Liberty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Schindler

11 Citing cases

  1. Curlew Consolidated School District v. Palo Alto County Board of Education

    73 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1955)   Cited 1 times

    Section 276.20, enacted fourteen years before 274.3, in part provided: "A consolidated school corporation, maintaining an approved central school, shall not be reduced to less than sixteen government sections, * * *." Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1064, 70 N.W.2d 544, 546, 547, considers the meaning of the language in section 274.3 upon which plaintiff's case here is bottomed and holds: "Section 274.3 contains no definite prohibition againstreduction of an existing consolidated district below 16 sections.

  2. Turnis v. Board of Education

    109 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1961)   Cited 16 times

    The Linn County appeal was dismissed February 11, 1959, prior to the time the joint boards, acting as a single board, finally fixed the boundaries of the proposed Monticello District February 24, 1959. [10] Appellees contend, and we agree, that it is immaterial whether or not the reorganization proceedings were in the courts on the day the petition was filed. It is also immaterial that planning appeals were pending when the boundaries were fixed on February 24, 1959. It appears and is presumed that there had previously been sufficient preliminary plans and surveys contemplated by sections 275.1 to 275.5. Liberty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 70 N.W.2d 544. Once completed as required by the statute, there are no provisions in the Code which require additional studies and surveys to be made before boundaries may be finally fixed, even though they do not correspond with the original plan. The matter is then left to the judgment of the board, and no rules are prescribed which it must follow in making changes.

  3. United States v. West View Grain Company

    189 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Iowa 1960)   Cited 9 times

    Those provisions constitute a special statute in that matter. It is well settled that where there is a special statute dealing with a particular matter that statute will prevail over a general statute dealing with the same subject matter. Shelby County Myrtue Memorial Hospital v. Harrison County, 1957, 249 Iowa 146, 86 N.W.2d 104, 108; Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 1955, 246 Iowa 1060, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547; Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Association v. Fischer, 1954, 245 Iowa 951, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 1942, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 396, 4 N.W.2d 869. In the case of Schisel v. Marvill, 1924, 198 Iowa 725, 197 N.W. 662, the situation was such that the defendants were sureties on a statutory bond given by a contractor in connection with a highway contract with a county.

  4. Lifeline Ambulance, Inc. v. Iowa Insurance Division

    505 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1993)   Cited 2 times
    Reviewing insurance commissioner contested-case ruling to uphold an HMO's decision to terminate a group health insurance plan under section 514B.17

    We have recognized that, if a general statute would include the same subject matter as a special statute and thus conflict with it, the special statute will be considered to be controlling whether enacted before or after the general statute. Liberty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1955); Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 955, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1954). It is not necessary to rely on this rule of statutory interpretation, however, because we do not find that the statutes in question conflict in their application to the present dispute. The provisions of section 509B.5(2) upon which appellees rely are not applicable unless the employees' benefits have first been terminated.

  5. State v. Halverson

    261 Iowa 530 (Iowa 1967)   Cited 15 times
    In State v. Halverson, 261 Iowa 530, 155 N.W.2d 177 (1967), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Iowa's spotlighting statute which, like South Dakota's, reads "any animal.

    [9] It is a fundamental rule that where a general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as a special statute and thus conflict with it, the special Act will be considered an exception to or qualification of the general statute and will prevail over it, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991, 998, 54 N.W.2d 439, 443; Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assn. v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 955, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; Liberty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547; Gade v. City of Waverly, 251 Iowa 473, 477, 101 N.W.2d 525, 527; Smith v. Newell, 254 Iowa 496, 501, 117 N.W.2d 883, 886; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 564; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 369. Therefore, sections 109.119 and 109.32, the general statutes, should not be interpreted as limiting the sentence provided by section 109.93, the special statute.

  6. Long v. Board of Supervisors

    258 Iowa 1278 (Iowa 1966)   Cited 26 times
    Finding that a courthouse hour provision did not violate the single-subject rule when it was added to a bill "relating to the compensation of county officers, deputies and clerks"

    As illustrative of this rule, we have said as to chapter 275 of the Code that procedure of the board and superintendent must be in accordance with general policies prescribed in the chapter. Wall v. County Board of Education, 249 Iowa 209, 229, 86 N.W.2d 231; Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1066, 70 N.W.2d 544. Here, among others, the officers referred to in section 10 of chapter 307, Acts of the Sixty-first General Assembly, are defendants board of supervisors and the county auditor as caretakers of the county property.

  7. Rath v. Rath Packing Co.

    136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965)   Cited 32 times
    In Rath, a corporation attempted to avoid the requirements of a corporate merger statute that required that a two-thirds vote of shareholders approve a merger, and accorded appraisal rights to dissenters.

    [11] A closely related rule, many times applied by us, is that where a general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as a special statute and thus conflict with it, the latter will prevail and the former must give way. The special provision will be considered an exception to or qualification of the general one. Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547, and citations; Gade v. City of Waverly, 251 Iowa 473, 477, 101 N.W.2d 525, 527; Olson Enterprises v. Citizens Insurance Co., 255 Iowa 141, 145, 121 N.W.2d 510, 512. See also Maiatico v. United States, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 295, 302 F.2d 880, 886.

  8. Novak v. Oneida Township School Board

    95 N.W.2d 291 (Iowa 1959)   Cited 4 times

    Under such circumstances, it is the rule that the "special Act will be considered an exception or qualification of the general statute and will prevail over it, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment." Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547; Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 740, 741, 76 N.W.2d 187. The judgment and order of district court dismissing the appeal to that court is affirmed.

  9. Shelby County Hosp., v. Harrison County

    249 Iowa 146 (Iowa 1957)   Cited 15 times

    Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance Assn. v. Fischer, supra; Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991, 998, 54 N.W.2d 439, 443. The governing principle is likewise laid down, with a considerable citation of authorities, in Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 247 Iowa 736, 739, 740, 741, 76 N.W.2d 187; and in Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547 ("the special Act will be considered an exception to or qualification of the general statute and will prevail over it, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment"). To the same effect are State ex rel. McPherson v. Rakey, 236 Iowa 876, 878, 879, 20 N.W.2d 43, 45; Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601; and State ex rel. Rankin v. Woodbury County, 231 Iowa 356, 1 N.W.2d 223, 224.

  10. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm

    247 Iowa 736 (Iowa 1956)   Cited 19 times

    [4] When we have as a part of our legislative law, a general statute such as section 472.18, amended by a special statute, such as section 472.19, the provisions of the special statute prevail. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 4 N.W.2d 869; Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601, and citations; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 564; 59 C.J., Statutes, section 623; Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 331 Mich. 337, 49 N.W.2d 318, 331; In re Miller's Estate, 261 Wis. 534, 53 N.W.2d 172, 173; Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991, 54 N.W.2d 439; Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assn. v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; Liberty Consolidated Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 70 N.W.2d 544. [5] A general analysis of this legislative situation appears in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 369: "For purposes of interpretation, legislative enactments have long been classed as either general or special, and given different effect on other enactments dependent as they are found to fall into one class or the other.