Opinion
09-26-2017
In re Adonna LEWIS, Petitioner, v. DAYTON BEACH PARK # 1 CORP., et al., Respondents.
Law Office of Courtney K. Davy, LLP, New York (Courtney K. Davy of counsel), for petitioner. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Megan E.K. Montcalm of counsel), for New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, respondent.
Law Office of Courtney K. Davy, LLP, New York (Courtney K. Davy of counsel), for petitioner.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Megan E.K. Montcalm of counsel), for New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, respondent.
Determination of respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development, dated June 8, 2015, which issued a certificate of eviction upon a finding that the Mitchell–Lama apartment leased to petitioner was not her primary residence, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Manuel J. Mendez, J.],entered d on or about March 2, 2016), dismissed, without costs.
The determination that petitioner failed to maintain the apartment as her primary residence, as required by the rules applicable to Mitchell–Lama apartments (see 28 RCNY 3–02[n][4] ), is supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180–182, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 [1978] ). Such evidence includes petitioner's filing of documents with public agencies, including the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles and the New York County Board of Elections, listing a different address, petitioner's possession of a Maryland driver's license and vehicle registration, and petitioner's admission that, for an unspecified period of time, she was a dual resident of New York and Maryland. In addition, the Hearing Officer found that petitioner's claim of primary residence was not credible (see Matter of Cyril v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 140 A.D.3d 632, 33 N.Y.S.3d 706 [1st Dept.2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 913, 2017 WL 525291 [2017] ; Matter of Arroyo v. Donovan, 70 A.D.3d 517, 896 N.Y.S.2d 14 [1st Dept.2010] ; Matter of Studley v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 277 A.D.2d 101, 715 N.Y.S.2d 697 [1st Dept.2000] ).
Petitioner's request that, in the alternative, this Court grant her son, a nonparty to both the administrative proceeding and the instant proceeding, the right to claim succession rights, is not properly before this Court (see Matter of King v. New York City Hous. Auth., 118 A.D.3d 636, 989 N.Y.S.2d 470 [1st Dept.2014] ). In any event, "[f]amily members do not have the right to succeed the tenant/cooperator in occupancy if the housing company terminates the tenancy of a tenant/cooperator for cause" (28 RCNY 3–02[p][4] ).
FRIEDMAN, J.P., RICHTER, MOSKOWITZ, GESMER, JJ., concur.