Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-2281-KHV
November 7, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Anthony Lewis, pro se, brings suit against Roberta Wilkes and the Honorable David P. Mikesic under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on Judge Mikesic's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #14) filed August 26, 2002; Defendant, Roberta Wilkes' Motion To Dismiss Or For Judgment On The Pleadings (Doc. #29) filed October 1, 2002; and Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions Against Defendant David Mikesic (Doc. #24) filed September 16, 2002, which the Court construes as a motion to amend plaintiff's complaint. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains defendants' motions to dismiss and overrules plaintiff's motion to amend.
Factual Background
Plaintiff's complaint, as supplemented by plaintiff's subsequent briefs, alleges the following facts:
Plaintiff was the successor administrator of his late grandfather's estate. The probate matter is pending in the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas before Judge Mikesic. In February 2002, Judge Mikesic appointed Roberta Wilkes, an attorney, guardian ad litem for plaintiff's grandmother, Eleanor Lewis. On February 8, 2002, Wilkes filed a petition to remove plaintiff as successor administrator, to have plaintiff provide a complete accounting, to appoint a second successor administrator and to set aside the homestead and statutory allowance for plaintiff's grandmother. On February 21, 2002, Judge Mikesic sustained Wilkes' petition and appointed Wilkes the second successor administrator. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Mikesic denied him an opportunity to present his argument and that Wilkes and Judge Mikesic deprived him of civil rights. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and three trillion dollars in damages.
Standards For Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
The Court may exercise jurisdiction only when specifically authorized to do so, see Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994), and must "dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Scheideman v. Shawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D.Kan. 1995) (quoting Basso v. Utah Power Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The party who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction is proper. See Basso, 495 F.2d at 909. When federal jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff bears the burden of showing why the case should not be dismissed. See Jensen v. Johnson Co. Youth Baseball League, 838 F. Supp. 1437, 1439-40 (D.Kan. 1993).The Court affords a pro se plaintiff some leniency and must liberally construe the complaint. See Oltremari v. Kan. Soc. Rehab. Servs., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D.Kan. 1994). While pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as other litigants. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 940 (1993). The Court may not assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Analysis I. Motions To Dismiss (Doc. ##14, 29)
Wilkes and Judge Mikesic assert that the complaint does not state a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. "It is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments [or interlocutory orders] where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review." Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986); see Bisbee v. McCarty, 3 Fed. Appx. 819, 823 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2001) (doctrine applies to both final and interlocutory orders) (citing Brown Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents "a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Generally, jurisdiction to review state-court decisions lies exclusively with appellate state courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars consideration of issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, and also bars consideration of constitutional claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with issues which the state court has adjudicated. See id; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486 ("Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional.") (internal quotation omitted). "[A] federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987). In other words, plaintiff may only pursue claims that are "separable from and collateral to" a state court judgment. Kiowa Indian Tribe v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennzoil, supra).
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts which show that his claim against Wilkes and Judge Mikesic is "separable from and collateral to" the state probate court decisions. Plaintiff claims that Judge Mikesic denied him an opportunity to present his argument in the state probate proceeding and that Wilkes and Judge Mikesic deprived him of civil rights, apparently by removing him as successor administrator of his grandfather's estate. Without a factual finding that the state probate court erroneously removed plaintiff as administrator or otherwise erred in its rulings, plaintiff cannot prevail on his civil rights claims against Wilkes or Judge Mikesic. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.
Even if this Court had jurisdiction, it would abstain from interfering with the pending probate case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational Prof. Licensing, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001) (federal courts should not interfere with state court proceedings by granting relief when the state forum provides an adequate avenue for relief); see also Beren v. Ropfogel, 24 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994) (federal courts may not interfere with probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of probate or control of property in custody of state court).
Judge Mikesic also would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (judges immune from suit for judicial acts unless acts are "taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction").
Wilkes, as an appointed guardian and attorney, would not be subject to suit under Section 1983 because she is not a state actor. See Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (state-court guardian ad litem did not act under color of state law in representing children in custody proceedings); Dickerson v. Leavitt Rentals, 995 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (D.Kan. 1998) (private attorney, though an officer of the court, is not state actor for purposes of § 1983).
See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414-16. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court rulings on constitutional grounds, his judicial remedy is with the United States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482.
II. Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions (Doc. #24)
Plaintiff seeks sanctions because in September of 2002, Judge Mikesic allegedly had the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department deliver notices to plaintiff's home and work which stated "[y]ou are requested to call the Wyandotte County Sheriff's Department immediately, regarding a matter that requires your immediate attention." See Exhibits 1 and 2, attached to Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions Against Defendant David Mikesic (Doc. #24) filed Sept. 16, 2002. The notices apparently related to an order by Judge Mikesic that plaintiff provide an accounting regarding his grandfather's estate and/or a contempt order based on plaintiff's failure to provide the accounting or attend a court hearing. Plaintiff argues that Judge Mikesic should be sanctioned $50,000 for harassment. Based on the nature of plaintiff's request and absent any authority to "sanction" such conduct without a trial, the Court construes plaintiff's request as a motion to amend his complaint to assert a harassment claim based on Judge Mikesic's orders. Plaintiff has not cited any statutory or common law authority for such a claim. Moreover, absent a finding that Judge Mikesic erred by requiring plaintiff to provide an accounting or finding plaintiff in contempt, plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim. Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's proposed amended claim. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414-16. The Court therefore overrules plaintiff's motion for sanctions, which the Court construes as a motion to amend the complaint.
III. Other Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a second request for injunctive relief and three motions for summary judgment. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims, the Court cannot properly address the merit of those motions.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judge Mikesic's Motion To Dismiss (Doc. #14) filed August 26, 2002, be and hereby is SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, Roberta Wilkes' Motion To Dismiss Or For Judgment On The Pleadings (Doc. #29) filed October 1, 2002, be and hereby is SUSTAINED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions Against Defendant David Mikesic (Doc. #24) filed September 16, 2002, which the court construes as a motion to amend the complaint, be and hereby is OVERRULED.