Opinion
Civ. 8:24-CV-535 (AMN/DJS)
05-31-2024
SCOTT PHILLIP LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF ELIZABETHTOWN, Defendant.
SCOTT PHILLIP LEWIS, Plaintiff Pro Se.
APPEARANCES:
SCOTT PHILLIP LEWIS, Plaintiff Pro Se.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to L.R. 72.3(d).
DANIEL J. STEWART, United States Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk has sent the undersigned Plaintiff's civil Complaint for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee, but instead submitted a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 2, I IFP App. The Complaint alleges violations of the Plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Compl. at ¶¶ 26-43.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Governing Legal Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ° . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, even if a plaintiff meets the financial criteria to commence an action in forma pauperis, it is the court's responsibility to determine whether the plaintiff may properly maintain the complaint that he filed in this District before the court may permit the plaintiff to proceed with this action in forma p pauperis. See id. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff) have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should tn not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations ° contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal1-1 Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
B. Summary of the Complaint
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff travelled to observe a court proceeding in Defendant, Town of Elizabethtown, for the purpose of “work[ing] on an investigative story.” Compl. at ¶¶ 8 & 15. Plaintiff brought with him a backpack containing his “personal items including computers.” Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that the Town Justice told him he would not be allowed to bring his backpack or computers into the court proceedings out of a concern about recording inside the courtroom. Id. at ¶ 10. Despite that direction, Plaintiff's Complaint states that he brought his computers into the courtroom for the proceeding, though Plaintiff denies any intent to actually record the proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 14 & 15. Plaintiff alleges that he was ultimately “kicked out of ° the courtroom” because he had his computers there, despite an individual with a cell phone not being removed. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.
C. Analysis of the Complaint
In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), the Supreme Court found that “the language of § 1983, read against the background of the . . . legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend1-1 municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Courts apply “rigorous standards of culpability and causation” to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employees. Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Thus, in order for an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated to have recourse against a tn municipality under § 1983, he must show that he was harmed by a municipal “policy” or “custom.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690-91. A “policy” or “custom” cannot be shown by pointing to a single instance of unconstitutional conduct by a mere employee of the State. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 831 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“To infer the existence of a city policy from the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer, and then to hold the city liable on the basis of that policy, would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat superior liability rejected ° in Monell”).
While expressly recognizing that municipal liability is dependent upon the existence of a municipal policy or custom, Compl. at ¶¶ 23-25, the Complaint identifies no unconstitutional policy of the Town of Elizabethtown. Instead, Plaintiff alleges only that the Town Judge gave Plaintiff direction regarding his computer. That omission is fatal, at this juncture, to Plaintiff's Complaint. Arnold v. Town of Camillus, New York,1-1 662 F.Supp.3d 245, 259 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Plaintiff has not identified any formal town policy that has deprived [him] of equal protection.”); Beckwith v. City of Syracuse, 642 F.Supp.3d 283, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 2022) (dismissal required when complaint “does not allege the existence of any policy, practice, or custom from which [plaintiff's] alleged constitutional violation resulted.”)
Generally speaking, the Court should permit a pro se Plaintiff leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). The deficiency identified above could potentially be rectified by more detailed pleading and so the Court recommends that the Complaint be dismissed, but that Plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to amend. Plaintiff is advised that any such amended complaint shall supersede and replace in its entirety the previous Complaint filed by Plaintiff. If this recommendation is accepted and Plaintiff is permitted to amend her Complaint, Plaintiff is further warned that the failure to submit an amended complaint could result in ° dismissal of this action.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED with leave to amend; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-1-1 Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72 & 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).