Lewis v. State

8 Citing cases

  1. Opinion Number

    08-0212 (Ops. La. Atty. Gen. Jan. 23, 2009)

    We agree with the policy stated by Mr. Freyou of the SLO and the conclusions of the lawyer examining title for Moesley Petroleum, for the reasons set forth below. The case of Lewis v. State of Louisiana, 156 So.2d 431, 244 La. 1039 (1963), which you cited in your request letter of July 16, 2008, has not been overruled and thus is still "good law". In Lewis, "the plaintiffs claim to the mineral rights [in and to the tract in dispute] is based upon a chain of title beginning with [a] state patent . . . conveying the tract of land with no express reservation of the mineral rights."

  2. Justiss Oil v. La. Mineral

    34 So. 3d 507 (La. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    In both Hyams II and Douglas, supra, the Hyams heirs had applied for patents as to specifically identified property prior to the enactment of the 1921 Constitution. But for the State's failure to act and wrongful denial of the patent applications, the "transfers under lieu warrants" would have occurred prior to adoption of the 1921 Constitution. The plaintiffs' property rights vested at the time of their patent applications in 1917, 1918, and 1919, entitling them to both the surface of the land and the mineral rights attendant thereto. In Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (La. 1963), the supreme court reversed a judgment that had decreed the plaintiff owner of mineral rights to property for which a patent had issued in 1943. A defective patent had been issued by the State in 1862.

  3. American Lung Ass'n v. State Mineral Bd.

    507 So. 2d 184 (La. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    See also: Yiannopoulos, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977); Hardy, 24 La.L.Rev. 228-29 (1964); Note, 24 La.L.Rev. 416 (1964). Accordingly, this constitutional prohibition of any alienation of mineral rights by the state after 1921, Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963), likewise bars after 1921 divestiture through acquisitive prescription of a levee district's mineral interest in (state) lands owned by and administered by it. Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Pontchartrain Dist., 336 So.2d 248 (La.App. 1st. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 338 So.2d 1156 (La. 1976) ("No error of law."), Noted, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977). (emphasis added).

  4. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc

    362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978)   Cited 6 times
    In Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So.2d 734 (La.1978), the supreme court affirmed a decision of the first circuit holding that a levee district was the “state” within the meaning of La. Const. art. 4, § 2 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution.

    Decisions of this court, have consistently held that, for purposes of this article, levee districts were a state agency, performing a state function and administering state lands; they were therefore subject to this constitutional provision prohibiting alienation after 1921 of mineral rights owned by the state. Accordingly this constitutional prohibition of any alienation of mineral rights by the state after 1921, Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963), likewise bars after 1921 divestiture through acquisitive prescription of a levee district's mineral interest in (state) lands owned by and administered by it. Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Com'rs. of Pontchartrain Dist., 336 So.2d 248 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 338 So.2d 1156 (La. 1976) ("No error of law."), Noted, 37 La.L.Rev. 317 — 18 (1977). Our earlier constitutions provided no such prohibition against alienation of state minerals.

  5. Bd. of Com'rs., Etc. v. S. D. Hunter Foundation

    354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1978)   Cited 11 times

    See also: Yiannopoulos, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977); Hardy, 24 La.L.Rev. 228-29 (1964); Note, 24 La.L.Rev. 416 (1964). Accordingly, this constitutional prohibition of any alienation of mineral rights by the state after 1921, Lewis v. state, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963), likewise bars after 1921 divestiture through acquisitive prescription of a levee district's mineral interest in (state) lands owned by and administered by it. Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Pontchartrain Dist., 336 So.2d 248 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied 338 So.2d 1156 (La. 1956) ("No error of law."), Noted, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977). The functional distinction between the two lines of decisions probably revolves about the circumstances that in the Haas line, unless expressly barred by statute, levee districts were permitted to lose by acquisitive prescription what they could (at the time) validly alienate (unlike minerals after 1921), or could sue and be sued for (i. e., lands so conveyed or lost through acquisitive prescription).

  6. American Lung Ass'n v. State Mineral

    490 So. 2d 343 (La. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    See also: Yiannopoulos, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977); Hardy, 24 La.L.rev. 228-29 (1964); Note, 24 La.L.Rev. 416 (1964). Accordingly, this constitutional prohibition of any alienation of mineral rights by the state after 1921, Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963), likewise bars after 1921 divestiture through acquisitive prescription of a levee district's mineral interest in (state) lands owned by and administered by it. Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Pontchartrain Dist., 336 So.2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied 338 So.2d 1156 (La. 1956) ("No error of law."), Noted, 37 La.L.Rev. 317-18 (1977). (Emphasis ours).

  7. Plaquemines Parish v. Delta Development

    486 So. 2d 129 (La. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    IMMUNITY FROM PRESCRIPTION PPCC argues that "Article IV, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, makes all mineral rights owned by the state, inclusive of those herein involved, inalienable and thus, imprescriptible," citing Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 362 So.2d 734 (La. 1978); Lewis v. State, 244 La. 1039, 156 So.2d 431 (1963). Judge Swift rejected this argument as he determined that the overriding mineral royalties held by Delta and the Perez heirs, which are interests carved out of Gulf's working interests, did not qualify as a sale or alienation within the constitutional prohibition.

  8. Opinion Number

    96-200 (Ops. La. Atty. Gen. Jul. 24, 1996)

    Thus, the purported transfer by Act 116 of 1995 of "all property, both movable and immovable" clearly contravenes the provisions of Article IX, § 3 and § 4 with respect to navigable water bottoms and minerals. See Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Board, 317 So.2d 576, at 592 (Sup.Ct. 1976); and Lewis v. State, 156 So.2d 431 (Sup.Ct. 1963). Gulf Oil arose out of an oil company instituted concursus proceeding involving the issuance of a land patent by the State to private individuals on lands containing navigable water bottoms, holding that the beds of such navigable waters are owned by the State in its sovereign capacity and cannot be alienated by the State, except through constitutional amendment.