"Under Maine law and federal constitutional dictates of due process, service of process effected in a manner most reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant in fact of the proceeding is necessary to insure that the court in which an action is initiated gains personal jurisdiction over the parties." Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Me. 1981) (citing, inter alia, Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). "Any judgment by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over a party is void."

Maine's own Rule 60, like the federal rule, recognizes that an independent collateral attack based on litigation fraud may be brought even after the one-year period for a motion to reopen has passed. Me. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800 (Me. 1981). Quite apart from administrative reasons for this distinction between reopening and collateral attack, the conditions on relief are more severe when it is made by independent action.

As to equity, “an action to quiet title may be brought under the general equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court even though the plaintiff is not in possession, where fraud, an independent ground of equity jurisdiction is alleged and inadequate relief is available at law.” Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 804 n.8 (Me. 1981).

Although personal jurisdiction is not an issue in this case, we liken our holding that Thompson did not waive his lack of residency argument to our previous determinations that a failure to assert lack of personal jurisdiction does not waive the issue, and that even a default judgment entered without personal jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked. See Architectural Woodcraft Co. v. Read, 464 A.2d 210, 212 (Me. 1983); Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 805 (Me. 1981) ("Without personal jurisdiction, any judgment entered by such a court is void and . . . should not be given res judicata effect."). [¶ 21] The parties' statements of material facts indicate a factual dispute about Thompson's residency for years 1997-1999.

Additionally, and as addressed in the 1992 Advisory Committee Notes, service of process gives the court personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Me. 1981) ("Under Maine law and federal constitutional dictates of due process, service of process . . . is necessary to insure that the court in which an action is initiated gains personal jurisdiction over the parties."). See also Printed Media Servs., Inc. v. Solna Web, Inc., 11 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1993) (court lacks jurisdiction over defendant who was improperly served).

Although the Psonaks failed to cite the statute in their complaint, they brought the equivalent of the statutory real action at law to recover an estate in real property. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 6701 (1980); see also Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 802 (Me. 1981). [¶ 4] "[A] party is entitled to a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

. . ." Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228, 66 S.Ct. 556, 560, 90 L.Ed. 635 (1946) (holding that absence of notice barred District of Columbia court from according full faith and credit to a New York court's alimony award); see also Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 804-06 (Me. 1981) (holding that judgment in a quiet title action was void because, based on plaintiff's representation, court erroneously had required only notice by publication rather than actual service on known claimants); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 comment a, at 74 (1982) (stating that "however the proceeding is categorized [as true in rem or quasi in rem], means reasonably certain to result in actual notice must be used as against persons to be bound by the proceeding if they can be identified and located"); Me.R.Civ.P. 4(f) (authorizing service by mail outside Maine "where the pleading demands a judgment . . . affecting the title to any property") 4(g) (permitting service by publication by order of the court "upon a showing that service cannot with due diligence be made" personally or by mail). As we have noted, Rule 54(c) finds its source in a party's due process right to be heard in an action determining his or her rights.

Under Maine law a separate action may be brought alleging fraud on the court. Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 805 (Me. 1981). The nature of such an action, however, is to present a collateral attack on a judgment entered in a previous action.

The fact that the Enforcement Act subjects foreign judgments sought to be enforced in Maine to the “procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying the judgment” as would be available in the Maine trial courts, 14 M.R.S. § 8003, does not dictate that Reliable was required to employ Maine service of process rules for the Pennsylvania Court to obtain personal jurisdiction over Liberty individually, or over his corporate namesake. See Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 804–05 (Me.1981) (“Under Maine law and federal constitutional dictates of due process, service of process effected in a manner most reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant in fact of the proceeding is necessary to insure that the court in which an action is initiated gains personal jurisdiction over the parties.” (emphasis added)).

[P]rior to the April 26, 1990 meeting held by the Defendant Board of Directors, one or more members of the Defendant School Board discussed and/or deliberated on the merits of Ms. Marxsen's professional qualifications, suitability for reappointment for the . . . 1990-91 school year . . . Said discussions and/or deliberations took place outside of a regularly scheduled School Board meeting and were conducted in violation of the Maine Open Meeting Law. Consistent with our well established policy of construing pleadings to do substantial justice, M.R.Civ.P. 8(f); Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1981), we understand the allegation to mean that the official action on the renewal of Marxsen's contract, as a practical matter, took place during a clandestine meeting and not at the regularly scheduled April 26, 1990 board meeting. As a matter of pleading, this allegation is sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and the Superior Court erred in concluding otherwise.