Opinion
No. 04-0490979 S
September 2, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I FACTS
On June 16, 2004, the plaintiff, Beverly Lewis, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, H.N.S. Management Company, Inc., doing business as Connecticut Transit, alleging a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. According to the complaint, on July 2, 2003, the plaintiff was a passenger on a bus operated by the defendant when an unidentified vehicle collided with the bus, causing the plaintiff numerous injuries. The plaintiff alleges that the unidentified vehicle qualifies as an uninsured motor vehicle, and the defendant is self-insured and is, therefore, obligated to provide her with uninsured motorist benefits.
On February 14, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant is an arm of the state and as such it is entitled to sovereign immunity. On March 9, 2005, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion and a memorandum of law in support thereof. On May 27, 2005, following a hearing on the motion, each party filed a supplemental memorandum.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . Moreover, [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . . When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005).
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that in Gordon v. H.N.S. Management, 272 Conn. 81, 861 A.2d 1160 (2004), the court decided that the defendant is an arm of the state and, as such, it is entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to claims for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff counters that her law suit and the accident predate the decision in Gordon, and the court should not apply the decision retroactively.
It is undisputed that, in Gordon, which was decided on December 21, 2004, the Supreme Court found that the defendant, who is also the defendant in the present action, "is an arm of the state and is entitled to claim sovereign immunity." Id., 105. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the defendant for uninsured motorist benefits. These claims arose under the same circumstances as the plaintiff's claims in the present action. The only issue is whether the decision in Gordon should be applied to the plaintiff's claims, which arose on July 2, 2003, a year and a half before Gordon was decided.
In Neyland v. Board of Education, 195 Conn. 174, 179, 487 A.2d 181 (1985), our Supreme Court explained the three-part test for determining whether a decision should only be applied prospectively, as set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). This is the test that the plaintiff relies on. The court held, however that the CT Page 12215 Chevron Oil Co. test is inapplicable to subject matter jurisdictional rulings. Neyland v. Board of Education, supra, 195 Conn. 182-83. Instead, the court has determined that in deciding whether such rulings can be applied retrospectively the court will "consider whether exceptional circumstances or overriding needs of public policy similar to those present in [ Northern Pipeline Construction Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) exist] to merit a conclusion of [prospective only application]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Denardo v. Bergamo, 272 Conn. 500, 511, 863 A.2d 686 (2004) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 817). Accordingly, a judicial decision that pertains to subject matter jurisdiction "should be limited to prospective application only if exceptional circumstances or overriding needs of public policy exist that dictate such a conclusion." Id.
In the present case, this court finds that no exceptional circumstances exist and that the underlying public policy concerns of the uninsured motorist statutes are not similar to those that were present in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., supra, 458 U.S. 50. In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court "concluded that the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) is unconstitutional." Id., 88. The court realized, however, that "retroactive application would not further the operation of [the] holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts." Id. Therefore, the court decided that its decision should only apply prospectively. Id. Here, the public policy concerns behind the uninsured motorist statute are strong, but they do not rise to the level of the concerns present in Northern Pipeline. As the court noted in Northern Pipeline, vast numbers of litigants relied upon the bankruptcy courts and an overhaul of the system would place tremendous hardship on those people. Although the retrospective application of the Gordon decision will have a negative impact on litigants in the plaintiff's position, the decision does not completely frustrate the purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes. Moreover, these considerations must be weighed against the policy considerations that favor the granting of sovereign immunity to the defendant. Specifically the purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity "is to protect the state from liability for private litigation that may interfere with the functioning of state government and may impose fiscal burdens on the state . . . [and] any money judgment against the defendant ultimately will be paid out of state coffers and . . . interfere with a government function, namely, the state's operation of its system of public transportation." Gordon v. H.N.S. Management, supra, 272 Conn. 105. In addition, in Gordon, the court impliedly determined that its ruling should not only be applied prospectively because, after deciding that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, the court reversed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's motion to dismiss and ordered that the case be "remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaints." Id., 106.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
Rodriguez, J.