Lewis v. State

28 Citing cases

  1. Tipton v. State

    150 So. 3d 82 (Miss. 2014)   Cited 14 times
    In Tipton v. State, 150 So.3d 82 (Miss. 2014), for example, the Mississippi high court held that a claimant whose conviction was overturned after a ruling that the state failed to prove an essential element of the crime "clearly ha[d] satisfied all of the requirements of compensation[.]"

    ¶ 11. Although the ISP is called an “alternative to incarceration,” inmates in that program are under the complete jurisdiction of the MDOC. Miss.Code Ann. § 47–5–1003(3) (Rev. 2011). The Mississippi Court of Appeals has found that an inmate “participating in the house arrest program or serving time as an inmate in the general prison population was confined as a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the normally understood sense of that term.” Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals consistently has sided with the State's argument that the removal of an inmate from the ISP to a prison facility involves no liberty interest, and instead is merely a “change in ... housing assignment and classification, which does not require a hearing since it does not involve a liberty interest.”

  2. Tipton v. State

    NO. 2013-CA-00415-SCT (Miss. Feb. 6, 2013)

    The Mississippi Court of Appeals has found that an inmate "participating in the house arrest program or serving time as an inmate in the general prison population was confined as a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the normally understood sense of that term." Lewis v. State, 761 So. 2d 922, 923 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals consistently has sided with the State's argument that the removal of an inmate from the ISP to a prison facility involves no liberty interest, and instead is merely a "change in . . . housing assignment and classification, which does not require a hearing since it does not involve a liberty interest."

  3. Tipton v. State

    NO. 2013-CA-00415-SCT (Miss. Mar. 20, 2014)

    Id. at 682 (¶ 13). ¶15. While Tipton v. State is strong authority for the ISP not to be considered incarceration, there is precedent inconsistent with such a finding. See Lewis v. State, 761 So. 2d 922 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010); Brown v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 906 So. 2d 833 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 77 So. 3d 1152, 1155 (¶ 10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Ivory v. State, 403 So. 2d 1284 (Miss. 1981).

  4. Jacobs v. Grimes

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09-cv-653-HSO-JMR (S.D. Miss. Oct. 21, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    As a basis for filing this federal habeas corpus case, Petitioner cites case law from the Mississippi Court of Appeals finding that state post-conviction relief is an inappropriate remedy for a prisoner to pursue after he is removed from house arrest and returned to the general prison population. Resp., p. 3 ( citing Lewis v. State of Miss., 761 So. 2d 922, 923 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). As relief, Petitioner asks that this Court enter an order directing MDOC to show cause why they did not follow their policy and procedure in regards to his initial drug screening, and why his intensive supervision should not be immediately reinstated. He also seeks "immunity from disciplinary action during initial drug testing," and he would like to be "drug tested once placed on intensive supervision.

  5. Graham v. State

    2007 CP 1576 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)

    The removal from the ISP "to the general prison population is nothing more than an internal reclassification matter for which the inmate enjoys no liberty interest that would trigger the need for the kind of due process hearing necessary to revoke probation or parole." Lewis v. State, 761 So. 2d 922, 923 (¶ 3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Even in cases where the circuit court has retained jurisdiction, this Court has found no violation of due process in the MDOC's reclassification of a prisoner in the ISP. Miller v. State, 804 So. 2d 1062, 1066 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).

  6. Ivory v. State

    999 So. 2d 420 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Ivory v. State, 999 So.2d 420 (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (en banc), Annie Ivory was sentenced to fifteen years, with one year to be served in the ISP and, upon successful completion of the ISP, the remaining years to be suspended, with four years to be served under post-release supervision.

    House arrest is not a probationary status, but merely an alternative form of confinement. Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). The statutes governing the ISP provide that an offender in the ISP is under the full and complete jurisdiction of the MDOC and is subject to removal from the program by the classification hearing officer.

  7. McBride v. Sparkman

    860 So. 2d 1237 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 12 times
    Upholding circuit court's dismissal of prisoner's habeas corpus motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing because there was no indication that an evidentiary hearing would have aided the court in resolution of the issues

    The court held that "house arrest is nothing more than an alternative form of confinement" and that "the authority to remove an inmate from the program lies exclusively with the Department of Correction's classification committee — not the original sentencing judge." Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1003 (Supp. 2003). The code describes ISP and states: "(3) To protect and ensure the safety of the state's citizens, any offender who violates an order or condition of the intensive supervision program shall be arrested by the correctional officer and placed in the actual custody of the Department of Corrections.

  8. Hollingsworth v. State

    66 So. 3d 1254 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 2 times
    In Hollingsworth v. State, 66 So.3d 1254 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), we held, "Section 47-5-803(2) plainly states that a prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before he can file suit in court.

    Therefore, "the authority to reclassify an inmate from house arrest and to place her in the general prison population is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MDOC and outside the authority of the original sentencing judge." Ivory, 999 So.2d at 425 (¶ 11) (citing Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000)). ¶ 9.

  9. Moore v. Mississippi Dept. of Corr

    936 So. 2d 941 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times
    In Moore, insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process were not reasons for the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

    The interests of a person in the ISP do not rise to the level of "constitutionally-cognized liberty interests." Moore v. State, 830 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002); Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). Also, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-43-9 (Rev. 2002), a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be filed in the county where the inmate is detained.

  10. Brown v. Mississippi Dept. of Corr

    906 So. 2d 833 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that once the MDOC determines that a prisoner has violated the terms of his ISP, the MDOC is required to enforce the judge's original sentencing order

    When Brown was taken off house arrest and placed in MDOC's custody, he merely experienced a change in his housing assignment and classification, which does not require a hearing since it does not involve a liberty interest. See Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922, 923 (¶ 3-4) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000). ¶ 7.