Levy v. Lamar Sav. Lsng. Corp.

4 Citing cases

  1. Energy Res. Group v. Tarina Oil

    664 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    In order to come within the purview of exception 5, Tarina was required to prove a contract in writing designating a particular county or a definite place within a county for performance of an obligation. Flournoy Production Co. v. Kain, 626 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ); Levy v. Lamar Savings Leasing Corp., 584 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ). At the plea of privilege hearing held before the court it was stipulated that ERG was a resident and had its principal place of business in Harris County; and that the land and the wells in question in this suit are situated in La Salle County. Tarina's first amended original petition was admitted into evidence. The two farmout agreements entered into on July 31, 1981, by Tarina and ERG were admitted into evidence.

  2. Flournoy Production Co. v. Kain

    626 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    In order to come within the purview of exception 5(a), defendants were required to prove a contract in writing designating a particular county or a definite place within a county for performance of an obligation. Levy v. Lamar Savings Leasing Corp., 584 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Tyson v. Seaport Grain, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ dism'd). The trial court, in ascertaining proper venue, must look only to the written contract and may not consider parol evidence.

  3. Durant Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Towel & Uniform Co.

    624 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    (1) the defendant is a party reached by the statute; (2) the claim is based upon a written contract; (3) the contract was entered into by the defendant or one authorized to bind him; and (4) the contract by its terms provides for performance of the obligation sued upon in Tarrant County. See Levy v. Lamar Savings Leasing Corp., 584 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Brazos Valley Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd.). Appellant concedes that the appellee has established the first three venue facts for subd. 5. The first two points of error challenge the contention that the contract requires the obligation sued upon to be performed in Tarrant County.

  4. Midcon Pipeline Equip. v. Smith

    623 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    5(a), appellant must establish the following facts: (1) the defendant is a party reached by the statute; (2) the claim is upon a written contract; (3) the contract was entered into by the defendant or one authorized to bind him; and (4) the contract by its terms provides for performance of the obligation sued upon in Tarrant County. Levy v. Lamar Savings Leasing Corp., 584 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1979, no writ); Brazos Valley Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1976, writ dism'd). We agree that appellant has established the first three venue facts.