition presented, the basis of his argument is couched upon the theory that the instrument herein sued upon is a negotiable instrument, and he is a holder in due course. In support thereof he cites and relies on Howard v. Biggs, Okla., 378 P.2d 306; Phelps v. Malone, 193 Okla. 239, 142 P.2d 849; Steward v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 29 Okla. 754, 119 P. 216; Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Bashara, 39 Okla. 482, 135 P. 1051; Stevens v. Grisso, 91 Okla. 154, 216 P. 671; First State Bank of Oklahoma City v. Tobin, 39 Okla. 96, 134 P. 395; Liberty Nat. Bank of Pawhuska v. Kendall, 113 Okla. 140, 240 P. 72; Loomis v. Cole, 119 Okla. 203, 249 P. 327; Sharp v. Dunlap, 176 Okla. 329, 55 P.2d 971; and Credit Adjustment Co. v. McCormick, 198 Okla. 348, 178 P.2d 610. We find no fault with the law stated in the cited cases, but we must deny their being applicable to the question here involved.

When the evidence is uncontradicted and not inherently impossible, the trial court is not at liberty to disregard it and should advise the jury of the conclusive effect thereof and direct a verdict. Liberty Nat. Bank of Pawhuska v. Kendall et al., 113 Okla. 140, 240 P. 72; Sartain v. Walker et al., 60 Okla. 258, 150 P. 1096. This court is committed to the rule that suspicion of defect of title, or the knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion in the mind of a prudent man or of circumstances sufficient to put him upon inquiry, will not defeat his title, and that result can be produced only by bad faith on his part.

Circumstances or suspicions may be so cogent and obvious that to remain passive would amount to bad faith, but, in the absence of actual knowledge, bad faith or the absence of it is the test. Forbes v. First National Bank of Enid, 21 Okla. 206, 95 P. 785; McPherrin v. Tittle, 36 Okla. 510, 129 P. 721; Conquerer Trust Co. v. Bayless Drug Co., 75 Okla. 288, 183 P. 419; S.W. National Bank of Commerce of K. C. v. Todd, 79 Okla. 263, 192 P. 1096; Sanley v. Wilkinson, 107 Okla. 54, 229 P. 574; Liberty National Bank of Pawhuska v. Kendall, 113 Okla. 140, 240 P. 72; Gaither v. First National Bank of Muskogee, 113 Okla. 111, 239 P. 461. The case of Forbes v. First National Bank of Enid, supra, seems to be the parent case on the subject in this jurisdiction.

We shall therefore, in the instant case, limit our presentation of the law to citing without comment some of the cases relied on by appellant and respondent and suggest an examination of the Beckstead Case for a more comprehensive expression of our views. The cases by appellant most pertinent to the question involved are as follows: Peoples' Bank v. Reed, 86 Kan. 245, 120 P. 339; Huntington Roller Mills v.Miller, 60 Utah, 236, 208 P. 531; First Nat. Bank v. Carey, 153 Minn. 246, 190 N.W. 182; Oliver v. Garlick (C.C.A.) 2 F.2d 132; Myers v. Guardian T. Co., (C.C.A.) 296 F. 789; Bank of Jordan Valley v. Duncan, 105 Or. 105, 209 P. 149; Nat. Bank v. Kendall (Okla. Sup.) 240 P. 72; Jenkins v. Johnson, 116 Okla. 17, 243 P. 178; Gaither v. First Nat. Bank of Muskogee, 113 Okla. 111, 239 P. 461; Cedar Rapids v. Zeff, 119 Kan. 539, 240 P. 840. The above cases state the law relating to the rights of a holder without notice of defective title and sustain appellant's contention.

n the Negotiable Instruments Law with respect to when and against what a holder in due course is protected. In all of the following cases the doctrine stated in Howard Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 120 A. 889, and in First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque v. Stover, 21 N.M. 453, 155 P. 905, L.R.A. 1916D, 1280, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 145, is fully sustained: Huntington R.M. M. Co. v. Miller, 60 Utah, 236, 208 P. 531; Karren v. Bair, supra; Farmers' State Bank v. Brenneke, 118 Kan. 251, 119 Kan. 508, 240 P. 397; First Nat. Bank v. Gunning, 127 Wn. 307, 220 P. 793; State Bank v. Harford, 116 Kan. 262, 226 P. 750; Howard v. Reiter, 120 Kan. 303, 243 P. 278; Winter v. Nobs, 19 Idaho, 18, 112 P. 525, Ann.Cas. 1912C, 302; Butte Machinery Co. v. Jeppeson, 41 Idaho 642, 241 P. 36; Oliver v. Garlick, (C.C.A.) 2 F.2d 132; Mack v. Dailey (C.C.A.) 3 F.2d 534; Orient State Bank v. Zemlicka, (S.D.) 207 N.W. 69; Jenkins v. Johnson, 116 Okla. 17, 243 P. 178; Omaha Steel Works v. Martin, 78 Colo. 560, 243 P. 619; Liberty Nat. Bank v. Kendall, 113 Okla. 140, 240 P. 72; Kincaid v. Estes, 218 Mo. App. 109, 262 S.W. 399; Reitherman v. Wheeler (Mo.App.) 247 S.W. 222; First Nat. Bank v. Dutton, 199 Iowa 468, 202 N.W. 228; Goedhard v. Folstad, 156 Minn. 453, 195 N.W. 281; Bank of Jordan Valley v. Duncan, 105 Or., 105, 209 P. 149; Edelen v. First Nat. Bank, 139 Md. 413, 115 A. 599; Security StateBank v. Merchants' State Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 275 S.W. 721. We have cited only the more recent cases and all of those cited practically cover all the phases respecting defenses to commercial paper, and in many of them the verdict of a jury was set aside, and in some of them the lower court was directed to enter judgment for the plaintiff holder of the instrument upon the record presented to the appellate court.