Opinion
C. A. 0:21-1583-JFA-PJG
09-09-2021
Dr. Willis Lewis, Plaintiff, v. Winthrop University, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Dr. Willis Lewis, filed this civil rights action alleging a single claim for race discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his employer, a state university. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the defendant's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) The parties filed briefs in response and reply to the motion. (ECF Nos. 10 & 11.) Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendant's motion should be granted.
Although Lewis, a college professor, complains of the defendant's failure to promote him to department chair, the Complaint does not assert any claims based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
B. Defendant's Motion
The defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law for the dual reasons that Winthrop University, as an instrumentality of the State of South Carolina, (1) enjoys immunity from suit on this claim under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, the court addresses the second ground first. See Rose v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 0:18-3315-RBH, 2020 WL 289273 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2020); see also Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779 (2000) (False Claims Act) (holding that the question whether a statute permits a suit against a state should be addressed before an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense). Longstanding precedent answers the statutory question in the negative. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (recognizing that “arms of the State” are not “persons” under § 1983); see also Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing that “numerous courts have decided whether public state universities are ‘arms of the state.' Almost universally, the answer has been in the affirmative” and holding that University of Maryland entities were alter egos of the state and therefore not “citizens” for diversity jurisdiction purposes); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 59-107-10 (including Winthrop University within the definition of “state institution”); § 15-78-30(e) (listing state-supported schools, colleges, universities, and technical colleges within the statutory definition of “State”). Accordingly, Winthrop is not a “person” under § 1983, and the plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law.
Under the order of decision established in Vermont Agency, the court need not address the parties' Eleventh Amendment arguments. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 779; see also Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482-83 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that when “the defendant asserts both that the federal statute at issue does not permit a suit against the State and if not, that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the suit”-as defendant does here-“not only is the statutory question logically antecedent to the existence of the Eleventh Amendment question, but also . . . is virtually identical to the Eleventh Amendment question”) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted). Here, the determination that Winthrop is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 must be made first, and it ends the inquiry. See Rose v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 0:18-3315-RBH, 2020 WL 289273, at *3 n.7 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (citing Samuel v. Hogan, No. PWG-17-1372, 2018 WL 1243548, at *4 n.8 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 2018) (“It is not unusual for both defenses [i.e., a § 1983-‘person' defense and an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense] to be raised in a single suit, but when they are, this creates a ‘chicken-or-the-egg' situation for the court-which defense should be addressed first. Because a determination that a defendant is not a ‘person' for § 1983 purposes ends the inquiry, the Supreme Court has instructed that compliance with the ‘person' requirement of § 1983 must be analyzed first.”)).
RECOMMENDATION
Winthrop University is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court therefore recommends that the defendant's motion (ECF No. 7) be granted and this matter be dismissed with prejudice.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).