Lewis v. Midgett

11 Citing cases

  1. Armour Pipe Line Co. v. Sandel Energy, Inc.

    No. 14-20-00412-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 29, 2022)

    The courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that title passes to the grantee. See State v. Dunn, 574 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App.- Amarillo 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.) (concluding that because attempted exception of property in a deed was invalid, the property that was the subject of the attempted exemption passed to the grantee); Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ) (holding that because attempted exception of property in a deed was void the property that was the subject of the attempted exemption passed to the grantee). The Cashman Sisters have not shown that if the attempt to reserve or except the Purported Royalty was void or invalid, title to the Purported Royalty would stay with the Assignors rather than pass to Sandel Energy.

  2. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc.

    No. 07-16-00125-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 13, 2017)

    Nor do they dispute that the statute of frauds applied to the reservation of interest within the assignment at bar. See Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1969, no writ) (concluding that the deed passed all of the estate owned by the grantor despite the attempted reservation since the latter failed to comply with the statute of frauds). Disagreement comes in whether one particular element of the statute was satisfied, and that element concerns the need to describe the property being conveyed or reserved.

  3. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent, Inc.

    No. 07-16-00125-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 13, 2016)

    Nor do they dispute that the statute of frauds applied to the reservation of interest within the assignment at bar. See Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1969, no writ) (concluding that the deed passed all of the estate owned by the grantor despite the attempted reservation since the latter failed to comply with the statute of frauds). Disagreement comes in whether one particular element of the statute was satisfied, and that element concerns the need to describe the property being conveyed or reserved.

  4. Highway Properties v. Dollar Sav. Bank

    189 W. Va. 301 (W. Va. 1993)   Cited 9 times
    In Highway Properties v. Dollar Savings Bank, 189 W. Va. 301, 305, 431 S.E.2d 95, 99 (1993), this Court found that language in a deed stating "`[i]t is agreed and understood that there is common parking and rights-of-way or easements in, to and across all parcels for ingress and egress from and to all other parcels'" was insufficient and a "totally inadequate description" for purposes of creating an easement.

    (Emphasis in original; citations omitted).See also Dunlap Investors Ltd. v. Hogan, 133 Ariz. 130, 650 P.2d 432 (1982); Parkinson v. Board of Assessors of Medfield, 395 Mass. 643, 481 N.E.2d 491 (1985); Royse v. Easter Seal Soc'y for Cr. Children, 256 N.W.2d 542 (N.D. 1977); Germany v. Murdock, 99 N.M. 679, 662 P.2d 1346 (1983); Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969). From the foregoing law and aside from the merger question, it is our conclusion that the easement sought to be created in this case in the 1983 deed to Fayette Square was insufficient as a matter of law as to its description.

  5. Johnson v. Conner

    260 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. App. 2008)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that deed conveyed all mineral interests, despite any intent not to do so, when it stated that "[n]one of the [mineral, water, royalty, timber, or other interests] are available to be conveyed" because that language was not an explicit reservation

    A warranty deed will pass all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are reservations or exceptions that reduce the estate conveyed. Sharp v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 493, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952); Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1956); Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). See also Melton v. Davis, 443 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Held that if appellees had intended to reserve the disputed minerals, they could have done so by apt language specifically and unequivocally expressing such intent; having failed to do so, title to the mineral estate in question passed to appellants under the deed.).

  6. Angell v. Bailey

    225 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App. 2007)   Cited 39 times
    Holding appellant was estoppedby deed from claiming sole tenancy in a tract of land because the deed through which she claimed an interest in the land recited (mistakenly) that partial interests in the tract were previously conveyed to others

    We agree that, for a clause in a deed to operate as exception, it must identify, with reasonable certainty, the property to be excepted from the larger conveyance. Fuentes, 472 S.W.2d at 293 (citing Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ)). Where the subject of the conveyance is sufficiently described, but the excepted portion is not identifiable, the exception fails, rather than the grant, because the uncertainty goes to the exception only. State v. Dunn, 574 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Fuentes, 472 S.W.2d at 293).

  7. Walsh v. Austin

    590 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that plaintiff, as summary judgment movant in trespass-to-try-title suit, had burden only to prove prima facie case, upon which showing burden then shifted to defendant to produce defensive evidence raising material fact issue

    Reference cannot be made to the corrected plat because it did not come into existence until approximately 20 years after the conveyance. See Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). Appellants have neither alleged nor suggested, either in the trial court or in this court, that their claim to title was based upon anything other than this void deed. Appellee has shown by competent summary judgment evidence, peaceful and exclusive possession of the 395 acres for over five years.

  8. State v. Dunn

    574 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the Buskes retained no right, title, or interest in the tracts because the exception failed to state with requisite certainty the description of the excepted area

    Therefore, the Buskes retained no right, title or interest in the two acre tract. See Fuentes v. Hirsch, 472 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1969, no writ). However, in 1964 the Buskes purported to convey by deed to the State the fee for the west 130 feet of the highway right-of-way, it being a 1.161 acre tract out of the two acre tract which the Buskes had no interest in.

  9. Mooney v. Ingram

    547 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)   Cited 19 times
    Stating “there is no enforceable contract where the agreement of the parties leaves an essential term for later determination and it is never determined”

    Therefore, the present suit must be regarded as an action for damages for breach of an executory contract, and so considered, it fails because the contract is too indefinite to be enforced. Plaintiff would apply to this contract the rule sometimes applied with respect to deeds, that if the description of the whole tract is sufficient, but there is an indefinite reservation or exception, title to the whole tract passes and only the reservation or exception fails, citing Lewis v. Midgett,448 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1969, no writ); Fuentes v. Hirsch,472 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1971, writ ref'd n. r. e.); and De Roach v. Clardy, 52 Tex.Civ.App. 233, 113 S.W. 22 (1908) (writ ref'd). These cases stand for the rule that after a vendor has sold land, delivered the deed, and transferred possession, he or his heirs will not be permitted to recover title to the entire property because of uncertainty of an exception for which the vendor was himself responsible.

  10. Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Authority

    545 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)   Cited 15 times

    Inasmuch as the easement before us does not furnish within itself a description to its location, nor is there any reference to outside aids to help in determining its location, the easement must fail for lack of an adequate description. Lewis v. Midgett, 448 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Civ.App.1969, no writ); City of Port Arthur v. Badeaux, 425 S.W .2d 658 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref. n.r.e.). Judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is here rendered for appellants declaring the easement void.