Assuming, arguendo, that the Commonwealth's evidence proved all other elements of the crime, the record does not contain evidence that Shropshire acquired any type of ownership interest in the Taurus. In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 503 S.E.2d 222 (1998), this Court held that the defendant acquired a sufficient property interest to support his conviction for larceny by false pretenses by receipt of a temporary certificate of ownership. The Commonwealth argues that the issuance of a temporary certificate of ownership was not necessary to support the holding in Lewis and was not required in this case to prove the requisite element of ownership.

See State v. Small, 873 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Mo.App. 1994) (holding that because defendant had used false information to gain the car, a failure to breach a financing contract did not matter because "the crime was completed when defendant drove the car off [the] lot"). In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 503 S.E.2d 222 (1998), the defendant, who was convicted of grand larceny, claimed that a temporary certificate of ownership did not give him sufficient title to satisfy the elements of grand larceny. See id. at 168, 503 S.E.2d at 223.

However, where vehicles are financed, title remains with the creditor; purchasers are given ownership of financed vehicles. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 503 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1998). The issuance of the Temporary Certificate of Title transferred ownership of the Truck to Nigh on February 4, 2000.

"By omitting this element from the jury instructions, the trial court failed to inform the jury ‘as to the essential elements of the offense.’ " Lewis v. Commonwealth , 28 Va. App. 164, 172, 503 S.E.2d 222 (1998) (quoting Darnell , 6 Va. App. at 488, 370 S.E.2d 717 ). We find this omission to be error.

"The Supreme Court has unambiguously held that in a prosecution for larceny by false pretenses, the Commonwealth must prove 'the fraudulent intent . . . existed at the time the false pretenses were made, by which the property was obtained.'" Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 164, 172 (1998) (quoting Riegert v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 511, 518 (1977)). Thus, the question is whether "the intent to defraud existed at the time the act was committed."

We recognize that the terms are not always synonymous. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 164, 169, 503 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1998) (affirming a false pretenses conviction even though the seller retained title to a truck as security under a conditional sales contract). However, as used here, “title” means “the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself,” not the other common use connoting “[l]egal evidence of a person's ownership rights in property.”

In the appellant's case, in contrast to Shropshire, the evidence supports a finding that the appellant obtained sufficient documentation of a transfer of title to Upadhyay's timber rights to also obtain a contract with Short. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 168, 503 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1998) (recognizing that "'the doctrine that one must obtain title and possession in order to be guilty of the crime of false pretenses cannot mean an absolute title because any title obtained by fraud is voidable and the requirement would make it impossible for the crime to be consummated'" (quoting Whitmore v. State, 298 N.W. 194, 195 (Wis. 1941))). The evidence further supports a finding that, as a result of that contract, the appellant received some or all of the $50,000 purchase price paid by Short and Short received the timber.

Indeed, the granted instruction made no reference to repayment, nonpayment, or the intent to repay Clayton. Furthermore, the granted instruction complied with the holding in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 172, 503 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1998). In Lewis, we stated: "the jury should have been instructed that the intent to defraud must have existed at the time the false representations were made.

"[An appellate] court's responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is 'to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.' " Lewis v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 164, 171, 502 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1998) (quoting Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988)). Instruction No. 3 clearly stated the principle of law codified in Code § 18.2-183.