However, while Plaintiff's affidavit sets out his views that the petitioning system is burdensome and unconstitutionally discriminatory, Plaintiff does not provide any description of his own petition campaign: the strategy for attempting to gather signatures, affidavits from signature-gatherers, or comparisons of this campaign to prior petition campaigns, that would permit evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 on Plaintiff's petition-gathering process. See Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Merrill, 470 F.Supp.3d 169, 185 (D. Conn. 2020) (finding “unconvincing” evidence that petition laws severely burden ballot access where plaintiffs “adduce[d] very little evidence based on the actual experiences of . . . candidates during the current election cycle”). The same is true of Plaintiff's contention that the cost of gathering signatures for petitions is prohibitively high.

In essence, Plaintiff is contesting the notion that the state should be able to exclusively regulate the drafting of the ballot, instead urging a process where parties or individuals can use a self-drafted ballot without state involvement. “It is well-settled that the state has an important interest in ensuring that candidates appearing on the ballot have a ‘significant modicum of support.'” Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, 470 F.Supp.3d 169, 185 (D. Conn June 27, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont, 977 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).

Accordingly, the plaintiff has not alleged a violation of his right to free speech. Seeid.; Libertarian Party of Conn, v. Merrill, 470 F.Supp.3d 169, 179 (D. Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamont, 977 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2020); McCarthy v. Cuomo, Nb. 20-cv-2124, 2020 WL 3286530, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020).

The Court notes that, to date, parties challenging Governor Lamont's COVID-19 executive orders largely have failed to show that those orders violate (or likely violate) the provisions of the federal Constitution. SeeAuracle Homes , 478 F. Supp. 3d at 220–27 (finding, on motion for preliminary injunction, that executive orders temporarily limiting the ability of residential landlords to initiate eviction proceedings against tenants and allowing tenants to apply security deposit funds to past due rents were not likely to violate the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution); Amato v. Elicker , No. 3:20-cv-464, 2021 WL 1430918 (D. Conn. Apr. 15, 2021) (holding, in relevant part, that plaintiffs failed to state claims under First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in action challenging executive orders’ restrictions on operations of restaurant); see alsoLibertarian Party of Conn. v. Merrill , 470 F. Supp. 3d 169 (D. Conn. 2020), aff'd sub nom.Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Lamont , 977 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2020) ; Murphy v. Lamont , No. 3:20-CV-0694 (JCH), 2020 WL 4435167 (D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2020) ; Vincent v. Bysiewicz , No. 3:20-cv-1196 (VAB), 2020 WL 6119459 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2020) ; but seeConn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont , 465 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D. Conn. 2020) (granting preliminary injunction in action claiming that executive order's indefinite suspension of fingerprinting for handgun permit applications violated permit-seekers’ rights under the Second Amendment).

Indeed, these parties and their candidates have demonstrated time and again that they can raise their own challenges to election laws when they so desire, including by filing suit in federal district court. See, e.g. , Stein v. Cortés , 223 F. Supp. 3d 423 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (Green Party Presidential candidate Jill Stein seeking recount); Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Merrill , No. 20-467, 2020 WL 3526922 (D. Conn. June 27, 2020) (seeking to enjoin Connecticut's ballot access rules that required minor party candidates to petition their way onto the ballot); Green Party of Ark. v. Martin , 649 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2011) (challenging Arkansas’ ballot access laws). Additionally, Plaintiffs failed to present evidence that connects the county-residency requirement to their inability to find enough poll watchers.

"The hallmark of a severe burden is exclusion or virtual exclusion from the ballot." Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, No. 3:20-CV-0467, 470 F.Supp.3d 169, 179 (D. Conn. June 27, 2020) (quoting Libertarian Party of Kentucky v. Grimes, 835 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2016) ). As such, state election laws are less likely to impose impermissibly severe burdens, if minor party candidates have other channels to seize upon the "availability of political opportunity."

This is not a case where third-party candidates engaged in minimal effort to access the ballot. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Merrill, No. 3:20-cv-0467-JCH, 2020 WL 3526922 at *10 (D. Conn. June 27, 2020) (the "very limited experience" of a candidate's 45-minute effort seeking signatures door to door, "is insufficient to persuade the court that in-person petitioning is impossible, particularly in light of the evidence before the court of successful in-person petitioning"). Further, the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to access the ballot access should not be "forfeitable based on a timeline."

The State "undoubtedly ha[s] an interest in the statutory scheme [it] enact[s]" under its constitutional authority. See Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Merrill, No. 3:20-CV-0467 (JCH), 2020 WL 3526922, at *14 (D. Conn. June 27, 2020) (citing Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 243 (6th Cir. 2011) ("States . . . have a strong interest in their ability to enforce state election law requirements.")). The Maine Legislature enacted these requirements to protect these interests, and courts have upheld them in the past.