Constructive notice is a legal “ ‘fiction.’ ” ( Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1867, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63.) For constructive notice to be conclusively presumed, the instrument or document must be “recorded as prescribed by law.” (Civ.Code, § 1213; Hochstein v. Romero, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 452, 268 Cal.Rptr. 202; accord, Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1866, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63.)

B. The Trial Court's Statement of Decision In the statement of decision, the trial court made the following findings regarding the issue of good faith on the part of Security One and Urban Financial: "The Court finds both Security One Lending and Urban Financial acted in good faith in making and purchasing the Subject Loan, respectively, such that Urban Financial has a complete defense to Nautilus's claim under the UFTA.... It is undisputed that Urban Financial paid $422,302.21 for the Subject Loan and the Urban Deed of Trust. Pursuant to the two controlling California cases of Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1858-1859, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63..., and Annod Corp. v. Hamilton & Samuels (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1299-1300, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 924..., in order to defeat a good faith obligee defense under the UFTA, a party must show that the lender either (1) colluded with the debtor, or (2) actively participated in the debtor's fraudulent scheme. [Citation.] As the evidence presented at trial was that neither lender had actual knowledge of Nautilus, Nautilus's judgment against Stanley Yang, or Nautilus's Abstract, Nautilus did not meet its burden in establishing that either lender colluded with ... Stanley Yang or actively participated in the debtor's fraudulent scheme.

A lis pendens recorded in such an action is a nullity; it has no effect, and does not provide constructive notice of the pending action. See Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1860. "Accordingly, the Courts position is that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden under CCP section 437c(o)(1) as to the final element of their quiet title action by showing, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs could not have had constructive notice of the pending action in Case No. 656570.

The majority of these courts have concluded that a claim that seeks an interest in real property merely for the purpose of securing a money damage judgment does not support the recording of a lis pendens. (E.g., Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1862 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63] ( Lewis); La Paglia, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1329; Wardley Development Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 391, 394 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 87] ( Wardley); Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1149 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 837] ( Urez); but see Okuda v. Superior Court (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 388] ( Okuda); Coppinger v. Superior Court (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 883, 891 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 24] ( Coppinger).) The California Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue.

The comments in the state bar report were relied upon by the Legislature and indicate the legislative intent. ( Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 67, 71-72; Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1864; historical note to § 405 in 14 West's Ann. Cal. Codes, 1999 pocket supp., p. 149; see California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700.) These comments (hereafter cited as "Comment") are reproduced under the applicable sections in both Deering's and West's Annotated California Codes.

For Constructive notice is a legal “ ‘fiction.’ ” (Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1867, .) For constructive notice to be conclusively presumed, the instrument or document must be “recorded as prescribed by law.” (Civ. Code, § 1213 ; see Hochstein v. Romero, supra , 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 452, 268 Cal.Rptr. 202 ; accord, Lewis v. Superior Court, supra , at p. 1866, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63.) The phrase “recorded as prescribed by law” means the instrument must be indexed. (Hochstein v. Romero, supra , at p. 452, 268 Cal.Rptr. 202 ; see Cady v. Purser (1901) 131 Cal. 552, 556–557, .) “ ‘A document not indexed as required by statute (see Gov. Code, §§ 27230 –27265 ), does not impart constructive notice because it has not been recorded “as prescribed by law .” ’ [Citation.]” (Lewis v. Superior Court, supra , at p. 1866, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63, italics added.)

Consistent with this line of authority, the majority of California courts had concluded that constructive trust and equitable lien claims are not "real property claims" because the claims seek an interest in real property merely for the purpose of securing a money damage judgment. When the California Court of Appeal examined whether a fraudulent conveyance cause of action could be a "real property claim" in Lewis v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 37 Cal.Rptr. 2d 63 (1994) (hereinafter " Lewis ") and Hunting World, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.4th 67, 26 Cal.Rptr. 2d 923 (1994) (hereinafter " Hunting World" ), however, it narrowed the equitable remedy exclusion that had been adopted in Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal.App.3d at 1149, 235 Cal.Rptr. 837.See, e.g. , Burger v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 1013, 199 Cal.Rptr. 227 (1984) (constructive trust claim appended to breach of contract and fraud claims); Deane v. Superior Court, 164 Cal.App. 3d 292, 210 Cal.Rptr. 406 (1985) (constructive trust claim appended to breach of contract claim); Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal.App.3d 1141, 235 Cal.Rptr. 837 (1987) (constructive trust claim appended to fraud and deceit claims); Wardley Development Inc. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.App.3d 391, 262 Cal.Rptr. 87 (1989) (equitable lien claim appended to default money judgment); La Paglia v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.App.3d 1322, 264 Cal.Rptr. 63 (1989) (constructive trust claim appended to waste, tr

) The other cases cited are: BGJ Associates, LLC v. SuperiorCourt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 952 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 693]; Lewis v.Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 63]; La Paglia v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1322 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 63]; Wardley Development Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 391 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 87]; Moseley v.Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 672 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 116]; Deane v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 292 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 406]; Burger v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1013 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 227]. Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, is inapposite and actually supports our conclusion.

'"'" (Ibid.) Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Alpha, arguing we must look at "the claim as actually pled and with[] reference to [the] evidence," citing to Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1141 (Urez), Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850 (Lewis), and Campbell v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904 (Campbell). In those cases, the plaintiffs filed lis pendens based on a cause of action for constructive trust or equitable lien.

An agent has the power to alter the legal relations between the principal and third persons, or the principal and the agent. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1869 (Lewis).) An agent should act as a fiduciary regarding matters within the scope of the agency.