Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-2613-GTV
May 19, 2003.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs bring this civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Topeka and five Topeka police officers. Plaintiffs allege that during a pretextual traffic stop, the police officers physically attacked Plaintiffs and verbally abused them. Plaintiffs further allege that they were wrongfully detained in the Shawnee County Jail. Plaintiffs claim that these actions violated the provisions of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Kansas.
The case is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 16). Defendants ask the court to dismiss the claims against the Topeka police officers in their official capacities. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiffs are bringing their claims against the Topeka police officers in their official or individual capacities. To the extent that Plaintiffs have named Defendants in their official capacities, the court dismisses the claims.
"[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S 159, 166 (1985) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs have sued the City of Topeka in addition to the individual police officers. They have served the City, and the City has filed an Answer. Plaintiffs' claims against the police officers in their official capacities are therefore redundant. See Smith v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 216 F. Supp.2d 1209, 1219-20 (D.Kan. 2002) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a sheriff in his official capacity when the Board of County Commissioners was also a party); Burns v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp.2d 1278, 1296-97 (D.Kan. 2002) (noting that if a motion to dismiss were not moot, the court would dismiss a § 1983 claim against the defendants in their official capacities because the Board of County Commissioners was also a party); see also Miller v. Brungardt, 916 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (D.Kan. 1996) (holding that it was duplicative for a plaintiff to bring a Title VII claim against both an employer and a supervisor in his official capacity).
In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, the court dismisses the claims against the officers in their official capacities. See Land v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc., 979 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (D.Kan. 1997) (citations omitted) (holding that in a Title VII case, dismissal of an official capacity claim against an employee when the employer is also a defendant promotes "`judicial economy and efficiency'" and "`prevents the possibility of juror confusion'").
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss the official capacity claims (Doc. 16) is granted.
Copies or notice of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.