Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-1574-R
August 28, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. Background
Nature of the Case: Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division and formerly incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail, has filed the instant unspecified civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In his original complaint filed August 14, 2001, plaintiff names Judge Jerry Meier; Jim Bowles; Bill Hill and Bill Wiskyre, District Attorneys; and his public defender, E.A. Sere, as defendants. In an amended complaint he omits Bill Hill and E.A. Sere as defendants. He later indicates that he plans to sue the Dallas Police Department; Dallas Police Department Child Protective Services; Judge Lusk; Bill Hill, and the Dallas District Attorney's Office. (See Answer to Question 5 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) No process has been issued in this case.
Plaintiff specifically names "Dallas Police Department Children Services Protective." The Court has altered the name of the defendant to "Dallas Police Department Child Protective Services", as plaintiff also refers to CPS at times — an acronym associated with Child Protective Services.
In an effort to flesh out plaintiff's claims and determine the precise defendants, the Court mailed plaintiff a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire on September 13, 2001. Plaintiff completed and returned his answers. He therein describes the acts or omissions of Judge Meier, Jim Bowles, and Bill Wiskyre that led to this action. (See Answers to Questions 1-4 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.) He also lists additional defendants in answer to Question 5, but provides no facts supporting a claim against them. (See Answer to Question 5 of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire.)
As plaintiff omitted E.A. Sere from his amended complaint and did not mention him as a defendant in answer to Question 5 of the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, the Court deems the claims against him abandoned. E.A. Seres should be terminated as a party to this suit.
Statement of the Case: Plaintiff filed this civil action on August 14, 2001. On August 29, 2001, he filed an amended complaint. He asserts numerous claims against the various defendants named in his amended complaint. He seeks his release from imprisonment and monetary damages.
II. Screening for Frivolity
The Court has permitted plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. His complaint is thus subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, plaintiff's complaint is also subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A regardless of whether he proceeds in forma pauperis. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal, if the Court finds the complaint "frivolous" or "malicious" or if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."
A claim is frivolous, when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law, furthermore, when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact, when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, on the other hand, when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F. Supp.2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
Plaintiff's claims appear to arise out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id.
III. Findings
Plaintiff has no claim that survives summary dismissal. He seeks some relief that is simply unavailable in this civil action. He also seeks relief from individuals who are either immune from suit or not proper defendants under § 1983. He further seeks relief from entities who are not subject to suit under § 1983.
A. Available Relief
As part of the relief he seeks, plaintiff wants release from jail. Such relief, however, is an inappropriate remedy in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554 (1974). Accordingly, this claim for relief does not survive summary dismissal. Plaintiff thus has only one proper basis for relief under § 1983, i.e. monetary damages.
The Court declines to construe this civil action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff has already filed such an action and the Court has dismissed it for his failure to exhaust his state remedies. Plaintiff makes no indication that he has yet exhausted his state remedies.
B. Claims Against State Judges
Plaintiff asserts that Judge Lusk set excessive bail. He further asserts that District Judge Jerry Meier showed bias and impartiality has she presided over his state proceedings. He asserts that she denied him proper bail and legal representation. He contends that she took an adversarial position and conspired with the District Attorney's Office to subject him to twelve months imprisonment. He claims that she refused him an evidentiary hearing. He asserts that she wrongly kept him in jail.
The claims against the state judges prompt consideration of judicial immunity. Judges are absolutely immune to monetary damages while acting in the performance of their judicial duties. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 745-46 (1982). Judges are immune from suit for damages resulting from any judicial act, unless performed in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991). Allegations of bad faith or malice do not overcome judicial immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. "The fact that it is alleged that the judge acted pursuant to a conspiracy and committed grave procedural errors is not sufficient to avoid absolute judicial immunity." Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
In this case, plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest that Judges Meier or Lusk acted without jurisdiction. His claims against these judges are essentially trying to hold them liable for performing judicial acts. Judges, however, are immune from monetary damages for such claims. Judges Meier and Lusk are thus completely immune from damages on the claims asserted against them. Accordingly, there is no basis for holding them liable. Plaintiff's claims against the judges should be dismissed as frivolous.
C. Claims Against Sheriff
The claims against Sheriff Bowles likewise do not survive summary dismissal. One cannot prevail against a supervisor, such as Sheriff Bowles, under § 1983, unless the supervisor's (1) conduct directly caused a constitutional violation or (2) the supervisor was "deliberately indifferent" to a violation of a constitutional right. Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531U.S. 816 (2000). The acts of a subordinate "trigger no individual § 1983 liability." Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). There must be some showing of personal involvement by a particular individual defendant to prevail against such individual. Id.; Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).
In this instance, plaintiff presents no specific incident or causative link between his claims and conduct on the part of Sheriff Bowles. He makes no allegations of any policy that impinged his constitutional or federally protected rights. He articulates no facts that demonstrate a violation of his rights by Sheriff Bowles. The claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed. Liability under § 1983 requires some level of personal involvement in the claimed deprivation. Plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Bowles appear based, if anything, upon his supervisory role as Sheriff of Dallas County.
D. Claims Against District Attorney
Plaintiff alleges that District Attorney Bill Wiskyre tried to trick him into a plea bargain and when plaintiff resisted Mr. Wiskyre resorted to illegal tactics. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity to initiate and pursue criminal prosecutions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). The allegations against Mr. Wiskyre appear limited to actions taken while in his role as prosecutor. Plaintiff is essentially trying to hold him liable for performing prosecutorial acts. Mr. Wiskyre, however, enjoys absolute immunity against such liability. The claims against Mr. Wiskyre should be dismissed.
Plaintiff also sues Bill Hill for the unfair and illegal law practices by his office. These claims fail for the same reasons the claims against Sheriff Bowles failed. Plaintiff has shown no personal involvement by Bill Hill. He has alleged no policy or custom of the District Attorney's Office that has impinged his constitutional or federally protected rights. One cannot be held liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the acts of a subordinate.
E. Claims Against Governmental Entities
The claims against the Dallas Police Department, the Dallas Police Department Child Protective Services, and the Dallas County District Attorney's Office likewise fail. A plaintiff may not bring a civil rights action against a servient political agency or department unless such agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). In Darby, the Fifth Circuit held that "unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself." Id. at 313. Neither the police department, the Dallas Police Department Child Protective Services, nor the district attorney's office are jural entities that can be sued. Id. at 313-14 (holding that a police department is not a jural entity); Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep't, 915 F. Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that county district attorney's office is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued). Plaintiff thus seeks relief from entities that are not subject to suit under § 1983. Consequently, the action against them should be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).