Opinion
2022 CA 0429, 2022 CA 0430
11-04-2022
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Kevin D. HARRIS, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Triad Electric & Controls, Inc. Donald C. Soday, Jr. and Dana Soday v. Kevin D. Harris, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Triad Electric & Controls, Inc.
Scott H. Fruge, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Donald C. Soday, Jr. and Dana Soday Bobbie L. Monroe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company David J. Shelby, II, Leah C. Cook, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellee Triad Electric & Controls, Inc.
Scott H. Fruge, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Donald C. Soday, Jr. and Dana Soday
Bobbie L. Monroe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiff/Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company
David J. Shelby, II, Leah C. Cook, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellee Triad Electric & Controls, Inc.
BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ.
McCLENDON, J.
Personal injury plaintiffs appeal a summary judgment that dismissed their claims against Triad Electric & Controls, Inc. (Triad). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The lawsuit underlying this appeal arises from a vehicle-pedestrian accident that occurred on February 13, 2019, at approximately 3:30 a.m., in a parking lot adjacent to the "south gate" entrance to the ExxonMobil Baton Rouge complex. Pertinent to the issues raised on appeal, the south gate parking lot was designated for use by ExxonMobil's contractors and their employees. Kevin Harris, an employee of ExxonMobil's contractor Triad, was searching for a parking spot in his personal vehicle in the south gate parking lot when he struck and injured Donald C. Soday, Jr., an employee of ExxonMobil's contractor ISC Constructors, LLC (ISC). Mr. Soday sustained severe injuries.
On April 16, 2019, ISC's workers' compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), filed a petition seeking damages for payments Liberty Mutual made to or on behalf of ISC as a result of the accident. Liberty Mutual's petition named as defendants Mr. Harris; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), as Mr. Harris's liability insurer; and Triad, as Mr. Harris's employer.
Subsequently, on September 12, 2019, Mr. Soday and his wife Dana Soday filed a petition seeking damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the accident. Like Liberty Mutual's petition, the Sodays' petition named as defendants Mr. Harris, State Farm, and Triad. The two suits were consolidated on October 16, 2019, pursuant to an unopposed motion to consolidate filed into the record of Liberty Mutual's suit. On February 12, 2020, the Sodays filed their first supplemental and amending petition for damages, which added several Exxon entities as defendants. In particular, the Sodays named Exxon Mobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Global Services Company, ExxonMobil Chemical Company, ExxonMobile Research & Engineering Company and Brock Industrial Services LLC (collectively, "Exxon") as defendants. The Sodays alleged that Exxon was liable for their damages because Mr. Harris was under the joint care, custody, and control of Exxon and Triad at the time of the accident. The Sodays also maintained that Exxon was liable for failing to provide safe premises, because a lack of adequate lighting and defects in the configuration of the south gate parking lot created hazardous conditions that caused and/or contributed to the accident. However, Exxon is not a party to this appeal.
On November 19, 2020, Triad filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of the Sodays' and Liberty Mutual's claims against Triad. Triad argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Mr. Harris's actions because the undisputed facts indicated that Mr. Harris was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Triad also maintained that it could not be held independently liable because it had no duty to supervise and/or train Mr. Harris regarding acts that were outside the course and scope of his employment. Triad initially submitted the affidavit of Robert "Robbie" Payne, the Site Manager of Baton Rouge Operations for Triad, in support of its motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2021, Triad filed a supplemental and amending motion for summary judgment and submitted as additional exhibits excerpts of Mr. Harris's deposition and Triad's corporate deposition pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1442.
There were no objections to the supplemental and amending summary judgment motion, and the other parties had the opportunity to file responses to the supplemental motion.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1442, entitled "Deposition of an organization," provides:
A party may in his notice name as the deponent a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and designate with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. The organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which he will testify. The persons so designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. This Article does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in this Chapter.
On December 20, 2021, the Sodays filed a memorandum in opposition to Triad's motion for summary judgment. Contesting Triad's assertions, the Sodays contended that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. In support of their position, the Sodays offered Mr. Harris's deposition and Triad's 1442 deposition in their entirety. Liberty Mutual, State Farm, and Mr. Harris also filed memorandums in opposition to Triad's motion for summary judgment. Triad filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment on January 5, 2022.
Triad's summary judgment hearing was held on January 24, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Triad's motion for summary judgment. A written judgment, executed on February 4, 2022, provided that Triad's motion for summary judgment was granted "in favor of Triad and against the Soday Plaintiffs and Liberty Mutual, dismissing all of the Soday Plaintiffs' and Liberty Mutual's claims against Triad with prejudice." Subsequently, the trial court issued written reasons pursuant to a request from the Sodays. The Sodays have appealed. LAW AND DISCUSSION
We note that the trial court designated the February 4, 2022 judgment as a final appealable judgment, stating that there were no other claims against Triad and no just reason for delay. However, a judgment that dismisses a party from a suit without adjudicating all of the issues in a case is a partial final judgment subject to immediate appeal pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1) without the need of the trial court's certification as such. Cavalier v. Rivere's Trucking, Inc. , 2003-2197 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 38, 40.
Triad filed a motion in this Court to strike Liberty Mutual's brief, challenging Liberty Mutual's right to file an appellate brief and alleging multiple violations of the Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal (URCA). Triad begins by arguing that Liberty Mutual is not a proper appellant because it did not appeal the February 4, 2022 judgment. Triad then maintains that in the event Liberty Mutual's brief was intended to be an amicus curiae brief, Liberty Mutual failed to comply with URCA Rule 2–12.11, which provides that amicus curiae briefs may be filed only upon motion by the applicant and order of the court. Triad also argues that Liberty Mutual's brief was not timely filed pursuant to URCA Rule 2–12.7, which provides that an appellant's brief shall be filed not later than 25 calendar days after the record is filed, and that the brief of the appellee shall be filed not later than 45 calendar days after the record is filed. In this matter, the record was lodged on April 25, 2022, and Liberty Mutual's brief was filed on August 5, 2022. Thus, Triad contends that it had no opportunity to respond to Liberty Mutual's brief. Finally, Triad argues that the content of Liberty Mutual's brief is not helpful to this Court. For these reasons, Triad argues that Liberty Mutual's brief should be stricken pursuant to URCA Rule 2–12.13, which provides that "[b]riefs not in compliance with these Rules may be stricken in whole or in part by the court, and the delinquent party ... may be ordered to file a new or amended brief." Having considered the arguments, we deny the motion to strike. Further, consideration of Liberty Mutual's brief would not affect our analysis or conclusions herein.
On appeal, the Sodays raise one assignment of error: that the trial court erred in granting Triad's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether or not Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment with Triad at the time of the accident.
I. Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Alfred v. Trapp, 2021-0563 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/22), 340 So.3d 1083, 1087, writ denied, 2022-00424 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So.3d 157.
The initial burden of proof is on the mover. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The mover can meet this burden by filing supporting documentary evidence. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). The mover's supporting documentary evidence must prove the essential facts necessary to carry its burden. Thus, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, we must first determine whether the supporting documents presented by the mover are sufficient to resolve all material fact issues. Seal v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. , 2021-0988 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/16/22), 341 So.3d 659, 662. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion, the mover's burden does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense be negated; rather, the mover must point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The burden then shifts to the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Trichell v. McClure , 2021-1240 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So.3d 856, 860. A genuine issue of triable fact exists if reasonable persons could disagree; however, if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Craig v. Harell, 2019-0216 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/11/20), 303 So.3d 661, 665. A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to a plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Because the applicable substantive law determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material must be viewed in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Trichell , 341 So.3d at 860.
II. Course and Scope
The applicable substantive law in this case is set forth in LSA-C.C. art. 2320, which provides, in pertinent part: "[m]asters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed." Lemmon v. de la Mora, 2016-1004 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 215 So.3d 264, 267. Generally, an employee's conduct is within the course and scope of his employment if the conduct is of the kind that he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. Berthelot v. Indovina, 2021-0517 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 119, 124-25, writ denied, 2022-00165 (La. 3/15/22), 334 So.3d 394.
Courts typically consider four factors when assessing vicarious liability, including whether the tortious act: (1) was primarily employment rooted; (2) was reasonably incidental to performance of employment duties; (3) occurred during working hours; and (4) occurred on the employer's premises. It is not necessary that each factor is present in each case, and each case must be decided on its own merits. Holt v. Torino, 2012-1579 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 117 So.3d 182, 185, writ denied, 2013-1161 (La. 8/30/13), 120 So.3d 267. The determinative question is whether the employee's tortious conduct was so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer's interest. If the purpose of serving the master's business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act is otherwise within the service. Id.
III. Analysis
As the mover, Triad bore the burden of proof on the summary judgment. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). However, because Triad would not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue of course and scope, Triad was not required to negate all essential elements of the Sodays' claim; rather, Triad was required to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the Sodays' claim. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Thus, the propriety of summary judgment in favor of Triad hinges on whether Triad successfully pointed out the absence of factual evidence that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment with Triad at the time of the accident, and, if so, whether the Sodays thereafter came forward with sufficient factual support to show a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding whether Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See Bolden v. Tisdale, 2021-00224 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 697, 707-09.
In support of Triad's motion for summary judgment, Triad submitted the affidavit of Robert "Robbie" Payne, who attested that as the Site Manager of Baton Rouge Operations for Triad since 1995, he had personal knowledge of Triad's contract work at the Exxon facility, including employee scheduling, wages, and duties. According to Mr. Payne, on February 13, 2019, the date of the accident, Mr. Harris was employed by Triad as an electrical foreman. His job responsibilities did not require travel, and did not require, include, or in any way involve driving his personal vehicle for Triad. Triad "[did] not own, lease, or have any interest or control in" the vehicle involved in the accident. Mr. Harris did not receive mileage, a vehicle allowance, or other payment for travel time or transportation to and from work.
Mr. Payne further attested that Triad's work area at the Exxon facility "began after the employees swiped their badge, passed through a turnstile, presented their badge and TWIC card to the guard, and entered into a fenced area beyond the [south gate] parking lot." Triad employees were not allowed to begin work early unless requested by Exxon or Triad supervision. On the day of the accident, Mr. Harris was not scheduled to begin work until 5:30 a.m., approximately two hours after the accident occurred. At the time of the accident, Mr. Harris was not "clocked-in or otherwise on duty for Triad"; was not being paid by Triad; and was not working, driving, or otherwise on any mission for Triad. Mr. Payne's affidavit was accompanied by a document reflecting Mr. Harris's time entries for January and February of 2019, which Mr. Payne's affidavit verified as true and correct.
In addition to Mr. Payne's affidavit, Triad offered excerpts of Mr. Harris's deposition and of Triad's 1442 deposition. The excerpt of Triad's 1442 deposition appears to be the index and exhibit list from the transcript thereof. The excerpt of Mr. Harris's deposition reflected his testimony that he typically arrived at work early because it was his personal preference to ensure he did not arrive late. Mr. Harris testified that Triad did not generally ask him to arrive early, and that if Triad saw Mr. Harris in the parking lot and asked him to come in early, it would have been an exception to the regular schedule. Thus, Triad would have had to specifically ask him to come in and perform a particular task. Mr. Harris also confirmed Mr. Payne's attestation that he was not asked to arrive early or to perform a specific task on the morning of the accident.
Based on Mr. Payne's affidavit and the excerpt of Mr. Harris's deposition testimony submitted by Triad in support of its motion for summary judgment, Triad demonstrated that at the time of the accident, Mr. Harris was not on the job site, was not on the clock, and was not doing anything reasonably incidental to the performance of his employment duties as an electrical foreman. Thus, Triad successfully established an absence of factual support for the Sodays' claim that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. See Holt , 117 So.3d at 186. Accordingly, the burden shifted to the Sodays to produce factual support sufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that Triad was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
In opposition to Triad's motion for summary judgment, the Sodays argued that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the issue of whether Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment with Triad at the time the accident occurred. They submitted Mr. Harris's deposition and Triad's 1442 deposition in support of their position.
Triad's 1442 deposition was given by Mr. Payne; Mark Richardson, the Corporate Safety Manager at the Newtron Group, the parent company of Triad; and Joel Gautreaux, Project Manager for Triad (sometimes collectively, "Triad's corporate representatives"). Triad's corporate representatives confirmed the general facts as set forth above, reviewed and discussed the contents of relevant safety policies and the personnel file of Mr. Harris. They also provided further detail on certain aspects of Mr. Harris's employment with Triad.
According to Triad's corporate representatives, the south gate parking lot was designated for use by Triad and Exxon's other contractors. Mr. Harris was required to either park in the south gate parking lot or to be dropped off at work. While Mr. Payne was aware that Mr. Harris regularly arrived early, he specifically denied having any control over or knowledge of what Mr. Harris did with his time before his shift began. After arrival in the south gate parking lot, a badge issued by Exxon was required to gain entrance to the Exxon facility through the turnstile at the gate. Once inside the Exxon facility, Triad was required to abide by Exxon's safety policies in addition to its own. Triad relied on entrance and exit times tracked through the badge when calculating employees' time for compensation purposes; employees who entered early were not paid until their shift began, and compensation ended when the employee exited the facility or their shift was over. Travel time inside the Exxon facility was included in employees' time for compensation purposes.
Triad's corporate representatives further testified that Mr. Harris was assigned to a work area within the Exxon facility known as the "coker" complex or unit, which was located approximately half a mile from the turnstile at the south gate entrance to the Exxon facility. Triad provided company trucks inside the Exxon facility for employees to travel from the turnstile to their assigned locations and to move materials. The first employee to arrive at the truck would wait for others, until a designated time, and then drive everyone present to the coker unit. Thus, Triad's corporate representatives testified that once inside the Exxon facility, Mr. Harris drove Triad's company vehicles to transport employees and materials, not his personal vehicle. Triad did not have any policies or insurance coverage regarding employees' personal vehicles in parking lots. Mr. Payne specifically denied knowledge of any work-related meetings that may have occurred prior to the employees reaching the coker complex.
As previously noted, Mr. Harris testified during his deposition that he preferred to arrive at work early to avoid being late. Mr. Harris also testified that he sometimes arrived early for work meetings or to make work plans. Once inside the Exxon facility, he transported coworkers from the gate to the coker unit before shift start for the employees to attend those meetings. Occasionally, Triad would request that he begin work early. Mr. Harris received some of these calls while he was still at home, and other calls while waiting in his vehicle in the parking lot before the start of his shift. Mr. Harris testified that while Mr. Payne was his immediate plant supervisor, his friend, Ray Alford, was his job supervisor. About three times per month, Mr. Harris would ride into the plant with Mr. Alford. When asked whether Mr. Alford knew that he arrived early and whether Mr. Alford relied on him to get into the plant and get things done, Mr. Harris answered affirmatively. Further, when asked whether he felt that he was at Triad's "beck and call" once he arrived at the parking lot, Mr. Harris stated he was "on call 24/7, 365, so if I was at the facility, I could be getting dressed at my house, and they could call, and I would have to go."
The Sodays argued this testimony supported a finding that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment with Triad at the time of the accident. They averred that it demonstrated the actual benefit to Triad of Mr. Harris arriving early, as well as Mr. Harris's subjective motivation to benefit Triad by doing so. The Sodays also reasoned that because Mr. Harris had performed his work duties early on previous occasions, Triad had a reasonable expectation that he would be in the parking lot at the time of the accident, and Mr. Harris had a subjective belief that he was under Triad's control once he arrived in the parking lot. Further, the Sodays maintained that this testimony created a genuine issue of material fact because it conflicted with Mr. Payne's statement that Mr. Harris was not on a mission for Triad at the time of the accident.
Regarding the accident at issue, Mr. Harris testified that he spoke to his "safety representative" Roy Rogers, the sheriff's department, and an Exxon supervisor immediately afterwards. Mr. Harris was then sent home. Mr. Rogers called him later the same day and requested that he report for a drug test, and Mr. Harris complied. The Sodays maintained that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment when he reported for the drug test, even though he was not on the job site at that time. Further, the Sodays contended that the location of the accident, in the job site parking lot Mr. Harris was required to use rather than on a road between Mr. Harris's home and the job site, supported a finding that Mr. Harris was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
In this matter, it is undisputed that this accident occurred two hours before Mr. Harris's shift began, outside the scope of Mr. Harris's working hours and outside the Exxon facility. Because he had not passed through the turnstile at the south gate and entered the Exxon facility, he was not clocked in. It is likewise undisputed that Mr. Harris was not asked to arrive early or to perform a specific work-related task prior to the scheduled beginning of his shift that day. And, white Mr. Harris was required to park in the south gate parking lot, Triad did not exercise control over Mr. Harris and did not require Mr. Harris to be in the south gate parking lot two hours prior to the beginning of his shift. As testified to by Mr. Harris, it was his habit and preference to arrive early. Consequently, Mr. Harris's presence in the parking lot at the time of the accident was not primarily employment rooted, and Mr. Harris's presence in the parking lot at the time of the accident was not reasonably incidental to the performance of his employment duties. Thus, we cannot say that Mr. Harris's tortious conduct was so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to Triad's business. Moreover, while Mr. Harris's reliability and promptness may have been an asset to Triad generally, Mr. Harris's unilateral decision to arrive to the south gate parking lot two hours early did not extend any significant benefit to Triad.
Further, even if Triad agreed with Mr. Harris's assertion that he was always on call, the mere fact that an employee is "on call" does not automatically give rise to liability on the part of the employer. See Johnson v. C's Transportation Services, LLC , 2020-0338 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/4/21), 2021 WL 3418693, *2 (unpublished) and McClendon v. Edens , 2021-0894 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/17/22), 2022 WL 807959, writ denied, 2022-00634 (La. 6/8/22), 338 So.3d 1197 (unpublished writ action). A fortiari, Mr. Harris's expressed subjective belief that he was always on call could not support a finding that he was in the course and scope of his employment in the absence of other supporting evidence. Neither do we find the fact that Exxon requested that Mr. Harris submit to a drug test following an accident that occurred in Exxon's parking lot and involved employees of two of Exxon's contractors to be evidence supporting a relationship between the accident and Mr. Harris's employment with Triad so as to bring it within the course and scope. See Smith v. Babin , 2007-0173 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07), 2007 WL 3230224, *2 (unpublished).
We also note that this case presents similar facts to those considered by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Knowles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 2012-806 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/27/13), 113 So.3d 417, 419. In Knowles , the employee struck a pedestrian with her personal vehicle in her employer's parking lot, where she was required to park; the employee was paid hourly and had not yet reported for work; the employee was not compensated for travel expenses or mileage; and the employee was not required to use her vehicle to perform her duties. The Fifth Circuit found that the evidence did not support a finding that the employee was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. We find the similarity between the facts of this case and those of Knowles compelling.
Having conducted a thorough de novo review of the record before us, based on the undisputed facts, we find that the evidentiary burden of proof shifted to the Sodays, and they have not shown that they would be able to satisfy that burden at trial. Accordingly, there was no genuine issue of material fact, and Triad was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law finding that Mr. Harris was not in the course and scope of his employment with Triad at the time of the accident. The trial court's judgment dismissing the Sodays' claims that Triad was vicariously liable for Mr. Harris's actions was proper.
Finally, in response to the Sodays' general allegation in their petition for damages that "resulting damages were solely and proximately caused by the negligence and fault of the defendants [therein]," Triad argued that any claims that Triad was independently negligent should be dismissed. Triad maintained that the Sodays made no specific allegations of negligent acts or omissions directly related to Triad, and further, the Sodays failed to present any evidence that Triad was independently negligent. We agree. Summary judgment dismissing any claims that Triad was independently negligent and liable for the accident was proper.
We note Triad's assertion that, "As a matter of law, an employer has no obligation to supervise and/or train an employee regarding acts that are outside the course and scope of the employment." We agree. See Powell v. Gramercy Ins. Co. , 2013-928 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/14), 140 So.3d 324, 327 ("RaceTrac has no duty to train its employees regarding acts that are outside the course and scope of their employment".) and Conner v. Lemelle, 2019-843 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/13/20), 298 So.3d 361, 370 n.5, writ denied, 2020-00723 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 528.
CONCLUSION
The February 4, 2022 summary judgment in favor of Triad Electric & Controls, Inc., dismissing all claims brought against Triad by Donald C. Soday, Jr. and Dana Soday, is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed to Donald C. Soday, Jr. and Dana Soday.