The ALJ further determined that Northridge's failure to hire Anderson in a sales position was "legitimate" because Anderson "failed to notify Northridge of his interest in the sales position and also failed to notify it that he had been released to work." The ALJ found such notification was required pursuant to Hill v. LIRC , 184 Wis. 2d 101, 516 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1994), and L & H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC , 114 Wis. 2d 504, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983). Anderson sought other benefits as well, which were resolved by a limited compromise agreement with Northridge's worker's compensation insurer.
¶ 5. On review of a circuit court order reversing an order of LIRC, this court's scope of review is the same as that of the circuit court. SeeL H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 508, 339 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App. 1983). This court must affirm findings of LIRC if there is any credible evidence in the record to support those findings, even if they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.
This appeal followed. In reviewing a circuit court order reversing an order of an administrative agency, an appellate court's scope of review is the same as that of the circuit court. L H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 508, 339 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App. 1983). This court is to affirm the findings of the commission if there is any credible evidence in the record to support those findings.
It denies, however, that medical evidence is necessary. L H Wrecking Co., Inc. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct.App. 1983), stands for a contrary proposition. In that case, the employe had injured his back at work.
Id. at 117-18. In reviewing the sufficiency of credible evidence, we need find only that the evidence is sufficient to exclude speculation or conjecture. L H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 508, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct.App. 1983). LIRC has leeway in determining and drawing inferences from conflicting evidentiary facts.
In addition, the credibility of the witnesses and the persuasiveness of their testimony are for the board, not the courts, to determine. L H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 509, 339 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Ct.App. 1983). In applying the credible evidence test to the findings of the agency, a reviewing court does not weigh conflicting evidence to determine which should be believed.
Therefore, we must affirm LIRC's factual findings if they are supported by any credible and substantial evidence in the record. L H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 508, 339 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App. 1983). We cannot substitute our judgment for that of LIRC in respect to the credibility of a witness or the weight to be accorded the evidence supporting any finding of fact. West Bend Co. v.LIRC, 149 Wis.2d 110, 118, 438 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1989).
LIRC then states that no affirmative reapplication would be necessary when the employee is released by a physician to return to the same position without restrictions; informing the employer of the physician's release would be sufficient. LIRC also notes that no formal application is required where the employee has been terminated while on leave. See L H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 509-10, 339 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Ct.App. 1983). Finally, LIRC states that expressing to the employer the extent to which an employee is interested in working in a different capacity is necessary when the employee is precluded from returning to his or her previous job.
Id. Thus, we “affirm the findings of the Commission if there is any credible evidence in the record to support those findings.” L & H Wrecking Co. v. LIRC, 114 Wis.2d 504, 508, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct.App.1983). This standard requires “only that the evidence is sufficient to exclude speculation or conjecture.
Platten Developments' appellate briefing might be read as arguing, in the alternative, that Olson was required to formally reapply for her position on or after October 29, 2001, when she no longer had work restrictions. If Platten Developments means to make this argument, we are not persuaded. A terminated employee is not required to report to work or to reapply for the same position in order to recover under WIS. STAT. § 102.35(3). SeeL H Wrecking Co. v.LIRC, 114 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 339 N.W.2d 344 (Ct.App. 1983); cf.Hill, 184 Wis. 2d at 111-12 (the Commission reasonably interpreted § 102.35(3) to require that an employee express interest in employment in a different capacity when that employee remains unable to resume a previous position). Similarly, if Platten Developments is arguing that it was justified in refusing to rehire Olson because she failed to fulfill some responsibility to inform Platten Developments when she became free of restrictions, it has failed to sufficiently develop such an argument.