Opinion
Case No. 4:02-cv-0221-DFH-WGH.
July 6, 2004
ENTRY ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This case presents several issues arising from an Indiana city's attempt to exercise its power of eminent domain. Plaintiffs are Glen Lewis and Lewis Equity Group, LLC ("Lewis Equity"). They have sued as defendants the City of Jeffersonville, Indiana ("the City") and its Board of Public Works and Safety, its Redevelopment Commission, and the members of those bodies. Lewis Equity owned several adjoining parcels of property within the city limits of Jeffersonville. The City, through its Redevelopment Commission and Board of Works, declared the property blighted and then took steps to acquire it by eminent domain. The City eventually tendered a check for $350,000 and then razed the buildings and fixtures on plaintiffs' property. The City has plans to sell the property for purposes of development consistent with the redevelopment plans for the area. Lewis and Lewis Equity seek damages and injunctive relief for what they allege to be an improper taking of the property.
The First Amended Complaint asserts two federal claims and six state law claims:
Count I Taking of Property in Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of U.S. Constitution;
Count II Taking of Property without Procedural Due Process in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Count III Claim for Injunctive Relief to Prevent Sale or Improper Use of Property by City;
Count IV Taking of Property in Violation of Indiana Constitution;
Count V Taking of Property without Due Process in Violation of Indiana Constitution;
Count VI State Law Trespass Claim;
Count VII Appeal of Condemnation Decision;
Count VIII Appeal of Property Valuation Determination.
The defendants have moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety. As discussed below, the defendants' motion is granted as to Counts One through Five, but denied as to Counts Six, Seven, and Eight.
Standards for Motions to Dismiss
Defendants seek dismissal under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When deciding a motion asserting a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Veazey v. Communications Cable of Chicago, Inc., 194 F. 3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1999). A defendant may, without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, provide to the court documents that are referred to in the complaint if they are central to plaintiffs' claims. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002). To the extent that the complaint contains allegations that show there is no viable claim, those admissions are binding and can cause a plaintiff to plead himself out of court. Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1995). When a defendant asserts under Rule 12(b)(1) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may consider materials outside the allegations of the complaint without converting the motion to a summary judgment motion. The party seeking federal jurisdiction must be able to establish that jurisdiction with competent evidence. Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1995); Kontos v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1987). In this case, however, plaintiffs have relied only on their allegations to oppose the jurisdictional challenge.
Facts for Purposes of Motion to Dismiss
Except where otherwise noted, the facts are taken from plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint or from Indiana statutes.
Indiana Code §§ 36-7-14-1 through 36-7-14-44.2 provide a detailed statutory framework for the redevelopment of blighted areas in Indiana. Pursuant to that framework, on November 1, 2000, the Jeffersonville Redevelopment Commission ("the Commission") passed a resolution declaring that an area that included plaintiffs' properties was "blighted." The apparent plan was for a redevelopment project that would replace a blighted area with a more sightly entryway into the City from across the Ohio River in Louisville, Kentucky. The Commission passed a resolution confirming the blight determination on March 28, 2001. Plaintiffs did not challenge the blight determination then, nor do they today. Negotiations for the purchase of the Lewis Equity properties by a private entity, which was interested in building a hotel within the project area, were unsuccessful. On June 26, 2002 the Executive Director of the Commission reported to the members that the Lewis properties would need to be condemned if the project was to move forward.
The declaration of property as blighted and its subsequent transfer to another private owner can serve a public purpose, at least as part of a broad redevelopment process. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). The constitutional due process requirements of notice required for government actions which would adversely affect a person's property interest do not apply until the condemnation process begins. The blight declaration itself is a legislative decision which may or may not lead to a taking. Reel Pipe Valve Co., Inc., v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis-Marion County, 633 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind.App. 1994). Thus, whether plaintiffs challenged the blight determination in 2001 does not matter at this stage of the litigation.
Further negotiations directly between the Commission and Lewis Equity for the purchase of the properties did not pan out, so on August 19, 2002 the Jeffersonville Board of Public Works and Safety (the "Works Board") passed a resolution condemning the properties. Such a resolution is the first step in the condemnation process available to cities, which is currently codified at Ind. Code § 32-24-2-1 et seq. The next step in that process is publication of notice of the resolution, along with the date chosen for the city to receive any remonstrance to the condemnation. Ind. Code § 32-24-2-6(b). A notice was published for remonstrances to be delivered to the Works Board on September 9, 2002. However, it appears that the notice was not published sufficiently in advance of the date for remonstrance. In any event, for reasons not yet evident, the Works Board did not hear remonstrances on September 9th and instead went through the resolution process again at its September 16, 2002 meeting. That resolution set a date of October 7, 2002 for receipt of any remonstrance, but the City published only a defective notice of this resolution. The publisher's affidavit shows only that the exhibit to the resolution was published. The exhibit was simply the property descriptions, so that publication provided no meaningful notice. From paragraph 30 of the First Amended Complaint it can be inferred that Lewis made it clear to the City that he believed the condemnation process was flawed because it was being pursued under statutes that had been repealed. However, paragraph 29 also points out that no notice of the resolution or the October 7th remonstrance date was published. Neither the pleadings nor copies of the notices indicate that plaintiffs ever received notice of the need to present any remonstrance at the October 7th meeting.
Having received no remonstrance at its October 7th meeting, the Board of Works confirmed the condemnation and the City went forward with the process on October 14, 2002, deciding to award damages of $350,000 to plaintiffs for taking the properties. The City Attorney sent counsel for plaintiffs a copy of the resolution awarding $350,000 and setting a date of October 28th for any written remonstrance with regard to the amount of the award. Plaintiffs did not remonstrate at the October 28, 2002 meeting. On October 29, 2002 a check in the amount of $350,000 was issued by the Jeffersonville Urban Enterprise Zone Association to the plaintiffs, and the City Attorney sent the check and a letter to the plaintiffs.
Shortly after the City Attorney mailed the check to plaintiffs, a contractor acting for the City entered plaintiffs' properties and razed the existing buildings. Plaintiffs returned the check through their counsel, claiming that the condemnation process was flawed and that plaintiffs intended to challenge the actions of the City. On November 12, 2002, in an apparent reaction to plaintiffs' return of the check and their challenge to its earlier actions, the Board of Works passed another resolution condemning the properties and setting December 2, 2002 as a date for remonstrance against the condemnation. Notice of that resolution and the date for remonstrance, as well as the property descriptions, was published twice as required by statute.
Plaintiffs did not remonstrate at the December 2, 2002 meeting, nor did they pursue an administrative appeal of the condemnation through the Indiana court system. Instead, on November 15, 2002 they filed their initial complaint in this federal action. The gist of that original complaint was that the City pursued condemnation under an outdated and inapplicable statutory scheme, without appropriate notice. Plaintiffs also invoked diversity jurisdiction to assert claims arising under state law. On December 2, 2002, with no remonstrance occurring, the Board again confirmed the condemnation of plaintiffs' properties.
Plaintiffs' Complaint and First Amended Complaint alleged that Lewis was a resident of Kentucky and Lewis Equity was a Kentucky limited liability company. These allegations were insufficient to establish diversity because each member of a limited liability company must be identified and the citizenship of each member must be determined. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998). When it became apparent that this court's jurisdiction over the state law claims would depend on diversity jurisdiction (because the federal claims must be dismissed as not ripe), the court ordered plaintiffs to show that diversity jurisdiction existed. Plaintiffs' response shows that Lewis and all other members of the limited liability company are citizens of Kentucky, so that complete diversity exists.
Plaintiffs' claim of improper statutory application arises from the 2002 recodification of Title 32 of the Indiana Code. Indiana Public Law 2-2002 was enacted in March 2002. It aimed to recodify Title 32 and the "prior property law" of the state "in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to interpret and apply." The law was effective July 1, 2002. Public Law 2-2002 provided that the enactment was merely a recodification and that, with limited exceptions not applicable here, "the substantive operation and effect of the prior property law continue uninterrupted as if the recodification act of the 2002 regular session of the general assembly had not been enacted."
The August, September, October and November 2002 resolutions passed by the Board of Public Works and the notices published all referred to the Indiana Code section citations as they existed prior to the recodification. Before the recodification, the condemnation process specific to municipalities was contained in Chapter 1.5 of Article 11 of Title 32. After recodification, those same statutory provisions appear in Chapter 2 of the new Article 16 of Title 32. Not until its December 2, 2002 resolution did the Works Board refer to the new Indiana Code citation for condemnation proceedings specific to municipalities. Lewis has argued, first to the City and now here, that citation to and reliance upon the previous sections of the Indiana Code by the City was inappropriate because those statutes had been repealed. Plaintiffs have framed and expanded those arguments by making claims under federal and state constitutional law, state tort law and an "appeal" of the condemnation process.
Analysis
Counts I IICount I of the First Amended Complaint asserts an unconstitutional taking of property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Count II asserts a federal claim for a taking of property without due process as a result of defective notice. Defendants point out correctly that these federal constitutional claims are not ripe for resolution because plaintiffs have not yet exhausted the available state procedures for obtaining compensation and/or blocking the taking.
Ripeness is one element of justiciability and is a prerequisite to the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in a federal court. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, 361 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004); Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 957-58 (7th Cir. 2004). In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985), the Supreme Court "articulated a special ripeness doctrine for constitutional property rights claims." Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Williamson County, federal courts are barred from adjudicating federal takings claims until the plaintiff has demonstrated (1) that he or she received a final decision from the relevant government entity, and (2) that he or she has sought compensation through the procedures the States has provided for doing so. Forseth, 199 F.3d at 372, quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-87. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over only those takings claims for which the Williamson County requirements are satisfied or otherwise excused. See, e.g., SGB Financial Services, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis-Marion County, 235 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 2000); Forseth, 199 F.3d at 368; Hager v. City of West Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Williamson County requirements stem from the fact that the federal Constitution does not prohibit the government from taking property for a public purpose. It requires that just compensation be paid when a taking occurs. Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1993). Generally, it does not matter whether the claim is described as a failure to pay just compensation, an inverse condemnation, or a due process violation because "Labels do not matter." River Park v. City of Highland, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994). Until the plaintiff has tried to use the remedies available through state law, the federal Constitution has not been violated. Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d at 286.
Indiana law provided plaintiffs with two options. Regardless of whether plaintiffs believed that the City cited inappropriate statutory authority or provided inadequate notice, if they knew of the October 7th meeting, plaintiffs could have remonstrated then or at the October 28th meeting regarding the award. At a minimum, plaintiffs have the statutory appeal process set forth in the appeal provisions of Ind. Code § 32-24-2-11 (after recodification) or Ind. Code § 32-11-1.5-8 (before recodification). Even assuming that the plaintiffs, who were represented by counsel by at least October 2002, were entirely confused as to what was occurring, they still had options to pursue. Whether the result of the Works Board's use of outdated statutory citations in its resolutions and notices or because of other faults in the notice, any cloud of confusion was lifted once plaintiffs received a check and a letter indicating that the City believed it had taken the steps needed to obtain the property through condemnation. At that point, even if they were previously unaware of their ability to remonstrate, to the extent plaintiffs believed the taking or method of determining compensation had occurred contrary to law, they could pursue inverse condemnation proceedings under Ind. Code § 32-24-1-16, which provides:
Right to procedures. — A person having an interest in property that has been or may be acquired for a public use without the procedures of this article or any prior law followed is entitled to have the person's damages assessed under this article substantially in the manner provided in this article.
Plaintiffs elected not to use the process of appeal directly to state court or inverse condemnation at that same state court level. Instead they came to this federal court. As discussed below, this court has diversity jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' state law claims. However, because the process of determining just compensation has yet to be exhausted, there is no ripe federal constitutional controversy. Counts I and II must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Count III
The remaining claims in the First Amended Complaint all arise under state law. Because the federal claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court would not exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In this relatively unusual case challenging a local government's condemnation of property, though, diversity of citizenship is complete. See note 3, above. Accordingly, in the absence of sound reasons for abstention, which are not present here, the court has an obligation to exercise its diversity jurisdiction. See Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959).
In Count III, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting the City from selling or alienating the properties in any way. They allege that the City wrongfully relied on Ind. Code § 32-24-2-1 et seq. to condemn the property because that statutory scheme is limited to acquiring property in order to "change, lay-out or vacate a street, alley or a public place. . . ." Ind. Code § 32-24-2-6. Therefore, say plaintiffs, the City must be prohibited from transferring or otherwise reducing the value of the property.
Plaintiffs' incomplete quotation from Ind. Code § 32-24-2-6(a) as a basis for a limitation on the city's ability to use that chapter's condemnation provisions is difficult to overlook. It is hard to believe that the plaintiffs simply passed right over the phrase immediately preceding their quotation when formulating the argument. Adding that phrase, the language reads:
This chapter applies if the works board of a municipality wants to acquire property for the use of the municipality or to open, change, lay-out or vacate a street, alley or a public place in the municipality, including a proposed street or alley crossings of railways or other rights of way.
Ind. Code § 32-24-2-6(a) (emphasis added). The Board of Works for Jeffersonville wanted "to acquire property for the use of the municipality." Count III is based on an incorrect statement of the law and must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Counts IV V
Plaintiffs assert claims under the Indiana Constitution in Counts IV and V. The First Amended Complaint states that the claims are made pursuant to Sections 12 and 21 of Article II of the Indiana Constitution. Article II deals with "Suffrage Elections," and it has no Section 21. It is obvious that plaintiffs mean to assert claims under Article I, Section 12, which is the Indiana Constitution's "Due Course of Law" provision, and Article I, Section 21, which provides for just compensation when property or particular services are taken by the state. While these sections of the Indiana Constitution have similarities to "due process" under the federal constitution, they are not the same. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 1998).
The court would ordinarily overlook such a citation error. But in light of plaintiffs' repeated attacks on the City for having cited the wrong statute, any sense of irony demands that the error at least be mentioned. The court hopes that it has not made any similar errors itself.
Defendants maintain that Count IV and V are really no more than plaintiffs' attempt to have this court try the inverse condemnation proceedings when the Indiana Constitution itself provides no such direct action. This court agrees that the pursuit of an action under these sections of the Indiana Constitution is an attempt to have this court hear the inverse condemnation proceedings. In Indiana, the state constitution prescribes the rights associated with eminent domain, but its process is regulated by statute. State v. Flamme, 26 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. 1940). The statutory process for eminent domain is also the process by which individuals may pursue damages through a claim for inverse condemnation. Ind. Code § 32-24-1-16. That process is the manner of obtaining or determining "just compensation" pursuant to the Indiana Constitution. See State v. Pollitt, 45 N.E.2d 480, 482-83 (Ind. 1942) ("In this state the exercise of the right of eminent domain is prescribed by the Constitution and regulated by statute."), quoting State v. Flamme, 26 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. 1940). As a result, it appears to the court that any claim directly under the state constitution would duplicate an inverse condemnation claim under the statute. Since the court's diversity jurisdiction gives the court jurisdiction over Counts VII and VIII, which seek adjudication of both the adequacy of the condemnation proceedings and the award of compensation, Counts IV and V are duplicative and are dismissed without prejudice.
Count VI
Plaintiffs maintain in Count VI that agents of the City committed trespass by entering the properties and razing the existing improvements in November 2002. They seek damages in excess of $500,000 for repair of the properties to their former state. Defendants argue that this claim presumes that the October 28, 2002 condemnation was ineffective and therefore Count VI should be dismissed. The court could not dismiss Count VI without determining as a matter of law that the City complied with all state and federal requirements. As discussed below, whether the condemnation process was effective is an issue to be determined as a part of the appeal/inverse condemnation claims in Counts VII and VIII. The trespass claim in Count VI remains viable, at least until the court determines that issue. Counts VII VIII
In Count VII and Count VIII, plaintiffs seek to appeal the condemnation and the compensation award respectively. Plaintiffs cite Ind. Code § 32-24-2-11(a) as the authority for their appeal. That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
32-24-2-11. Appeal — Costs. — (a) The appeal may be taken by filing an original complaint in the court against the municipality within the time required by section 10(c) [IC 32-24-2-10(c)] of this chapter, . . .
Ind. Code § 32-24-2-11(a). The referenced "section 10(c)" provides that the appeal must be taken within 20 days of the decision. Ind. Code § 32-24-2-10(c).
Defendants argue that plaintiffs waited too long to appeal the condemnation and award. They point out that the condemnation resolution was passed on September 16th and confirmed without remonstrance on October 7th. The Works Board determined the value of plaintiffs' properties to be $350,000 by resolution of October 14th, and a copy of the same was sent directly to plaintiffs' attorney with notice of the opportunity to remonstrate as to the amount of the award at the meeting to be held on October 28th. No remonstrance was made on October 28th. Defendants maintain that more than 20 days passed between the condemnation confirmation of October 7th and the filing of the initial complaint in this case on November 15th, and the only appeal mentioned in that complaint was of the condemnation process. They also maintain that as to the amount of the award, a written remonstrance is a prerequisite to the exercise of the right of appeal, citing Ind. Code § 32-24-2-10(c). Finally, they argue that any mistake that might have been made with regard to the condemnation notice or proceedings was cured by the subsequent condemnation resolution passed on November 13th and confirmed without remonstrance on December 2, 2002. That action was never timely appealed either, according to defendants.
Defendants would have a stronger argument if it were not for the failure of notice to the plaintiffs of the opportunity to remonstrate against the September 16th condemnation resolution. Indiana Code § 32-24-2-6(b) requires such notice. A Board of Public Works must consider any remonstrance before taking final action on a condemnation. Ind. Code § 32-24-2-6(c). It might be fair to infer from the First Amended Complaint that plaintiffs had notice that a condemnation resolution was passed on October 7th. However, nothing in the pleadings or attached materials shows conclusively that the plaintiffs had notice of the time and place for remonstrance to be made regarding that decision. Perhaps later developments in this litigation may show actual knowledge, waiver, or some other basis to find that plaintiffs knowingly gave up the opportunity to remonstrate with regard to the condemnation, but on a motion to dismiss, the court can make no such determination. Also, the City's efforts to cure the defect by "recondemning" the property after the bulldozers had already knocked down the buildings were, at a minimum, incomplete. Although Ind. Code § 32-24-2-9(d) provides that a supplementary proceeding "of the same general character" may correct a defect, this court is not prepared to find that a failure at step two of an interdependent six step process can be rectified by reaffirming step two without subsequently redoing steps three through six as well, especially after the buildings have been destroyed. Moreover, the "fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). One can fairly wonder whether a postdemolition remonstrance would receive consideration equivalent to that available before the demolition.
In ¶ 30 of the First Amended Complaint, between allegations in ¶ 29 of the incomplete notices of condemnation proceedings published on September 18th and 25th and allegations in ¶ 31 of the final condemnation actions of the Works Board, plaintiffs state that Glenn Lewis notified the City of his objection to the allegedly improper procedures. This allegation suggests that he had actual knowledge of the passing of the resolution, but it is inconclusive as to his knowledge of the time, place and manner for remonstrance.
Plaintiffs filed their appeal of the condemnation with this court within 20 days after the October 28th confirmation of the $350,000 compensation award, which was the last step in a multi-step process and a step that the statute suggests must be completed before an appeal may be made. Ind Code § 32-24-3-10(c). Though the statutes require a written remonstrance with regard to the compensation award, there is no such requirement that remonstrances to the condemnation resolution be in writing. The pleadings and attachments do not show that plaintiffs were made aware of the time and place to remonstrate against the condemnation resolution. Because final action as to condemnation must come after the Works Board considers any remonstrances, plaintiffs should not be denied the opportunity to oppose or appeal the condemnation. While the earlier blight determination may make it difficult for plaintiffs to proffer a convincing remonstrance to the condemnation, they are entitled to be heard, or to knowingly pass up that opportunity.
This court cannot decline to exercise its diversity jurisdiction simply because the issue is one of eminent domain under local law. Allegheny County v. Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 187 (1959). Rule 71A(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipates occasional involvement of federal district courts with state law condemnation proceedings. This court has jurisdiction to hear the disputes raised in Counts VI, VII and VIII. Whether Counts VII and VIII are deemed appeals of the condemnation and award proceedings respectively, or together as an inverse condemnation proceeding pursuant to Ind. Code § 32-24-2-16, seems inconsequential to the court at this stage. The claims have been adequately raised by the pleadings. The legal questions posed are whether plaintiffs have a legitimate objection to the City's taking of property and, if not, the amount of just compensation. Only if plaintiffs have a valid objection to the decision to take the property would there be any additional issue of damages for the improper taking or trespass.
Accordingly, the court intends to apply Rule 71A to adjudicate the issues presented. Although the condemning party is not the plaintiff in this action (nor would it be in an inverse condemnation proceeding in state court), the procedural steps outlined by the rule can be adapted. Rule 71A(e) requires the property owner to make its objections to the proposed taking in an answer to the complaint seeking to condemn. That would seem the logical starting point for the further litigation of this action. Individual Defendants
As indicated earlier, the City can present evidence of actual knowledge and/or knowing waiver on the part of the plaintiffs with respect to their opportunity to remonstrate to the original condemnation resolution, thereby precluding subsequent efforts to do so. However, that must be done at trial or perhaps pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Defendants have argued that the individual members of the Works Board and Redevelopment Commission are not proper parties. Plaintiffs responded by arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows them to sue the individual members for the deprivation of their federal constitutional rights. Because plaintiffs federal claims are not ripe and must be dismissed, there is no basis for keeping the individual defendants in the case.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Counts I and II and all claims against the individual defendants are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Count III is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Counts IV and V are dismissed without prejudice as duplicative. The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Counts VI, VII, and VIII. Those counts will proceed against defendants City of Jeffersonville, the Jeffersonville Redevelopment Commission, and the Jeffersonville Board of Public Works and Safety.So ordered.