Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5614.
September 30, 2004
Memorandum and Order
Sandra Lewis, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action to object to proceedings and orders of a New Jersey court relating to the care and custody of her son. Currently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss. Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
On August 27, 2003, plaintiff's son Michael Lewis was removed from her home by a caseworker in the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS"). See Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 6U (filed in New Jersey Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. Lewis, Docket No. FN-04-093-04 (Super.Ct. N.J., Chancery Div. — Family Part, Camden County, Aug. 27, 2003)) (attached to Defs.' Mot. Dismiss as Ex. D); see generally Compl. (Doc. #3). In response to a verified complaint filed by DYFS and due to the "imminent danger" to his life, safety or health, on August 28, 2003 the Superior Court of New Jersey ordered that Michael Lewis "be immediately made wards of the court and placed in the immediate custody of the Division of Youth and Family Services." New Jersey Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. Lewis, Docket No. FN-04-093-04, *2 (Super.Ct. N.J., Chancery Div. — Family Part, Camden County, Aug. 28, 2003) (attached to Defs.' Mot. Dismiss as Ex. F).
Plaintiff filed this action seeking Michael's return to her custody. Defendants have moved to dismiss on seven grounds: first, under the Younger theory of abstention; second, because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; third, for improper venue; fourth, due to Eleventh Amendment immunity; fifth, because plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata; sixth, that plaintiff's complaint violates federal civil procedure pleading rules; and seventh, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Because a subject matter jurisdiction analysis resolves this matter conclusively and completely, it is unnecessary to consider each of these arguments.
The precise nature of the relief requested by plaintiff is unclear. As part of her demand, she references "Federal Witness Protection for Family Together." Compl. at 1. She also notes that she is seeking an order to "prevent future fraudulent court actions against her family," and alleges that the State of New Jersey has committed constitutional violations including the abduction of plaintiff's infant daughter in 1988. Id. at 1-3. Furthermore, plaintiff suggests that New Jersey's conduct was criminal and requests the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. Id. at 5. And finally, primary among plaintiff's demands seems to be her repeated request that Michael Lewis be returned to her custody and, as a related claim, that the New Jersey court's deprivation of custody violated due process because no hearing took place.
DISCUSSION
Federal district courts may not sit in direct review of decisions of a state tribunal. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) ("a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in [the U.S. Supreme Court]"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (holding that a state court decision, even where incorrect, cannot be reversed or modified by any federal court other than the U.S. Supreme Court).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a case that is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment." Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 149 (3d Cir. 2004). A case is the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment where the claim was "actually litigated" before the state court, or where the claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state adjudication. ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int'l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004).
After careful review of plaintiff's complaint and the Superior Court of New Jersey's 2003 order, it is clear that plaintiff's claims are inextricably intertwined with the decision of the state court and that this court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court adjudication where "the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)). In other words, Rooker-Feldman deprives this court of jurisdiction where to entertain a claim would be to exercise appellate review of a state court decision.
The Superior Court of New Jersey ordered that Michael Lewis be removed from plaintiff's custody and be placed with DYFS. New Jersey Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. Lewis, Docket No. FN-04-093-04, *2 (Super.Ct. N.J., Chancery Div. — Family Part, Camden County, Aug. 28, 2003). A week later the same court issued an interim order directing DYFS to maintain custody of Michael Lewis. New Jersey Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. Lewis, Docket No. FN-04-093-04, *2 (Super.Ct. N.J., Chancery Div. — Family Part, Camden County, Sept. 4, 2003) (attached to Mot. Dismiss as Ex. G). On October 30, 2003 — ten days after plaintiff filed the current action — the Superior Court of New Jersey dismissed the state court custody action without prejudice, reasoning that the "New Jersey Family Court declines jurisdiction in favor of the Family Court of Pennsylvania who has an existing Court order with the child and that Custody will be controlled by the Pennsylvania court order." New Jersey Div. of Youth Family Servs. v. Lewis, Docket No. FN-04-093-04, *2 (Super.Ct. N.J., Chancery Div. — Family Part, Camden County, Oct. 30, 2003) (attached to Mot. Dismiss as Ex. H).
The current custody status of Michael Lewis cannot be determined from the documents before this court, however it appears that the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services — which was given custody of Michael Lewis in March of 2003 — is handling the case. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to challenge the New Jersey Superior Court order removing Michael from her custody, then, her challenge seems to be moot. Moreover, review of a New Jersey Superior Court order by this court is clearly barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as plaintiff is requesting that a state court decision be invalidated. Plaintiff has asked this court to review the proceedings and orders of the family court relating to the custody of her son, issues which are clearly identical to those adjudicated by the Superior Court of New Jersey. Although the due process violations alleged by the plaintiff to have taken place in conjunction with the custody determination do not necessarily implicate the merits of the child custody decrees entered by the state court, this court could only grant plaintiff's demand for relief by effectively reversing or voiding the rulings of the Superior Court of New Jersey. As a result, the due process violations alleged by plaintiff are inextricably intertwined with the decision of the state court. Because this court cannot engage in appellate review of a state court's decisions, I find that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.
Had plaintiff wished to contest the custody determination of the Superior Court, she should have employed the appropriate channels of appellate review provided by the New Jersey state court system. Despite her claim that "[t]rying to litigate this case within the [New Jersey] court will only lead to more blood shed because of New Jersey's policy and history and unwillingness to confess and change its policy of the exploitation of some free citizens and their children for the preference of its chosen," Pl.'s Opp. At 1-2, she is nonetheless obligated to follow the standard appellate review process.
Even if I were to reach the merits of plaintiff's complaint, it would nonetheless be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Assuming the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint to be true, as I must in evaluating the legal sufficiency of a complaint, plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. Plaintiff has set foh vague allegations of terror, fraud, forced entry, and unfair judicial proceedings. Her complaint does not, however, make a single specific factual allegation against any named defendant. It is impossible, therefore, to find that the complaint states a cause of action based upon the liability of these defendants.
With respect to plaintiff's allegations concerning the unjustness which characterized the custody hearing before the Superior Court of New Jersey, plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was not allowed to enter the courtroom for a duration of two and one-half hours, that social workers and attorneys engaged in discussions to which she was not privy, and that the order was signed in a separate courtroom. Accepting each of these facts as true, however, does not give rise to a legally sufficient claim for violation of due process. Similarly, her allegation that DYFS forced her door open to check on the safety of her son, and that "there is a longstanding court case that has been effected [sic] by current events of terrorism proving the guilt on the part of some division workers," cannot support her request for issuance of a "certificate of probable cause" so that a criminal investigation can be commenced.
CONCLUSION
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows.