Opinion
No. 10-7-ag.
February 7, 2011.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
Li Qiang Zhu (pro se), Brooklyn, New York.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Christopher C. Fuller, Senior Litigation Counsel; Charles S. Greene, III, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C. for Respondents.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Li Qiang Zhu, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the December 11, 2009, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Li Qiang Zhu, No. A099 928 384 (B.I.A. Dec. 11, 2009). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Zhu did not file a timely petition for review of the underlying order denying his eligibility for relief; our review is therefore limited to the BIA's decision not to reopen Zhu's removal proceedings. See Alam v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Kaur v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhu's motion to reopen based on his failure to provide evidence establishing his prima facie eligibility for relief. See I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (holding that a movant's failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the BIA to deny a motion to reopen); Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). While Zhu stated that he began practicing Falun Gong in the United States after the immigration judge denied his original asylum application, and that his wife was arrested in China for practicing Falun Gong, the BIA reasonably found that Zhu offered insufficient evidence of his claimed fear of future persecution, or of his prima facie eligibility for relief. Zhu provided no evidence of his wife's arrest or practice of Falun Gong, and the evidence concerning Zhu's practice of Falun Gong in the United States was an affidavit that had multiple inconsistencies and did not indicate that Chinese officials were aware or would become aware of Zhu's practice of Falun Gong — let alone that they would persecute him as a result. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168 (noting that in order to establish prima facie eligibility for relief in a motion to reopen, petitioner must "show a `realistic chance'" of obtaining relief by "demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would likely alter the result in her case"); Jian Xing Huang v. I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that, absent "solid support in the record" for the petitioner's assertion that he would be subjected to forced sterilization, his fear was "speculative at best") (per curiam); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that an applicant who has not provided any evidence of past persecution and seeks to establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on his political activities in the United States, "must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities").
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).