Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-4778
September 23, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Darriel Lewis (a/k/a Darrell Lewis) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania. For the reasons which follow, the habeas petition should be summarily dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following a bench trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, No. 3498 EDA 2001, Mem. Op. at 2 (Pa. Super, filed Dec. 23, 2002); see also Hab. Pet. ¶¶ 1-6. On November 14, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to three to six (3-6) years in prison. See Pa. Super. Ct. Op. filed 12/23/02, at 2; see also Hab. Pet. ¶ 3. On December 23, 2002, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Pa. Super. Ct. Op. filed 12/23/02, at 5; see also Hab. Pet. ¶ 9. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied petitioner's request for allowance of appeal on June 26, 2003. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 817 A.2d 1180 (Pa.Super. 2002) (table), allocator denied, 827 A.2d 1201 (Pa. 2003) (table); see Hab. Pet. ¶ 11. Petitioner thereafter filed the present habeas petition alleging that evidence used in support of his conviction was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure without a warrant. See Hab. Pet. ¶ 12(A)-(B).
II. DISCUSSION
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court examined the nature of the exclusionary rule and balanced its utility as a deterrent against the risk of excluding trustworthy evidence and thus "deflect[ing] the truthfinding process and often free[ing] the guilty."Id. at 490. The Supreme Court found that, as to collateral review, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits of its application. Id. at 494-95; see Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 81 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1492 (2003). Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95; see Marshall, 307 F.3d at 81-82.
In the present case, petitioner was provided a suppression hearing by the trial court, see N.T. Mot. to Suppress 7/10/00, at 1-32;see also Pa. Super. Ct. Op. filed 12/23/02, at 1-2, and the Superior Court considered petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims on appeal,see id. at 3-5. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present and argue his Fourth Amendment claims.See Hab. Pet. ¶ 12(A)-(B); see, e.g., Miller v. Chesney, 2002 WL 467760, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2002) (where petitioner failed to claim he was denied opportunity to present and argue his claims in state court, district court was barred from reviewing petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim).
On direct appeal, petitioner "challenge[d] the trial court's refusal to suppress ninety-three vials of crack cocaine found in an unregistered van that had no VIN number and no license plate."See Pa. Super. Ct. Op. filed 12/23/02, at 1. The Pennsylvania courts found that since petitioner had no constitutionally-protected privacy interest in the van where the evidence at issue was found, he was not entitled to relief on his claim that the evidence should have been suppressed. Id. at 4.
Since petitioner was provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claims in the Pennsylvania courts, he may not be granted federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence was obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494; Marshall, 307 F.3d at 81; Hubbard v. Carroll, 2003 WL 277252, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 5, 2003) (quotingDeputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Even otherwise potentially meritorious Fourth Amendment claims are barred on habeas when the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them."), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994)); Reinert v. Larkin, 211 F. Supp.2d 589, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("Even if a federal court believes that the claim was wrongly decided by the state court,Stone v. Powell precludes reexamination of the state court's determination that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred as long as there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim."). Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted in the present case.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In the United States District Courts provides: "If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified." In the present case, for the aforementioned reasons, it plainly appears that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. Therefore, the petition should be summarily dismissed.
Pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 22.2 of the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at the time a final order denying a habeas petition is issued, the district judge is required to make a determination as to whether a certificate of appealability ("COA") should issue. Under the AEDPA, "a COA may not issue unless `the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.'"Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)). When a federal court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, the prisoner must demonstrate that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484;see Walker v. Frank, 2003 WL 115951, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003); Woods v. Kearney, 215 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (D. Del. 2002).
"Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further."Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; see Woods, 215 F. Supp.2d at 464. Here, for the reasons set forth above and in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. Powell precluding re-examination of the state court's determination that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, a reasonable jurist could not conclude that the Court would be incorrect in dismissing the present petition. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, a COA should not issue.
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this ___ day of September, 2003, upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for the reasons given in the accompanying Report, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the habeas petition be SUMMARILY DISMISSED and that a certificate of appealability should not issue.