The Court disagrees with the third-party defendant's contention. In Lewis-Moors v. Contel of New York, Inc., 563 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (3d Dep't 1990), a case factually analogous to the case at bar, plaintiff was injured when a telephone pole to which his safety belt was attached and on which he was standing collapsed. Defendant argued, inter alia, that it had not violated § 240(1) because plaintiff was equipped with a proper safety device, such as the safety belt.

As both the plaintiff and the defendant acknowledge, tree cutting and removal, in and of themselves, are not activities subject to Labor Law § 240(1) ( see Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 296; Enos v Werlatone, Inc., 68 AD3d 713; Morales v Westchester Stone Co., Inc., 63 AD3d 805). Those activities are generally excluded from statutory protection because a tree is not a building or structure, as contemplated by the statute but, rather, "a product of nature" ( Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d at 296; see Burr v Short, 285 AD2d 576; Gavin v Long Is. Light. Co., 255 AD2d 551, 552; McGregor v Bravo, 251 AD2d 1002; Serviss v Long Is. Light. Co., 226 AD2d 442; see also Caddy v Interborough R.T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420; Lewis-Moors v Contel of N.Y., 167 AD2d 732, 733, affd 78 NY2d 942). Here, however, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff fell from the roof of a building while in the process of removing a fallen tree that had come to rest at that location during a hurricane, that the tree removal was the first step in the process of undertaking structural repairs to the building, and that the repairs could only be commenced by removing the tree from the roof.

The cases relied upon by the dissent, however, are readily distinguishable from the fabrication situation at issue. In Lewis-Moors v Contel of N.Y. ( 78 NY2d 942, affg 167 AD2d 732), the plaintiff was employed on a project involving the removal and replacement of a network of telephone poles. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Third Department that "a telephone pole with attached hardware, cable and support systems constitutes a structure within the meaning of . . . section [240 (1)]" ( id. at 943).

The plaintiff alleges that he was injured when, while standing approximately 10 feet above the ground and cutting down a tree on the defendant's property, a tree limb struck him. The tree removal that the plaintiff was performing was outside the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1) since a tree is neither a building nor structure ( see Burr v Short, 285 AD2d 576; Gavin v Long Is. Light. Co., 255 AD2d 551, 552; Serviss v Long Is. Light. Co., 226 AD2d 442; see also Caddy v Interborough R.T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420 [1909]; Lewis-Moors v Contel of NY., 167 AD2d 732, 733, affd 78 NY2d 942). In any event, the defendant established, prima facie, that the activity that the plaintiff was performing at the time of the accident constituted routine maintenance outside of a construction or renovation context ( see Gavin v Long Is. Light. Co., 255 AD2d at 552; McGregor v Bravo, 251 AD2d 1002; cf. Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 296 [tree removal was part of overall renovation plan]).

A telephone pole, its attached hardware and supporting systems, including the wiring, has been considered a "structure" under § 240(1) ( Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960; Lewis-Moors v. Contel of New York, 167 A.D.2d 732, affd 78 N.Y.2d 942) . Moreover, plaintiff was stripping a transmission line to attach it to the Cablevision hardware, a covered "alteration" under the terms of the statute, because it involved a significant change to the composition of the structure ( see Weininger v. Hagedorn Co., 91 N.Y.2d 958; Joblon v. Solow, supra).

We affirm. In opposition to the motions for summary judgment, plaintiff had the burden of demonstrating that decedent was performing work necessary and incidental to the construction, renovation or repair of a building or structure for Brookview to be liable under Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see, Nephew v. Barcomb, 260 A.D.2d 821, 823, 688 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753;Perchinsky v. State of New York, 232 A.D.2d 34, 38, lv dismissed, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 830, lv denied sub nom. Perchinsky v. Granny "G" Prods., 93 N.Y.2d 812). It is well settled that a utility pole is a "structure" within the meaning of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) (Garrant v. New York Tel. Co., 179 A.D.2d 960;Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732, 733, affd 78 N.Y.2d 942;Dedario v. New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001, 1002) and that the removal of a utility pole is analogous to the demolition of a structure and, therefore, protected by Labor Law § 240 Lab. (see,Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., supra, at 734). However, it is clear that the removal of the utility pole upon which decedent was killed was not necessary or incidental to the installation of utilities at the subdivision.

However, we find defendant's arguments to be far too limited in their scope as to the matters at hand. As this court recently noted, a telephone pole, because of its "attached hardware, cable and support systems", is a structure within the scope of Labor Law § 240 (1) (Lewis-Moors v. Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732, 733, affd 78 N.Y.2d 942). It is undisputed that the telephone line at issue was suspended between two telephone poles. Notably the word structure "`in its broadest sense includes any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner'" (supra, at 733, quoting Caddy v Interborough Rapid Tr. Co., 195 N.Y. 415, 420). Given the liberal interpretation to be afforded Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Lewis-Moors v. Contel ofN.Y., supra, at 733) and the clear indication from the record that the telephone line involved here became a part of (or an offshoot of) the telephone pole "structures" to which they were attached (cf., Putnick v. H.M.C. Assocs., 137 A.D.2d 179, 185), summary judgment in defendant's favor was properly denied.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff was injured when he fell while unloading street light standards from a flatbed trailer at a lot where they were to be stored for future use throughout the City of Buffalo. The court properly dismissed his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action because the delivery of the street light standards was not to a construction site but was merely for stockpiling for future use (see, Cox v LaBarge Bros. Co., 154 A.D.2d 947, 947-948, lv dismissed 75 N.Y.2d 808; cf., Lewis-Moors v Contel of N.Y., 167 A.D.2d 732; Dedario v New York Tel. Co., 162 A.D.2d 1001). Likewise, the court correctly dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action (see, Sprague v Picciano, 100 A.D.2d 247, 249-250, lv denied 62 N.Y.2d 605).

"All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed." The pole on which the plaintiff was working was a structure within the meaning of this statute, and the work he was performing and the nature of the accident bring this incident within the coverage of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see, Lewis-Moors v Contel of N.Y., 167 AD2d 732 [3d Dept 1990], affd 78 NY2d 942 [1991]). The only issue that the defendant Hampton Bays has put in dispute in opposition to the current application is whether the defendant Hampton Bays, after contracting with the defendant Telepath, and having turned over control of the telephone installation project to Telepath, remained a party subject to the strict liability of Labor Law § 240 (1).

All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed. The pole on which the plaintiff was working was a structure within the meaning of this statute, and the work he was performing and the nature of the accident bring this incident within the coverage of Labor Law § 240(1) ( see,Lewis-Moors v Contel of New York, 167 A.D.2d 732, 563 N.Y.S.2d 303 [3d Dept., 1990], affd 78 N.Y.2d 942, 573 N.Y.S.2d 636). The only issue that the defendant Hampton Bays has put in dispute in opposition to the current application is whether the defendant Hampton Bays, after contracting with the defendant Telepath, and having turned over control of the telephone installation project to Telepath, remained a party subject to the strict liability of Labor Law § 240(1).