Opinion
D071559
05-24-2017
L.H., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Real Party in Interest.
Patti L. Dikes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. Children's Legal Services of San Diego and Beth Ploesch for Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. EJ3571) ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Patti L. Dikes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. Children's Legal Services of San Diego and Beth Ploesch for Minor.
L.H., who was the prospective adoptive parent of five-year-old J.R., seeks extraordinary writ review of an order removing J.R. from her care after a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (n)(3). L.H. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in removing J.R. from her care because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the removal was in J.R.'s best interest. We conclude that L.H.'s argument lacks merit, and we accordingly deny the writ petition.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. J.R. Is Placed in the Care of L.H., Declared a Dependent of the Juvenile Court and Parental Rights Are Terminated
In June 2012, when J.R. was approximately three months old, he was removed from his parents' care by the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) due to substance abuse and general neglect. J.R. was subsequently declared a dependent of the juvenile court.
On July 20, 2012, the Agency placed J.R. with L.H., a nonrelative extended family member, after obtaining a criminal history clearance on her behalf. From the beginning of the placement, L.H. indicated that she was interested in adopting J.R. if his parents failed to reunify with him.
According to L.H., she had guardianship of J.R.'s biological father while he was growing up because his parents were unable to care for him.
After J.R.'s parents were unsuccessful in completing reunification services, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights in February 2014 and selected adoption as the permanent plan. L.H. continued to care for J.R and began the process of adopting him. B. The Juvenile Court Monitors J.R.'s Status as L.H. Attempts to Adopt Him
After the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court held periodic status review hearings to monitor the progress of J.R.'s permanent plan, and the Agency submitted periodic status review reports. The August 2014 status review report explained that L.H.'s family was composed of L.H. and her four adopted children. L.H. previously had an approved home study and was working on obtaining a reapproval of the home study. J.R. was reported to have formed a solid attachment to L.H. and to be thriving in her care.
The February 2015 status review report stated that a referral was generated on November 6, 2014, for emotional abuse of J.R. by L.H., and had subsequently been closed as unfounded. The referral was based on a report that L.H. engaged in a verbal argument with her boyfriend, E.H., at his apartment, during which an air conditioner unit was pushed through the window and a deep fryer was thrown on the floor. The social worker explained that L.H.'s home study was completed and in the process of approval at the time the referral was generated. However, although the referral had been closed as unfounded, the Agency was continuing to monitor the family to assure that placement with L.H. was in J.R.'s best interest, because the Agency was concerned that J.R. was being exposed to an unhealthy environment. J.R. referred to L.H. as "mommy" and to L.H.'s children as his brothers and sisters. L.H. was facilitating supervised visits with J.R.'s biological mother.
In a later report filed in December 2016, in connection with the Agency's intent to remove J.R. from L.H.'s care, the Agency stated that it was highly likely that J.R. was present during the domestic violence incident that was the subject of the November 6, 2014 referral.
The August 2015 status review report stated that L.H.'s reapplication for a home study was being updated and was nearly complete, and that placement with L.H. continued to be appropriate.
The February 2016 status review report explained that there had been two hotline referrals regarding L.H. in October 2015. The first referral alleged that L.H. had choked her adoptive son, causing the adoptive son to flee to his biological father's house and be reported as a runaway. The referral was closed as unfounded because no noticeable marks or bruises were found and the situation had stabilized. A second referral alleged that when L.H. becomes upset, she hits J.R. on the head and chest. J.R. was also observed to climb on furniture at preschool, scream and say "fuck." The referral was closed as unfounded because no noticeable marks and bruises were seen on J.R., and he did not report a pattern of abuse. Further, it was determined that the misbehavior at school was due to a challenging transition in the classroom, which had since been resolved. The Agency reported that L.H. had completed all of the elements of the home study and a final interview was scheduled for February 2016, but because of the recent referrals, further examination and updates were needed.
In a later report filed December 2016, the Agency elaborated on what J.R. had stated to the social worker when he was interviewed in connection with the October 2015 referrals. "When this worker asked Jordan if anyone says bad words to him, he responded 'Fuck and Bitch.' When this worker asked him who says those words, he said that [L.H.'s boyfriend, E.H.] and [L.H.] did. When this worker asked him how those words make him feel, he replied, 'sad.' He also said that [L.H.] had hit him. When this worker asked where he had been hit, he motioned with his two hands and hit his head. He said that it hurts when she hits him and that she says 'sorry' afterward. This worker asked if there was any other place she hit him, and he pointed to his belly and said that it hurts when he got hit there. Then he said, 'Let me tell you a story. My mom got hit on the face at the park.' When asked how she got hit, he said, 'Someone smacked her.' He would not elaborate further . . . ."
The status review report for the July 25, 2016 hearing stated that J.R. was engaging in disruptive behavior at preschool and had been referred to the KidSTART therapy program. L.H.'s home study was approved on June 22, 2016, and J.R.'s "Telling" was completed. The Agency continued to recommend adoption by L.H. as the most appropriate permanent plan. C. The Agency's Notice of Intent to Remove J.R. from L.H.'s Care and L.H.'s Objection
The record does not explain the term "Telling."
On November 22, 2016, the Agency filed a notice of intent to remove J.R. from L.H.'s care. In the notice, the Agency explained, "During this reporting period, three [Child Welfare Service] referrals have been investigated and [L.H.] was arrested on two occasions. On 7/14/16, [L.H.] was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon ([Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)]) and threatening great bodily harm ([Pen. Code, § 422]). On 10/19/16, [L.H.] was arrested for threatening great bodily harm. It was reported that [L.H.] pled guilty for threatening to commit great bodily harm on 11/14/16, and the Court ordered her to three years['] probation."
Addendum reports filed around the same time as the notice of intent to remove provided additional details regarding L.H.'s arrests and included the police reports relating to the July 14, 2016 arrest.
As explained in those documents, on June 18, 2016, police responded to a call at the home of E.H. and his wife. E.H.'s wife told police that she heard L.H. honking outside and went to out to investigate. L.H. yelled at her and made threats. E.H.'s wife then telephoned E.H., and while he was on the phone, L.H. threatened to kill him. L.H. then put her vehicle in reverse and almost ran over E.H.'s wife. A witness corroborated the incident, including seeing L.H. almost run over E.H.s' wife. In addition, police officers reviewed text messages from L.H. from June 2016 in which she threatened violence against E.H. and his wife. The police report also established that there had been four prior documented instances of domestic violence in San Diego involving L.H. and E.H.
A warrant was issued for L.H.'s arrest on July 13, 2016, and on July 14, 2016, she was arrested. L.H. was in custody for 24 to 48 hours in connection with that arrest. L.H. told the Agency that while she was in custody, J.R. stayed with her adult daughter, T.T., who lives in Riverside County.
The Agency did not provide police reports for the second incident for which L.H. was arrested on October 19, 2016. However, the Agency stated that criminal records show that L.H. was arrested and taken into custody for threatening great bodily harm on October 19, 2016, and was released from custody on October 27, 2016. According to the Agency, the second arrest was a result of L.H.'s violation of the terms of a criminal protective order put in place in September 2016 to prohibit L.H. from having contact with E.H. and his wife. When the second arrest occurred, T.T. again stepped in to take care of J.R. in Riverside County.
During L.H.'s arrests, the social worker did not know where J.R. was located for a couple of days. Although not completely clear from the record, it appears that L.H. continued to have T.T. care for J.R. through the date of the hearing on the Agency's request to permanently remove J.R. from L.H.'s care, either voluntarily or at the urging of the Agency.
The Agency's notice filed on November 22, 2016, identified it as a notice of intent to remove J.R. from L.H.'s care with the court's approval, rather than a notice of emergency removal by the Agency.
On November 14, 2016, L.H. pled guilty to the felony of threatening great bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 422). According to L.H., she was placed on probation for three years, although she was advised that her conviction may be reduced to a misdemeanor in six months. L.H. also told the Agency that although she had been supporting herself as a daycare provider, she voluntarily surrendered her daycare license as a result of her conviction.
In connection with the notice of intent to remove J.R., the Agency detailed the eight referrals that had been received and investigated regarding L.H. since she began caring for J.R. in 2012, including those related to L.H.'s recent arrests. Among the referrals not described in earlier reports was a January 2013 referral for emotional abuse alleging that L.H. went to the home of E.H. on a continual basis to harass him, including with minors in the car on three occasions, during which she threw rocks, jumped the fence, banged on doors and windows and threatened people in the house. The referral was closed as unfounded. In addition, a May 2013 referral alleged that L.H. had bitten and spanked E.H.'s daughter, who is a dependent of the juvenile court. This referral was also determined to be unfounded.
The Agency provided information about its prior attempts to address the domestic violence issues between L.H. and E.H. According to the social worker, in February 2015, the social worker discussed the November 6, 2014 referral with L.H. She told him that she and E.H. had known each other for 13 or 14 years, that they were currently in a " 'brother/sister relationship' " and that E.H. " 'drives [her] crazy.' " L.H. stated that during the 2014 domestic violence incident, E.H. had " 'pissed [her] off' by 'blowing [her] off.' " In May 2015, the social worker met with L.H. to have her sign a safety plan regarding steps she would take to keep J.R. safe if a domestic violence incident were to occur in the future. Further, the social worker testified that prior to his assignment to J.R.'s case, a previous social worker had spoken to L.H. about the domestic violence incident that led to the November 6, 2014 referral and informed her that the Agency removes children from biological parents for such conduct. Around the same time, a different Agency employee had "very strong conversations" with L.H. about the domestic violence issues.
In its addendum filed in connection with the notice of intent to remove, the Agency summed up its reasons for requesting removal. The Agency was "concerned about the ongoing risk and detriment to [J.R.] due to [L.H.'s] actions." The Agency observed that "[d]espite several incidents involving law enforcement, [L.H.] has persisted in contacting [E.H.] and his wife and visiting their home which have reportedly resulted in threats and violence . . . . This pattern has continued despite conversations with [L.H.] by the previous and current [social workers] . . . . [¶] Due to a series of events reportedly perpetrated by [L.H.] this past summer, [L.H.] was incarcerated on two separate occasions. She was charged with assault with a deadly weapon and threatening great bodily harm. She was then found in violation of a restraining order. The assault charge was eventually dropped, but she pled guilty to a felony of threatening great bodily harm. Furthermore, her incarceration resulted in [J.R.] missing school and being placed outside of her home for an extended period of time, which [J.R.] was not expecting. Her arrests have brought about instability in [J.R.'s] young life and jeopardized the viability of her adoption home study. [¶] There have been eight [Child Welfare Services] referrals since [J.R.] was placed in her home. These reports again raise concerns about her judgment, her treatment of the children in her care, and her physical response to imposing appropriate forms of discipline and resolving conflict."
L.H. filed an objection to the removal, and the juvenile court set the matter for a hearing. In L.H.'s objection, she stated that instead of removing J.R. from her care, the court should direct her to participate in services that would help her in addressing her problems. According to L.H., she was attending "weekly therapy session support groups" and was seeking a group for battered women. L.H. also submitted character reference letters from several people. D. The Evidentiary Hearing
The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of removal on January 5 and 6, 2017.
Initially, on December 6, 2016, the parties appeared before the juvenile court and agreed to an evidentiary hearing to commence on January 5, 2017.
L.H. testified that she knew she had made mistakes in a relationship that she had stayed in too long, but she attempted to minimize her culpability, stating that she pled guilty to a felony because she was "worn down," just wanted to get it over with, and was talked into pleading guilty by her attorney. According to L.H., she was voluntarily attending weekly therapy and anger management classes and a support group. In her closing statement, L.H. downplayed the current risk of domestic violence stating, "It's been a year now that I have not been with him—well, close to a year. There is a restraining order. I am on probation. I don't speak to him. I don't see him." She added, "This relationship is over. It's over. It's finally over. And thank god it's over. . . . I'm getting help. I feel good about what I'm doing. And my house is peaceful." L.H. also submitted a confidential psychological evaluation that was performed in connection with her criminal case on August 18, 2016. Notably, the psychologist reported that L.H. "did not evidence any current frustration or anger relative to [E.H.]" and "appeared quite sincere in stating that she realized she had created a situation that harmed her and her children." However, the psychological evaluation was prepared in August 2016, which was several weeks before L.H. violated the protective order in October 2016.
L.H.'s 38-year-old adult daughter T.T. testified that she was J.R.'s current caregiver. J.R. was "doing fine" in her care and "seems normal." According to T.T., J.R. did not view being cared for by her as a "change of environment" because she had cared for him before. T.T. said that she was able to care for J.R. on a long-term basis and that she was willing to adopt him. L.H. visited J.R. while he was being cared for by T.T. Further, J.R.'s biological mother testified that she had a good relationship with T.T. According to the social worker, the Agency had started the process of approving T.T. to adopt J.R., in that it had approved J.R.'s placement with T.T. and had referred T.T. for a home study.
The juvenile court explored with the social worker whether it was likely that L.H. could eventually be approved to adopt J.R. The social worker stated that being convicted of a felony did not necessarily preclude a person from being approved to adopt a child. However, because of L.H.'s recent arrests and conviction, if J.R. remained in L.H.'s care, the Agency would have to review the adoptive placement again. The social worker did not have an opinion as to whether the adoption could ultimately be approved.
The social worker testified that the decision to remove J.R. from L.H.'s care had been made because of "a pattern where the Agency is concerned that [J.R.] will be potentially exposed to a dangerous situation which would put him at risk of harm . . . due to [L.H.'s] impulsive decisions" and the culmination of the pattern was "her being arrested and everything kind of escalating to the point that she was threatening great bodily harm." In response to the juvenile court's inquiry about whether the social worker believed that some type of services could be provided to L.H. to preserve J.R.'s placement with her while still keeping J.R. safe, the social worker stated that he did not know what more could be done because the Agency had already warned L.H. about the serious problems caused by her participation in domestic violence, yet the problems had persisted and escalated. The social worker testified that even though L.H. had in the past been able to articulate the need to avoid domestic violence, she had not been able to follow through in her actions. The Agency had therefore concluded that "whatever interventions we might attempt, it will still result in not changing the instability risk that [J.R.] has." The social worker pointed out that even if J.R. were removed from L.H.'s care, L.H. would still be a grandmother figure and would still be involved in his life, but with the advantage that if L.H. once again became involved in domestic violence, J.R.'s "life would not be destabilized" and he would garner "all the benefit [L.H.] could bring in terms of a loving relationship . . . , but he wouldn't have the risk of instability, should she get arrested."
Counsel for J.R. concurred that it was in J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care. As she explained, L.H. had exposed J.R. to instability as a result of an abusive relationship, and he had been negatively impacted by the instability. Further, if the court were to return J.R. to L.H.'s care, "it would be devastating to [J.R.] if . . . we find out in two to three months that the home study can't be approved and we can't move in this direction anymore." E. The Juvenile Court's Ruling
The juvenile court stated that it had "struggled" with a "very, very difficult" decision, and ruled that it was in J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care. As the juvenile court explained, it was making the finding that "it would be in the best interests to remove the child from [L.H.'s] care at this point in time" because the court was concerned about the "domestic violence situation." The court observed that addressing domestic violence issues is "something that takes a long time and a lot of therapy and a lot of introspection to solve." The court also observed that with J.R. in T.T's care, J.R. would not be isolated from the family that he has come to know, and would not be isolated from L.H. The juvenile court concluded, "I'm very concerned about the domestic violence issues and the fact that I don't believe that they're perfectly resolved at this point in time. And that stability is what he needs right now even though emotionally he is going to have issues right now."
The juvenile court also made clear that it did not necessarily view J.R.'s removal from L.H.'s care as a permanent situation. As the juvenile court explained, it might reassess the placement if the Agency eventually concluded that L.H. could be approved to adopt J.R. and if L.H. makes progress on dealing with her domestic violence issues. As the juvenile court stated, "I'm going to make an order . . . that I would like [L.H.'s] home study to continue to be evaluated to determine if, in fact, it could be approved. Because my concern is I can make all these things, but [J.R.] is still going to think that's his mom. Period. If there is a way that this process could go on—and I'm going to order it does—and her home study would be approved and . . . she continues to do well in her anger management and her therapies and it looks like it would be okay, I'd like the door open to returning [J.R.] to this potential placement."
L.H. filed an appeal from the juvenile court's order, which this court ordered would proceed by petition for writ review. Counsel was appointed to represent L.H. on appeal.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standards
A request by a child welfare agency to remove a child from the care of a prospective adoptive parent after parental rights have been terminated is governed by section 366.26, subdivision (n)(3). Under this provision, "[t]he juvenile court has the authority and responsibility to determine whether removal from the home of a prospective adoptive parent is in the child's best interests." (T.W. v. Superior Court (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 30, 45 (T.W.).) The statute states that "[p]rior to a change in placement and as soon as possible after a decision is made to remove a child from the home of a designated prospective adoptive parent," an agency is required to provide notice of the removal to the court, the child's attorney (and the child if at least 10 years old), and the prospective adoptive parent. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3).) If a petition objecting to removal is filed, or the court acts on its own motion, a hearing is held to determine whether the child should be removed from the prospective adoptive parent. (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).)
A prospective adoptive parent is defined by the statute as "a current caretaker . . . if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(1).) The parties stipulated that L.H. met the definition of a prospective adoptive parent for purposes of section 366.26, subdivision (n). --------
As provided by statute, "At the hearing, the court shall determine whether the caretaker has met the threshold criteria to be designated as a prospective adoptive parent . . . , and whether the proposed removal of the child from the home of the designated prospective adoptive parent is in the child's best interest, and the child may not be removed from the home of the designated prospective adoptive parent unless the court finds that removal is in the child's best interest." (§ 366.26, subd. (n)(3)(B).) The child welfare agency has the burden of proof in the juvenile court, and "must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that removal from the prospective adoptive parent is in the child's best interests." (T.W., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 45; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.727(g) [setting forth the agency's burden of proof].)
"In enacting section 366.26, subdivision (n), the Legislature intended to 'limit the removal of a dependent child from his or her caretaker's home after parental rights are terminated, if the caretaker is designated or qualified as a prospective adoptive parent, as defined, in order to "protect the stability and best interests of vulnerable children." ' [Citation.] The legislation was designed to correct the ' "nearly complete, unchecked authority" ' appellate courts had given to a child welfare agency to decide a dependent child's adoptive placement after termination of parental rights." (T.W., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 44-45.)
"A juvenile court's decision to authorize a change in the minor's placement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] But we must also review the juvenile court's finding that the change is in the minor's best interests to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support it." (In re M.M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 54, 64.) In determining whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, " '[w]e do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.' " (In re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087.) Further, we will find an abuse of discretion only if the juvenile court's ruling " 'falls outside the bounds of reason' under the applicable law and the relevant facts." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) B. The Juvenile Court's Best Interest Finding Is Supported by Substantial Evidence, and It Was Therefore Not an Abuse of Discretion for the Court to Remove J.R. from L.H.'s Care
The central issue in dispute is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that it was in J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care. "The concept of best interest 'is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.' [Citations.] A primary consideration in determining the child's best interest is the goal of assuring stability and continuity of care. [Citation.] This can occur only by considering all the evidence available to the court at the time the court makes its decision regarding removal of the child." (State Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 273, 286-287.)
In determining that it was in J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care at the present time, the juvenile court focused on the harm to J.R. caused by L.H.'s involvement in the domestic violence incidents described in the record. "Domestic violence is always a serious concern, and any propensity to it is certainly highly relevant as regards children's welfare." (Guardianship of Simpson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 914, 938.) As the juvenile court indicated, L.H.'s participation in the domestic violence incidents had caused instability for J.R., and L.H. had not yet "perfectly resolved" those problems. Therefore, with the intention of preventing any further instability in J.R.'s life, it was J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care until it was determined whether L.H. had made progress on dealing with the domestic violence problems and whether the Agency could approve L.H. to adopt J.R., in light of recent events.
The first component of the juvenile court's best interest finding is its determination that L.H.'s involvement in domestic violence harmed J.R. and created instability in his life. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. Because of L.H.'s threatening and violent behavior toward E.H. and his wife, L.H. was twice arrested and taken into custody. While she was in custody, J.R.'s life was disrupted, in that he was unexpectedly uprooted to be cared for in Riverside County by T.T. In addition to temporary disruptions, the domestic violence incidents and arrests have created a much more significant disruption because it is now unclear whether L.H. will still be permitted to adopt J.R. or whether J.R. will be required to move to a different adoptive placement to achieve permanency. The juvenile court could reasonably find that it would create less chaos in J.R.'s life at the present time if he is maintained in T.T.'s home, where he was currently located, and could end up being his permanent adoptive home, while the Agency determined if L.H. is now precluded, due to her arrests and conviction, from adopting J.R.
Further, the record supports a finding that in addition to disrupting J.R.'s life, the domestic violence incidents harmed J.R. because he was exposed to violence and may have been emotionally impacted and acted out in school because of it. The Agency explained that it was likely that J.R. was a witness to the domestic violence incident that was the subject of the November 6, 2014 referral. Further, when interviewed in connection with the October 2015 referrals, J.R. told the social worker that he heard L.H. and E.H. say the words " 'Fuck and Bitch' " and he witnessed L.H. getting "smacked" in the face by someone at the park. These incidents coincided with reports that J.R. was being disruptive in school, and he reported that the cursing by L.H. and E.H. made him " 'sad.' "
The second component of the juvenile court's best interest finding is the determination that L.H. had not yet fully resolved her problems with domestic violence. That finding also has support in the record. L.H.'s escalating pattern of behavior started at least in 2013 when the first referral for domestic violence was made, and got worse over time, culminating in two arrests and a conviction for making criminal threats. Although L.H. professed that her domestic violence issues were resolved because her relationship with E.H. had ended almost a year ago and she was subject to a protective order, the juvenile court could reasonably find that L.H. was not credible on that subject and had not gained the insight needed to change her behavior. Indeed, during L.H.'s psychological evaluation in August 2016, she seemed sincere in having gotten over her anger toward E.H. that caused the violent behavior, but she was subsequently arrested in October 2016 for violating the protective order and was jailed for over a week. L.H. presented no evidence of any changed circumstance since October 2016 that would prevent another similar incident in the future. Further, as counsel for J.R. pointed out at the hearing before the juvenile court, some of the character reference letters that L.H. submitted contain references to her problems dealing with conflict and her propensity for angry verbal outbursts, as does the psychological evaluation. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that it would take some time for L.H. to address and resolve those issues. Significantly, the Agency had in the past explained to L.H. the importance of avoiding engaging in domestic violence if she wanted to be approved to adopt J.R., and a safety plan was put in place, but despite being informed of that concern, L.H. was unable to control her behavior and was twice arrested. In light of that history, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that it was possible that L.H. might again be unable to control her behavior in the future despite having good intentions to do so.
Based on the above, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that due to L.H.'s unresolved domestic violence issues and the instability they caused to J.R., together with the possibility that L.H. may be disqualified from adopting J.R., it was in J.R.'s best interest to remove him from L.H.'s care at the present time. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's best interest finding, the court did not abuse its discretion in removing J.R. from L.H.'s care. Indeed, based on the juvenile court's comments about leaving open the possibility of returning J.R. to L.H.'s care if the Agency determines that she is eligible to adopt J.R. and she makes progress on her domestic violence issues, we are confident that in making its ruling, the juvenile court carefully and reasonably exercised its discretion and considered all of the relevant factors bearing on J.R.'s best interest, including J.R.'s emotional attachment to L.H.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ relief is denied.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. HALLER, J.