Opinion
20-CV-7973 (CM)
12-03-2020
REGINA LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN JACOBSON; JAMES SKOUFIS; SEAN PATRICK MALONEY; JOSEPH DONAT, City Manager; CITY OF NEWBURGH, Defendants.
ORDER :
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants are discriminating against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, the Hobbs Act, and the "Obstruction Federal criminal statutes." (ECF No. 2, at 1.) By order dated October 8, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).
In a prior action, Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith had conducted a competency hearing under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, in which she determined that Plaintiff was not competent to represent herself in that action. Lewis v. Newburgh Hous. Auth., ECF 7:11-CV-3194, 153 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017). Judge Smith held the hearing on September 29, 2017, and by order dated March 6, 2020 (ECF No. 211), she denied Plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and to reopen the action, concluding that there was no basis to modify the September 29, 2017 determination that Plaintiff was not competent to represent herself. (ECF Nos. 205, 208-210).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses from this action the claims brought against U.S. Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, New York State Assemblymember Jonathan Jacobson, and New York State Senator James Skoufis as frivolous. As for the remaining claims, brought against the City of Newburgh and Joseph Donat, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to reassign the action to a district judge, in accordance with the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Court Judges.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Regina Lewis brings this complaint against (1) U.S. Representative Sean Patrick Maloney, New York State Assemblymember Jonathan Jacobson, and New York State Senator James Skoufis (the "Legislator Defendants"); and (2) the City of Newburgh and Newburgh City Manager Joseph Donat (the "Newburgh Defendants").
The following facts are taken from the complaint: Plaintiff is "personally being shunned and [discriminated against] based on [her] race, gender, disability, and poverty because of the inability to make large campaign donations or to campaign." (ECF No. 2, at 1.) Although Plaintiff is "the Chief Executive Officer of two legal entities . . . neither organization has received funding from any source and the defendants refuse to provide assistance through community constituent services." (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff has "made numerous requests for legislative advocacy." (Id.) But "[t]he defendants refuse to engage in meaningful communication despite numerous promises." (Id.) For example, Newburgh City Manager "Donat refuse[s] to allow his scheduler to make an appointment." (Id.) In fact, the Newburgh Defendants have "denied [her] support after presenting [her] cause to the defendants . . . [and was] denied altogether without reason and then misinforming [her] that there is no information or resources available." (Id. at 2.)
As for the Legislator Defendants, Plaintiff alleges "that they have no idea as to funding or any service that can help [her] further [her] goals for [her]self and [her] organizations." (Id. at 3.) These defendants are therefore "liable for discrimination and obstruction," as they "have denied [Plaintiff] legislative assistance and constituent services." (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's claims against Maloney, Jacobson, and Skoufis are dismissed as frivolous. Local legislators sued under civil rights statutes are entitled to absolute immunity for their legislative activities. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998). And the doctrine of legislative immunity protects members of Congress from defending themselves in court from acts committed within their official capacity. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 6; see Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85 (1967) ("It is the purpose and office of the doctrine of legislative immunity, having its roots as it does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution [citation omitted] that legislators engaged in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity [citation omitted] should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Plaintiff's claims against the Legislator Defendants concern their legislative activities, they are absolutely immune from any liability. When "it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit," a complaint is dismissed as "frivolous." See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court therefore dismisses these defendants from this action as the claims against them are frivolous.
Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Maloney, Jacobson, and Skoufis as frivolous, and not on the merits, the Court need not address the issue of Plaintiff's competency as to the dismissal of these claims. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (dismissal of an IFP complaint on ground of frivolousness is not a dismissal on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court's discretion under the IFP statute). But while these claims are frivolous, in an abundance of caution, the Court dismisses them without prejudice. See Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2009) (courts should dismiss without prejudice claims of incompetent persons who appear without a guardian ad litem or counsel).
Plaintiff's claims brought against the Newburgh Defendants may not be dismissed as frivolous. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to reassign this matter to a district judge, who will determine whether to conduct a new competency hearing to consider Plaintiff's status at this time.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
The Court dismisses as frivolous, and without prejudice, Plaintiff's claims against Maloney, Jacobson, and Skoufis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to reassign the action to a district judge, in accordance with the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Court Judges. No summons shall issue at this time.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: December 3, 2020
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge