Opinion
B324197
10-12-2023
MAUREEN LEWIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. REPTILE FACTORY, LLC, et al., Defendants and Respondents
Law Office of Robert Starr and Adam Rose for Plaintiff and Appellant. Lee Law Offices and W. Dan Lee for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 19STCV34940 Kevin Brazile, Judge.
Law Office of Robert Starr and Adam Rose for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lee Law Offices and W. Dan Lee for Defendants and Respondents.
EDMON, P. J.
Plaintiff Maureen Lewis (plaintiff) brought the present action for wage and hour violations against her former boyfriend, Geovanni Solis (Solis), and his business, Reptile Factory, LLC (Reptile Factory) (collectively, defendants). At trial, plaintiff claimed she was not paid for the approximately two-and-a-half years she worked for the Reptile Factory, and therefore she was owed more than $30,000 in back pay, plus statutory penalties. The trial court entered judgment for defendants after finding that plaintiff was not an employee of the Reptile Factory and was not entitled to wages. We find no error, and thus we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Solis were involved romantically from sometime in 2016 until August 2019. During that time, Solis and/or his brother owned and operated three Reptile Factory stores, which sold reptiles and supplies.
After plaintiff's relationship with Solis ended, she filed the present action for unpaid wages. The case was tried to the court over two days in August 2022.
Neither complaint was included in the appellate record, and thus we cannot determine what causes of action plaintiff alleged.
Plaintiff testified at trial that she worked for the Reptile Factory from January 2017 until August 2019. She worked primarily in the Long Beach store until it closed in October 2018; after that, she worked at the Garden Grove and Downey stores. Solis was the sole proprietor of all three stores until the LLC was created. Plaintiff typically worked full days at the stores, beginning at 11:00 a.m. or noon, and finishing at about 8:00 p.m. Her work included cleaning animal cages, purchasing supplies, and assisting customers. She worked approximately 30 hours per week in 2017, and approximately 15 hours per week in 2018 and 2019. The only compensation she ever received during the approximately two-and-a-half years she worked for the Reptile Factory was about $300 in cash. Plaintiff and Solis fought about his failure to pay her for her work "all the time." Solis "brushed me off a lot, or he would give me an excuse or he would lie to me about something."
Plaintiff testified that she was never included on the employee work schedule, employee meetings, or in the employee Facebook chat group; instead, Solis would tell plaintiff each morning where to work. Plaintiff did not record the hours she worked, but "just kept it in [her] head." Plaintiff said Solis agreed to pay her for her work, but they never discussed how much she would be paid. Plaintiff stopped working for the Reptile Factory when her relationship with Solis ended. She believes she is owed about $30,000 in back wages.
On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted sending texts and messages to Solis that said, among other things," 'Mark my words, I'm going to destroy your business,'" " 'You are a F racist,'" " 'You're a fake phony lying selfish piece of blank. I hope you die,'" and" 'F Reptile Factory.' "
Plaintiff's daughter, Jailyn Lewis (Jailyn), testified that she worked at the Reptile Factory's Long Beach store during the summer of 2018, when she was 16 and 17 years old. After school started in September, Jailyn worked some weekends, usually at the Downey store. She kept track of her own hours, and Solis paid her $10.25 per hour in cash at the end of each week. Jailyn and her mother sometimes worked together in the Long Beach store, where Jailyn saw her mother cleaning animal enclosures, interacting with customers, and preparing food for the animals. Her mother typically worked two or three days a week for a portion of Jailyn's shift.
Ana Castro testified that she worked for the Reptile Factory from April 2018 until April 2019. She worked full time in the Long Beach store until it closed in October 2018, and then she worked full time in the Westminster store. Although Castro never saw plaintiff working in either store or saw plaintiff's name on the weekly schedule, she believed plaintiff was an employee because Solis and others "were always talking about how she was there at the store."
Solis and his brother, Juan Carlos Martinez, testified pursuant to Evidence Code section 776 that although plaintiff sometimes frequented the stores, she was never hired or employed by the Reptile Factory and did not perform work for the business. Specifically, plaintiff never cleaned the animal cages, prepared food for the animals, assisted customers, or purchased supplies for the stores.
Solis and Martinez testified that Solis owned and operated the Long Beach store, and Martinez owned and operated the Garden Grove and Downey stores. Plaintiff typically came into the stores if she needed supplies for her own animals. Plaintiff sometimes came to reptile conventions with Solis, but not as a representative of the Reptile Factory. Instead, she came to see reptiles and to "keep tabs on" Solis. Plaintiff's daughter Jailyn was never an employee of the Reptile Factory, although she sometimes spent time at the store because she was bored at home.
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court granted the motion, explaining as follows: "[I]n my view, she was not an employee. She fails to meet [the] test[s] established by the Supreme Court or the Labor Code to constitute being an employee. Why? I don't believe she is a credible witness....She's not believable....The text messagesclearly show bias, . . . show prejudice, show motive to lie, and quite frankly, they were disturbing. So I just don't find [plaintiff] believable, and [defendants have] met their burden.... [¶] . . . [¶] "[I]f they don't . . . consider her an employee, they haven't hired her, they don't pay her, they don't give her a schedule, . . . and she's the girlfriend of Mr. Solis whose half brother owned the other stores that she likes to frequent, that does not make her an employee."
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends (1) the trial court erred in entering judgment for defendants; (2) Reptile Factory is a sham corporation; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to issue a statement of decision. For the reasons that follow, none of these contentions has merit.
I. The trial court did not err by granting defendants' motion for judgment.
A. Standard of review.
Section 631.8, subdivision (a) provides: "After a party has completed his presentation of evidence in a trial by the court, the other party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in support of his defense or in rebuttal in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment. The court as trier of the facts shall weigh the evidence and may render a judgment in favor of the moving party, in which case the court shall make a statement of decision as provided in Sections 632 and 634, or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. The court may consider all evidence received, provided, however, that the party against whom the motion for judgment has been made shall have had an opportunity to present additional evidence to rebut evidence received during the presentation of evidence deemed by the presenting party to have been adverse to him, and to rehabilitate the testimony of a witness whose credibility has been attacked by the moving party."
"' "The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 is 'to enable the court, when it finds at the completion of plaintiff's case that the evidence does not justify requiring the defense to produce evidence, to weigh evidence and make findings of fact.' [Citation.] Under the statute, a court acting as trier of fact may enter judgment in favor of the defendant if the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof. [Citation.] In making the ruling, the trial court assesses witness credibility and resolves conflicts in the evidence."' (Kinney v. Overton (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 (Kinney).)' "Because the trial court evaluates the evidence as a trier of fact, it may refuse to believe some witnesses while crediting the testimony of others."' (Medrazo v. Honda of North Hollywood (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1, 10857125 (Medrazo); see Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1255 ['In doing so, the court may refuse to believe witnesses and draw conclusions at odds with expert opinion.'].)" (Orange County Water Dist. v. MAG Aerospace Industries, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 229, 239 (Orange County Water Dist.).)
"The trial court's ability to weigh the evidence and consider witness credibility distinguishes a motion for judgment from a motion for nonsuit during a jury trial, which also challenges a plaintiff's evidence at the close of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. When considering a motion for nonsuit, a trial court must deny the motion 'if the evidence presented by the plaintiff would support a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor.' (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 838.) In other words, to avoid a nonsuit, a plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 694; Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Medical Group, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1266.) If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, a motion for nonsuit must be denied. When considering a motion for judgment during a bench trial, a trial court is not so limited. Even if a plaintiff introduces evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the trial court may still conclude the plaintiff has not carried his or her burden of proof and grant judgment in favor of the moving defendant. For example, on a motion for judgment, the trial court may disbelieve the plaintiff's evidence, draw adverse (rather than favorable) inferences therefrom, and credit contrary evidence introduced through cross-examination or otherwise." (Orange County Water Dist., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.)
"' "The standard of review after a trial court issues judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 is the same as if the court had rendered judgment after a completed trial-that is, in reviewing the questions of fact decided by the trial court, the substantial evidence rule applies." '" (Medrazo, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 10.)' "But, we are not bound by a trial court's interpretation of the law...."' (Kinney, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 487.)' "We review legal issues . . . under a de novo or independent standard." '" (Orange County Water Dist., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 239-240.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendants were not liable to plaintiff for wages because they did not employ her.
Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that she was not employed by the Reptile Factory. The claim lacks merit.
Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) provides: "Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of suit."
The Labor Code does not define "employee," but our Supreme Court has held that "to employ" "has three alternative definitions. It means: (a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship." (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64.)"' "The question of whether an employment relationship exists' "is generally a question reserved for the trier of fact." '" '" (Mattei v. Corporate Management Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116, 123.)
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendants because Castro and Jailyn "provided testimony about their knowledge of [plaintiff's] work at the Reptile Factory stores," which testimony the court "wholly disregarded." In fact, Castro's testimony was far more ambiguous than plaintiff suggests: Castro testified that she worked full time in the Long Beach store during the same period plaintiff claimed to have worked there, but never saw plaintiff in the store. In any event, other witnesses-namely, Solis and Martinez-both testified that plaintiff was never hired by the Reptile Factory and did not perform any work for the business. The trial court explicitly credited this testimony and discredited that of plaintiff and her witnesses, a determination entitled to"' "extremely deferential review." '" (Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1176; see also Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 558, 579 ["As the exclusive judge of the credit and weight to be given to the testimony of a witness, the trier of fact may reject the testimony of a witness even if, as is certainly not the case here, it is uncontradicted."]; In re Marriage of D.S. and A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 936 [" '[a] trier of fact is free to disbelieve a witness . . . if there is any rational ground for doing so' "].) Solis's and Martinez's testimony thus is substantial evidence that the Reptile Factory did not employ plaintiff-that is, that it did not engage her, control her hours, or suffer or permit her to work.
Plaintiff further contends that under Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157 (Amaral), the defendant has the burden of proof in a wage and hour case if an employer does not maintain employment records. She thus urges that the trial court erred by placing the burden of proof on her, rather than on defendants. Not so. Amaral held that although a plaintiff normally has the burden of proving each fact essential to her claim for relief, a different rule applies in the wage-and-hour context when an employer's compensation records are so incomplete or inaccurate that an employee cannot prove his or her damages, or when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. (Id. at p. 1189.) In the present case, however, the trial court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that she was employed by the Reptile Factory at all-not that she failed to establish the number of hours that she had worked but for which she had not been paid. Under these circumstances, therefore, Amaral does not suggest that the defendants should have borne the burden of proof.
Next, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff was not entitled to be paid for her work because she and Solis were in a relationship akin to a marriage or plaintiff acted as "a volunteer." We do not agree. Although the trial court suggested that plaintiff did things for Solis "that one would expect or that would be reasonable for a spouse to do" and asked plaintiff's counsel whether the Labor Code excludes a girlfriend from the definition of employee, the court did not conclude that plaintiff was not entitled to be paid because of her relationship with Solis. Instead, the court found that plaintiff was not employed by Solis or the Reptile Factory because she did not "perform work" for either defendant. The court said: "The testimony has been from other witnesses that [plaintiff] did not perform work. She's the only one who said that she performed work, and as I said . . . earlier, I don't find that testimony credible or believable. I find the testimony credible and believable from the others-one, Ms. Castro said she never worked there, and both Mr. Solis and Mr. Martinez are saying she never worked at these locations. So when you use the premise 'performed work,' I don't buy it." (Italics added.)
Finally, plaintiff urges that the court erred in finding plaintiff not credible because "[a]n employee's credibility is irrelevant to payment of their wages." Not so. While it undoubtedly is the case that an employee is entitled to be paid for her work without regard to her "character," because there was conflicting evidence about whether plaintiff was employed by or worked for defendants, the trial court necessarily made credibility determinations to decide how to weigh the testimony of each witness. (See In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 1015 [trial court necessarily assesses credibility in evaluating conflicting evidence]; JMS Air Conditioning &Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 945, 967 [appellate court must "defer to the [fact finder] regarding credibility of witnesses and the relative weight to give two pieces of conflicting testimony"].) The trial court did not err in doing so here.
Plaintiff also suggests that the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiff was not employed by defendants because "at times she worked as a dancer outside of [defendants'] work hours." Plaintiff provides no record citation for this assertion, and thus we will not address it on the merits.
II. Reptile Factory's corporate status is immaterial to this appeal.
Plaintiff contends that Reptile Factory is a sham corporation created to avoid a tax lien, and thus "[a]n inequitable result would occur if the timeframe for Plaintiff's employment were limited to after [its] establishment." Because we have found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff was not employed by any of the defendants at any time, we need not reach this issue.
III. The trial court did not err by declining to issue a written statement of decision.
Plaintiff filed a written request for a statement of decision on August 18, 2022. The following day, she filed an amended request for a statement of decision on 12 controverted issues, including whether she was an employee of defendants. The court did not issue a statement of decision.
On September 18, 2023, plaintiff sought judicial notice of an August 24, 2022 minute order denying as untimely plaintiff's request for a statement of decision because "the trial was concluded in less than eight (8) hours over more than one day." We grant the request for judicial notice.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to issue a statement of decision because "[a] statement of decision is mandatory when granting a motion for judgment." Not so. As noted above, if the trial court grants judgment pursuant to section 631.8, it "shall make a statement of decision as provided in Sections 632 and 634." (§ 631.8, subd. (a), italics added.) Section 632 provides that the court "shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial." The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours, in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision. (Ibid.) The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise; however, when the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours, the statement of decision may be made orally on the record in the presence of the parties. (Ibid.)
Section 634 is of no relevance to the present case. It provides that if a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue or is ambiguous, "it shall not be inferred on appeal or upon a motion under Section 657 or 663 that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue."
In the present case, plaintiff filed a request for a statement of decision on August 18, 2022, seven days after the trial court announced its intended decision. The request therefore was timely only if the trial was not concluded "within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day." (§ 632.)
Although the reporter's transcripts indicate that the presentation of evidence occupied the morning and afternoon sessions on August 9 and 10, 2022, the transcripts do not indicate how long those sessions lasted. Specifically, the August 9 reporter's transcript contains no time information at all, and while the August 10 reporter's transcript states that proceedings began at 10:04 a.m. and concluded at 3:50 p.m., it does not reflect the length of the lunch recess.
The present case thus is analogous to Kearl v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1051 (Kearl).) There, the petitioner sought a writ of mandate requiring the medical board to set aside its decision to suspend the petitioner's medical license. (Id. at p. 1043.) A brief hearing was held during which the administrative record was introduced into evidence; the court said during the hearing that it had read the record and the parties' briefs, but it did not indicate how long it spent doing so. Three days after the court announced its intended decision to deny the writ, the petitioner submitted a request for a statement of decision. The trial court denied the request as untimely. (Id. at p. 1051.) The Court of Appeal found the petitioner had not established error because the record did not reflect the time the trial court spent reviewing the administrative record. It explained: "It is fundamental that an appellant 'must affirmatively show error by an adequate record.... Error is never presumed.... "A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent ...." (Orig. italics.)' [Citation.] Although petitioner belatedly attempted to make a record which would have revealed the alleged error, he was unable to do so due to the trial court's failure to recollect the amount of time spent reading the administrative record prior to trial. This court cannot speculate as to the amount of time spent. [Citation.] Inasmuch as petitioner has not met his burden of affirmatively showing error on the record, this court must presume the lower court's ruling was correct, i.e., that the trial lasted less than one day and petitioner's request for a statement of decision was untimely." (Id. at pp. 1051-1052.)
As in Kearl, the record in the present case does not affirmatively show that the trial of this matter lasted more than eight hours. As we have said, the reporter's transcripts reflect that morning and afternoon sessions were held on August 9 and 10, but do not indicate how long those sessions lasted, and plaintiff made no attempt below to make a record that would have demonstrated error. We therefore cannot conclude that the trial court erred by failing to issue a statement of decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their appellate costs.
We concur: LAVIN, J., ADAMS, J.