Woodall v. State, 294 Ga. 624, 627(3), 754 S.E.2d 335 (2014). The Batson test enforces the criminal defendant's “constitutional right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria” and the individual juror's “right not to be excluded from a jury on account of race.” Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680(2), 424 S.E.2d 626 (1993). “The exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.”

The preliminary issue of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination becomes moot where, as here, the trial judge made no ruling on whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination but the prosecutor nevertheless offered a race-neutral explanation for the challenges and the trial court ruled on the issue. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. ___ ( 111 SC 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395) (1991); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 626) (1993). The issue of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination, however, is but the first of three issues which must be evaluated in a Batson case.

The question whether the trial court correctly decided that no prima facie showing of racial discrimination had been made is moot in this case because the trial court proceeded to the second step in the Batson analysis. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (II) (A), 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality) ("Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot."); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680 (2), (424 S.E.2d 626) (1993) (same)."At the second step [of a Batson challenge], all that is required is for the proponent of the strike to provide a facially race-neutral explanation for the strike; this explanation need not be ‘persuasive, or even plausible.

; Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 , 680 (424 SE2d 626 ) (1993) (same). “At the second step, all that is required is for the proponent of the strike to provide a facially race-neutral explanation for the strike; this explanation need not be ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’ ”

Among the circumstances relevant to determining what remedy is appropriate is the fact that “a criminal defendant [has] the constitutional right to have a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria ... ‘and an individual juror has the right not to be excluded from a jury on account of race.’ ” Ellerbee [ v. State, 215 Ga.App. 312], 450 S.E.2d [443,] at 448 [ (1994) ] (quoting Lewis v. State, [262 Ga. 679] 424 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1993)). This need to consider conflicting constitutional rights, as, for example the equal protection rights of the defendant and the excluded juror, Batson, [ supra,] 476 U.S. at 86–87, 106 S.Ct. at 1718, 90 L.Ed.2d at 81, militates in favor of permitting the trial court to tailor the remedy so as to protect the rights of all the parties concerned.

This Court has done the same in analogous situations where the trial court failed to hold a required hearing. See, e.g., McNeal v. State, 263 Ga. 397, 398-399 (435 SE2d 47) (1993) (remanding for the in-camera hearing required by Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274 (280 SE2d 352) (1981), to determine the State's compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963)); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680-681 (424 SE2d 626) (1993) (remanding for a hearing required by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986)). "Should the trial court determine that the State's evidence concerning the prior transactions does not comport with the requirements set out in Williams, a new trial will be required."

While the trial court did not make a finding that Arrington had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial court did require the State to articulate its reasons for the peremptory strikes, rendering moot the issue of whether Arrington had established a prima facie case. Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680 (2) ( 424 SE2d 626) (1993) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 358 (II) (A) ( 111 SC 1859, 114 LE2d 395) (1991)). Thus, we consider whether the State tendered racially neutral reasons for the exercise of its peremptory strikes.

There were eleven African-Americans on the panel before jury selection, and three African-Americans served on the jury. The State gave reasons for the seven peremptory strikes, rendering a preliminary showing of prima facie discrimination moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (II) (A) ( 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395) (1991); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 626) (1993). The trial court ruled that Brannan did not meet his burden of showing that the State acted with discriminatory intent.

This Court consistently refused to consider untimely enumerations of error under our former Rule 39, which required the enumerations to be filed as a separate part of appellant's brief within 20 days after the case is docketed in this Court. Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 681 (3) ( 424 S.E.2d 626) (1993); Hullender v. State, 256 Ga. 86, 91 (5) ( 344 S.E.2d 207) (1986). See also Brooks v. State, 265 Ga. 548, 551 (8) ( 458 S.E.2d 349) (1995); Trenor v. State, 252 Ga. 264, 267 (8) ( 313 S.E.2d 482) (1984).

[Cit.] Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process. Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679, 680 ( 424 S.E.2d 626) (1993), quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 ( 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.E.2d 411) (1991). Thus, as a general rule, we have not automatically deprived citizens of their right to sit as jurors unless a presumption of bias is clearly established.