Opinion
D075847 D075851 D076191 D075852
06-30-2020
L.G., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.G., Defendant and Appellant.
Law offices of Michael G. York and Michael G. York; Public Law Center and Joanna L. Wong, Kenneth Babcock for Plaintiff and Respondent. M.G., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 18V001721) (Super. Ct. No. 18V001544) CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Barry S. Michaelson, Renee Wilson, Judges. Affirmed. Law offices of Michael G. York and Michael G. York; Public Law Center and Joanna L. Wong, Kenneth Babcock for Plaintiff and Respondent. M.G., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
M.G., a self-represented litigant, appeals from domestic violence restraining orders (DVRO) issued in favor of his former girlfriend, L.G. M.G. contends in case No. D076191 that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on L.G.'s motion filed on July 23, 2018, (case No. 18V001721) because: (1) the hearing was held more than 25 days after the petition was filed, thus violating Family Code section 6320.5; and (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to grant L.G.'s requests for continuances.
The appeals in case No. D076191 are related to case Nos. D075847 and D075851, and are from orders entered on September 24, 2018, granting L.G.'s request for a DVRO and denying M.G.'s request for a DVRO in superior court case No. 18V001721. M.G. designated identical records for both appeals.
The appeal filed on January 18, 2019, in case No. D075847 is from an order entered on July 23, 2018, dismissing L.G.'s prior request for a DVRO against M.G. in case No. 18V001544. On February 25, 2019, the appellate court stayed the appeal in case No. D075852, inviting M.G. to file points and authorities addressing whether he has standing as an aggrieved party to appeal from the July 23, 2018 order.
The appeals in case Nos. D075847, D075851 and D075852 were ordered consolidated, with case number D075847 being the lead case number.
We separately ordered the appeals in case Nos. D076191 and D075847 consolidated for purpose of decision.
We decline M.G.'s January 13, 2020 request for judicial notice of Family Code and Code of Civil Procedure statutes.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
In case No. D075847, M.G. contends: (1) the trial court erroneously dismissed L.G.'s application for a DVRO (case No. 18V001544) without prejudice; (2) under the doctrine of res judicata, that dismissal as well as a subsequent criminal matter in which M.G. was acquitted of battery (case No. 8WC05457) barred L.G.'s DVRO application in case No. 18V001721; (3) the court lacked jurisdiction because the matter was continued beyond the 25-day limit set forth in section 6320.5, thus the court's orders are void; and (4) the court had no basis to grant L.G.'s motion for a DVRO or to deny M.G.'s motion for a DVRO. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
L.G.'s DVRO Request
In June 2018, L.G. requested and obtained a temporary restraining order against M.G. On July 23, 2018, after L.G. failed to appear for a court proceeding, the trial court dismissed her DVRO application "without prejudice." L.G. filed a new DVRO application that same day in case No. 18V001721.
L.G. stated in a declaration that on June 6, 2018, she and M.G. got into an argument. Although they lived in Santa Ana, California, she had driven a van to West Covina to meet M.G. After they exchanged some words, "[M.G.] closed the [van's] door, then turned around and open[ed] the door again and elbowed my daughter on her chest to get her out of the way, he reached over and was trying to get the keys out of the ignition and using profanity said that that was his van and that we could walk home. . . . [M.G.] eventually snatche[d] the keys because he is much bigger, buff[ed] and stronger. At this point my daughter [wa]s crying hysterically and his son got out of [M.G.'s] car crying and screaming to his dad to leave us alone and not to leave us stranded. When [M.G.] took the keys, I got out of van [sic] and got into his car and tried to reach to get keys [sic]."
L.G. in her declaration recounted M.G.'s other acts of domestic abuse. She specifically described what happened on December 25, 2017, after a late-night argument: "[M.G.] chased me down the stairs and outside the apartment. He forced me to walk . . . to the parking lot where the van was a mile away. I had to run out in flip flops and no sweater. I walked to [the] parking lot and [M.G.] was already there as he had driven there in his car. He had purposely disabled the van by disconnecting some hoses and battery. He disabled me from being able to pick up my daughter from her [d]ad's in Long Beach that night. He drove away and left me there with disabled van in the very back of a very dark parking lot where cars go there to do drugs or have sex [sic]. I was scared to go home and slept in the disabled van that night and a couple nights after that. I made arrangements with my daughter's [d]ad for her to be able to stay with him a little bit longer for her safety and emotional and mental well-being." L.G. submitted photos showing bruises she suffered from an incident with M.G. that occurred in April 2018. M.G.'s DVRO Request
On August 2, 2018, M.G. requested and obtained a temporary restraining order against L.G. for himself, his mother and his son. He stated in a declaration that during the June 2018 incident, L.G. "was upset because I am not putting her on any of my [F]acebook pages or acknowledging her after I posted I am a 'single' man going into 2018 and blocked her from my page on [F]acebook. [She] was driving my car that I had previously given her permission to drive. She being upset and making threats, I told her she is not driving my car in this state and reached into the vehicle and grabbed the keys out of the ignition[.] [S]he then physically grabbed me trying to take the keys to my car from me, pulling my hair, hitting me." He added that he tried to leave but L.G. pursued him to his car "and then proceeded to use force and fear to try to take the keys to my vehicle from me. She started to damage my vehicle while telling me to give her my keys[.] I resisted and tried to keep her from damaging my car[.] [S]he tried yanking the rear passenger door off. [D]amaging it, she ripped off windshield wiper[.] . . . [S]he hopped into my car trying to destroy the inside of the car and then threw the contents inside the car out of the car."
On August 20, 2018, the court granted L.G.'s request for another continuance to retain counsel. On September 4, 2018, the court granted L.G. a third continuance because she went to the hospital that day. M.G. objected to the continuances.
This court granted M.G.'s November 2019 motion to augment the record with a medical note from a hospital stating L.G. "was seen and treated in our emergency department on [September 4, 2018]." M.G. argues this note, which L.G. submitted in connection with her opposition to his motion to vacate the court's DVRO, was inadmissible because it was not before the trial court when it ruled on the DVRO. M.G. adds without citation to authority that the medical note is unauthenticated, not attested to under penalty of perjury, and does not prove L.G. was at the emergency care and was actually ill on that day. We need not address these unsupported assertions.
On September 24, 2018, the court held a joint hearing on the mutual DVRO applications. L.G. testified about the June 2018 van incident: "[M.G.] was trying to cause harm and leave me and my daughter in imminent danger, leave us stranded there, number 1. [¶] Number 2, injuring my daughter caused harm, and number 3, driving off while the [van] door was opened and pushing me—trying to push me out obviously was causing harm and putting me in imminent danger."
M.G. admitted he told L.G. not to drive the van, and reached inside it to grab the keys. He also testified he went to West Covina in a separate car, and planned to drive both vehicles. He added, "I feel I have a right to not let anyone take my vehicle[.] [A]fter taking the keys to my vehicle, I tried to leave. [L.G.] then pursued me to my car, jumped in my car . . . and tried to take the keys from me. [¶] She tried to destroy the inside of the car. She started ripping off the door to my car, ripped off the windshield wiper, and I had every right to resist and every right to stop her from destroying my car or taking my keys from me."
L.G. rebutted M.G.'s claim: "[T]he only reason I started to throw things out of the car is because I repeatedly asked him to stop the car. . . . [¶] I did not cause any damage to his car whatsoever."
The court granted L.G.'s application and issued a DVRO against M.G. for three years, explaining to M.G. from the bench what the evidence showed: "You disturbed [L.G.'s] peace. In fact, you stalked her by going into the vehicle to grab the keys so that she could not return home. [¶] I find that you caused injury to her daughter by elbowing her." The court stated that the ownership of the vehicle was not an issue because L.G. used the van with permission, and there was no criminal case alleging L.G. had stolen it.
The court denied M.G.'s application for a DVRO, pointing out that to the extent it related to his mother and his son, they were not mentioned during the hearing. The court found L.G.'s actions were "under these circumstances, possibly inappropriate, but they do not rise to the level of abuse under [section] 6203."
M.G. does not challenge the court's denial of the DVRO as to his mother and son.
M.G. subsequently moved to vacate the DVRO against him on grounds the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it. The court pointed out the matter was on appeal, and denied the motion, rejecting M.G.'s jurisdictional claim.
DISCUSSION
I. Appeal in D076191
A. Trial Court's Jurisdiction to Decide the Case
M.G. contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on L.G.'s application for a DVRO because the date set for the hearing was beyond the maximum 25-day limit set forth in section 6320.5 He also claims the court lacked jurisdiction under the Orange County Superior Court Local Rules, and Agricultural Prorate Commission (1938) 30 Cal.App.2d 154. He further contends the court lacked jurisdiction to grant L.G.'s requests for continuances.
Section 6320.5 provides: "(a) An order denying a petition for an ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320 shall include the reasons for denying the petition.
(b) An order denying a jurisdictionally adequate petition for an ex parte order, pursuant to Section 6320, shall provide the petitioner the right to a noticed hearing on the earliest date that the business of the court will permit, but not later than 21 days or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days from the date of the order. The petitioner shall serve on the respondent, at least five days before the hearing, copies of all supporting papers filed with the court, including the application and affidavits.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), upon the denial of the ex parte order pursuant to Section 6320, the petitioner shall have the option of waiving the right to a noticed hearing. However, this section does not preclude a petitioner who waives the right to a noticed hearing from refiling a new petition, without prejudice, at a later time."
This court requested M.G. brief the issue of whether he had standing to appeal the dismissal of L.G.'s application for a DVRO, and he did so. We assume without deciding that M.G. had standing, and address the matter on the merits.
Code of Civil Procedure section 902 provides: "Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in this title." Under California case law, "[o]ne is considered 'aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.] Appellant's interest ' "must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment." ' " (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) " 'And as to the question who is the party aggrieved, the test . . . seems to be the most clear and simple that could be conceived. Would the party have had the thing, if the erroneous judgment had not been given? If the answer be yea, then the person is the 'party aggrieved.' But his right to the thing must be the immediate, and not the remote consequence of the judgment, had it been differently given.' " (Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201.)
"The principle of 'subject matter jurisdiction' relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it. [Citation.] In contrast, a court acts in excess of jurisdiction ' "where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no 'jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites." ' " (Conservatorship of O'Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1087-1088; see also Law Offices of Stanley J. Bell v. Shine, Browne & Diamond (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1021-1023.)
The trial court here unquestionably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense. Thus, at most, the court's failure to conduct a timely order to show cause hearing was an act in excess of jurisdiction. "Action 'in excess of jurisdiction' by a court that has jurisdiction in the 'fundamental sense' (i.e. jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties) is not void, but only voidable." (Conservatorship of O'Conner, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) " 'Unlike some other jurisdictional defects, a party may, by its conduct, be estopped from contesting an action in excess of jurisdiction.' [Citation.] When ' "the court has jurisdiction of the subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of jurisdiction." ' " (Id. at p. 1092.)
Whether a party is estopped to complain about an act in excess of jurisdiction " ' "depends on the importance of the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in some instances on other considerations of public policy." ' " (Conservatorship of O'Conner, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.) The public policy at issue here is to grant continuances in DVRO proceedings to help the parties develop their cases. As the California Supreme Court has stated in a different context, a trial court's efforts to expedite a family law case "should never be directed in such manner as to prevent a full and fair opportunity to the parties to present all competent, relevant and material evidence bearing upon any issue properly presented for determination. [¶] Matters of domestic relations are of the utmost importance to the parties involved and also to the people of the State of California . . . . To this end a trial judge should not determine any issue that is presented for his consideration until he has heard all competent, material, and relevant evidence the parties desire to introduce." (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357-1358.)
Section 245, subdivision (b) states a party may request a continuance based on good cause and the superior court "may also grant a continuance on its own motion." Similarly, California Rules of Court, rule 5.94(f)(2) states, "on its own motion, the court may: [¶] (A) Continue the hearing and set a new date . . . ." (See rule 5.2(b)(3), (c) [application of rules to actions under the DVPA].) More generally, "[t]he time within which any act is permitted or required to be done by a party under these rules may be extended by the court upon such terms as may be just." (Rule 5.2(f).) The word "may" indicates discretionary authority and, therefore, a superior court's decision to continue, on its own motion, a hearing for a restraining order under the DVPA is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (§ 12 [" 'may' is permissive"]; Baldwin v. Baldwin (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 175, 177 [use of "may" in rule granted discretionary authority].)
This conclusion is consistent with the general rule that the grant or refusal of a continuance is committed to the discretion of the superior court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. The exercise of this discretion requires the balancing of a variety of factors, such as the preparedness of the parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the demands of the court's schedule. Consequently, a superior court's decision to grant a continuance is in excess of its jurisdiction only if it exceeds the bounds of reason—that is, if it is arbitrary and capricious. Under this standard, we will not reverse the trial court unless M.G. persuades us the court's decision was beyond "the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) B. The Court's Grant of L.G.'s Continuances
M.G. argues with no citation to supporting evidence that L.G. engaged in dilatory tactics: "[She] was well-informed that there was a misdemeanor charge against [M.G.] and there was a hearing on [August 22, 2018,] and [L.G.] was looking to use the automatic criminal protective order/plea agreement conviction as leverage in the proceedings. . . . She never sought counsel at all, and [M.G.] never plead[ed] to the charges. [L.G.] also never intended in [sic] getting counsel to represent her on her petition at all. [¶] [She] if anything, would have only sought counsel to represent her as to [M.G.'s] petition for a restraining order and not her own."
Here, the record includes minute orders showing that M.G. objected to the continuances, but has no transcript showing the basis for the objections and the court's response to them. "A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness." (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) " '[E]rror must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' " (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) In particular, " '[t]he reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment.' [Citations.] It is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record which supports appellant's contentions on appeal. [Citation.] If no citation 'is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived.' " (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.) "Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys." (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.)
A party may not simply cite general principles governing an issue without applying those principles to the circumstances before the court. When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1120; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. State Bd. of Equalization (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1294.) We are unable to evaluate whether M.G.'s objections had merit, and whether he was prejudiced by the court's decision to grant the continuances. We therefore regard the claim as forfeited.
Even if the claim were not forfeited, the law requires us to presume the trial court acted properly in granting the continuances based on L.G.'s medical circumstances and her claim she sought to retain an attorney to assist her in the DVRO proceedings. Also, after M.G. filed his application, the court was required to ensure both parties were present at the hearing under section 6305, section (a), which applies in cases, as here, when the parties seek mutual applications for protective orders. As a court has pointed out, section 6305's purpose is to "help[ ] ensure that a mutual order is the product of the careful evaluation of a thorough record and not simply the result of the moving party yielding to the other party's importunities or the court deciding that a mutual order is an expedient response to joint claims of abuse." (Monterroso v. Moran (2006) 135 Cal. App.4th 732, 737.) The court added, "Domestic violence is a grievous problem in today's world, and its victims often have few places to turn. The courts must be sensitive to allegations of domestic violence, root out the truth in each case, and protect victims when possible. Victims should be guided through our judicial system, not herded." (Id. at p. 738.) We discern no abuse of discretion here.
Section 6305 provides: "(a) The court shall not issue a mutual order enjoining the parties from specific acts of abuse described in Section 6320 unless both of the following apply:
(1) Both parties personally appear and each party presents written evidence of abuse or domestic violence in an application for relief using a mandatory Judicial Council restraining order application form. For purposes of this paragraph, written evidence of abuse or domestic violence in a responsive pleading does not satisfy the party's obligation to present written evidence of abuse or domestic violence. By July 1, 2016, the Judicial Council shall modify forms as necessary to provide notice of this information.
(2) The court makes detailed findings of fact indicating that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and that neither party acted primarily in selfdefense."
M.G. relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 527 subd. (d), which states: "In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice in the contingency above specified in subdivision (c): (1) The matter shall be made returnable on an order requiring cause to be shown why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, on the earliest day that the business of the court will admit of, but not later than 15 days or, if good cause appears to the court, 22 days from the date the temporary restraining order is issued." He also cites to Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.2d at p. 155, and McDonald v. Superior Court (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 652, which address an earlier version of the statute that imposes a ten-day limit for the court to grant a preliminary injunction. This statute is inapplicable here because the court did not issue a temporary restraining order without notice to M.G. Moreover, the continuing validity of this line of cases is questionable because in 1994, subdivision (f) was added to Code of Civil Procedure section 527, expressly giving a court jurisdiction to proceed with a hearing notwithstanding the failure to comply with the time requirements so long as other very basic requirements are met. Finally, subdivision (g) of the statute states, "This section does not apply to an order issued under the Family Code." Here, the court's orders are governed by Family Code section 6320.5.
Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (f), states: "Notwithstanding failure to satisfy the time requirements of this section, the court may nonetheless hear the order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted if the moving and supporting papers are served within the time required by [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 1005 and one of the following conditions is satisfied: [¶] (1) The order to show cause is issued without a temporary restraining order. [¶] (2) The order to show cause is issued with a temporary restraining order, but is either not set for hearing within the time required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (d), or the party who obtained the temporary restraining order fails to effect service within the time required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (d)." The Law Revision Commission Comment pertaining to the 1994 amendment of Code of Civil Procedure section 527 expressly states that subdivision (f) "changes the result in McDonald v. Superior Court, supra, ." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 15A Wests Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2002 supp.) fol. § 527, p. 164.)
II. Appeal in D075847
A. The Dismissal With Prejudice of L.G.'s DVRO Application
M.G. argues the trial court erred by dismissing L.G.'s DVRO application without prejudice. He claims the court only has inherent authority to dismiss the case with prejudice. He also argues without citation to the record or legal authority that L.G. was dilatory in failing to appear.
The court did not err by dismissing L.G.'s DVRO application without prejudice. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (b)(3), a trial court may dismiss any action "without prejudice, when no party appears for trial following 30 days' notice of time and place of trial." We conclude the court acted according to its authority under that statute. B. Res Judicata
M.G. contends that res judicata effect should be given to the order of dismissal, "which should have been with prejudice," and to an order of acquittal and dismissal in his criminal case (No. 8WC05457), the record of which he requests we judicially notice.
" 'Res judicata' describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. . . . Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit; a judgment for the defendant serves as a bar to further litigation of the same cause of action." (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897.) Res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies when: "(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding." (Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1202.)
We reject M.G.'s res judicata arguments. The court's dismissal of L.G.'s earlier DVRO application was based on her failure to appear. It was not a final decision "on the merits"; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to that order or any other order in this case. Next, although M.G. claims the court's order of dismissal should have been with prejudice, in fact the order states it was without prejudice.
We also reject M.G.'s claim that his acquittal in the criminal case should be given res judicata effect, as the criminal case was not yet concluded when the court entered the order granting L.G.'s DVRO; logically, therefore, the criminal case could not have provided a basis for resolving the earlier DVRO proceedings. In any event, the different standards governing criminal and civil proceedings would not support the application of res judicata even if the criminal case had been adjudicated first: "The long-established rule denies res judicata effect in a civil proceeding to a prior acquittal in a criminal proceeding. The principal reason is the difference in the degree of proof required in the two proceedings; acquittal in the prior criminal proceeding merely determines that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Mention has also been made of the differences in objects, issues, results, procedures, elements of proof, weight of the evidence, effect of illegally obtained evidence, and parties." (7 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 387, pp. 1015-1016.) Based on our resolution of this issue, we deny M.G.'s July 10, 2019 motion to take judicial notice of the records in the criminal case because they are immaterial.
C. No Abuse of Discretion in Granting L.G.'s DVRO and Denying M.G.'s DVRO
M.G. claims that L.G.'s admissions in her declarations and testimony establish that during the June 2018 van incident, she committed several "public offenses," including attempted theft of a vehicle, tampering, malicious mischief, attempted robbery, attempted carjacking, battery and offensive touching. We reject these contentions because, as noted, under our standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence.
The gravamen of M.G.'s contention is that he "had every right to use whatever force was necessary to resist the taking of or prevent damage to either of his two vehicles by [L.G., and] to deny usage of his vehicle/property to [L.G.] or anyone." He concludes that the trial court "made no effort to reconcile the penal [and] civil statutes with its ruling."
The DVPA "permits the trial court to issue a protective order 'to restrain any person for the purpose' of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved; the petitioner must present 'reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.' [Citation.] The abuse that provides a basis for the findings includes bodily injury [citation]; reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury [citation]; and 'behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.' [Citation.] Section 6320 in turn permits enjoining 'molesting, . . . harassing, telephoning[,] . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise . . . disturbing the peace of the other party.' As a result, abuse under the DVPA includes physical abuse or injury, as well as acts that 'destroy[ ] the mental or emotional calm of the other party.' " (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816, 820, fn. omitted.) The usual standard of review of a restraining order issued under the DVPA is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495; Burquet v. Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140.)
A superior court's findings of fact are upheld on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th706, 711; Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 [findings relating to protective order].) Under the substantial evidence review standard, "[i]t is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment." (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) Furthermore, under the doctrine of implied findings, an appellate court must presume that, where the record is silent, the superior court considered all of the relevant factors and made all of the factual findings necessary to support its decision for which there is substantial evidence. (Brewer v. Carter (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1320.)
Here, the parties testified that L.G. and M.G. were in West Covina by separate vehicles. Following an argument, M.G. tried to take the keys from the vehicle L.G. was driving. M.G. stated he intended to drive back the vehicles. Substantial evidence showed M.G., who was physically bigger and stronger than L.G., pushed her. There also was substantial evidence that M.G. "disturb[ed] the peace of" L.G within the meaning of section 6320, subdivision (a), by attempting to deprive her of a means to return home with her young daughter. Her declaration shows that six months earlier, he had done something similar; therefore, he could do it again, and she could reasonably have expected that he would do it again. The court did not err in granting L.G.'s application for a DVRO.
As to L.G.'s daughter, the record shows M.G. elbowed her. M.G. does not meaningfully challenge the issuance of the DVRO as to L.G.'s daughter. Rather, he again invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. He argues: "The court . . . finds I did elbow [L.G.'s] daughter even though I denied it. How could any man defend this if all is needed [sic] is the accusation[?] . . . [¶] This finding must be viewed with distrust, under Evidence Code [section] 412 the accusations should be viewed with distrust." --------
M.G. contends the court erred by denying his request for a DVRO, arguing, "Without question [he] is the complete owner of the van . . . and has exclusive '[d]ominion' over the van" and L.G. had "no legal right to the van or basis to try to take the keys to the van for any reason." He purports to set forth L.G.'s admissions in her affidavit, but does not cite to the record. M.G. also confusingly argues without citation or analysis, "The court never reads the petition of which [L.G.] never filed or served a response. The court arbitrarily ruled in favor of [L.G.] of whom never filed a response [sic] and the appellant was on notice that there would be no opposition to the petition. [¶] The court had the petition to base a decision upon without hearing the matter & reading the affidavits, arguments & lack of argument from respondent." We do not consider those statements, as they amount to an invitation that we reweigh the evidence. Under the applicable standard of review, it was for the trial court to weigh the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, as credibility issues are routinely resolved by the trier of fact. (See Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223.)
Under section 6305, the trial court was required to "consider the provisions concerning dominant aggressors" set forth in Penal Code section 836, subdivision (c)(3). Taking that statute into account, the trial court reasonably could find that L.G. did not act primarily as the aggressor but acted in reasonable self-defense in response to M.G.'s aggressions. In responding to M.G. taking the van keys by force, L.G. did not employ extreme violence against him. (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 779; J.J. v. M.F. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 968, 975-976.) We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying M.G.'s application for a DVRO against L.G.
DISPOSITION
The orders granting L.G.'s petition and denying M.G.'s petition for a DVRO are affirmed. L.G. shall recover costs on appeal.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. HUFFMAN, J.