Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2501-CM.
July 11, 2000.
Patrick K. McMonigle, Jacqueline L. Mixon and John F. Wilcox, Jr., Dysart, Taylor, Lay, Cotter McMonigle, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for ROBERT W LEWIS, plaintiff.
Morris J. Nunn, Morrison Hecker L.L.P., Kansas City, MO; Jere D. Sellers, Morrison Hecker L.L.P., Overland Park, KS; William C. Martucci and Eric W. Smith, Shook, Hardy Bacon L.L.P., Kansas City, MO; Daniel B. Boatright, Spencer, Fane, Britt Browne, Overland Park, KS; B. Simeon Goldstein, Unum Life Insurance Co. of America, Portland, ME, for UNUM CORPORATION and UNUM PROVIDENT CORPORATION, defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case involves a dispute over severance benefits claimed to be owed by the defendants when plaintiff's position of employment was eliminated. The matter is before the court on the defendants' motion (Doc. 25) to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims, to strike the claim for punitive damages, and to strike the jury trial demand. Plaintiff claims that his position was eliminated after UNUM Corporation merged with Provident Companies, Inc. Plaintiff claims that, pursuant to a severance benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq., certain benefits are due and the defendants have failed to provide the benefits despite his demands.
The plaintiff filed his amended complaint on March 31, 2000. Plaintiff alleges: Count I; breach of contract, based upon the defendants' "promises and assurances relating to the Plan . . . and . . . obligations . . . pursuant to the Plan." (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 14 at 3). Count II; misrepresentation, based upon the defendants' representations that they would provide benefits pursuant to the plan. Count III; promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance, based upon plaintiff's reliance upon the promise of benefits contained in the plan. Count IV; failure to provide plan benefits (ERISA). Count V; failure to provide plan information pursuant to ERISA.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the state law claims contained in Counts I through III alleging the claims are preempted by federal law under ERISA. Defendants argue that the punitive damage claims and the demand for a jury trial must be stricken, because, under ERISA such claims are not allowed. Plaintiff filed a motion (Doc. 29) to extend the time for response to May 2, 2000, which the court hereby grants. However, plaintiff never filed his response.
I. Standard Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss
Where a party fails to respond within the time required, the court will consider the motion as uncontested, and will ordinarily grant it. D. Kan. R. 7.4. In the interest of justice, the court has considered the merits of this motion.
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). Issues of law are dispositive of the defendants' motion.
II. ERISA Preemption
With a few exceptions which do not apply here, ERISA expressly preempts any state law which "relates to" any employee benefit plan.See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1999). State law "relates to" an employee benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." New York State Conf. of Blue Cross Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995). Where state law does not have a reference to an ERISA plan, a court must determine the scope of preemption by looking to the objectives of the ERISA statute. See id. One objective of ERISA is "to establish the regulation of employee welfare benefit plans `as exclusively a federal concern.'" Id. (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)). Congress intended to subject plan sponsors to a uniform (federal) body of benefits law, thereby preventing conflicts in substantive law applied to the plans. See id.
Were the courts to allow state law claims based upon the promises made in a employee welfare benefit plan covered by ERISA, employers and employees would be subject to regulation of the plans pursuant to multiple standards, i.e., ERISA, and the states' torts laws. Employees would choose the law most favorable to their position and seek enforcement of the plan pursuant to that law. Employers would be forced to tailor their plans for the states in which they choose to operate. The courts do not allow such subversion of Congress's intent.
This court has held that ERISA preempts state law claims for breach of contract and equitable estoppel when those claims constitute, essentially, claims for wrongful denial of pension benefits under an employee welfare benefit plan. See Miller v. Coastal Corp., No. 89-1431-C, 1989 WL 134934, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 27, 1989). Other court have held the same with reference to severance benefits. See, e.g., Joe v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 202 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000) (breach of contract claim); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 1996) (all state law claims) (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 644 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[P]reemption of state law claims `is required where a state law claim cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the contract governed by federal law.")); Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus., Inc., 984 F.2d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1993) (claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation). The plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by ERISA. Therefore, Counts I, II, and III of the amended complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
III. Punitive Damage Claim and Jury Trial Demand
The only claims remaining are ERISA claims. Punitive damages are not available in an ERISA action. See Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit has also determined, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132, that no right to a jury trial attaches to a claim for benefits due under the terms of an employee welfare benefit plan. See Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1998). Therefore, plaintiff will not be allowed to claim punitive damages, nor will he be given a jury trial of the issues.
IV. Order
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for an extension of time (Doc. 29) is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is granted. All state law claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's punitive damage claims are dismissed with prejudice, and a jury trial on the issues presented will not be allowed.