The parties agree that, although the complaint is based only on state law claims, Connecticut courts have looked to federal precedent in the employment discrimination arena for guidance in enforcing the state antidiscrimination statutes. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). Twenty-five cents an hour amounts to about ten dollars a week or five hundred dollars per year. It would take one hundred years for the claimed lost wages to exceed $50,000.

In Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 96, 104–109, 671 A.2d 349 (1996), a case in which the plaintiff asserted a CFEPA claim based on alleged discrimination due to a hearing disability, our Supreme Court discussed the two models used at that time by courts to allocate the burden of proof, and, accordingly, to establish the proper causation standard, in a disparate treatment case under CFEPA: the mixed-motive model and the pretextual model. The mixed-motive model originated in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion), wherein a plurality of the court applied the model to a sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 96, 104–109, 671 A.2d 349 (1996) (differentiating disparate employment treatment models).The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant in November, 2013, alleging that he and the defendant were employee and employer, respectively, within the meaning of the act.

(Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 104-105, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). Those two methods of proof apply to claims of intentional discrimination.

Even if the defendant demonstrably treats all rental applicants the same, however, its facially neutral conduct is not sufficient to avoid liability under the statute if such neutral conduct has a disparate impact on potential section 8 reimbursement tenants. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993), citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335- 36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Indeed, the legislative exception for "insufficient income" can be read as defining and incorporating the "business necessity" defense that is contemplated by the disparate impact portion of our antidiscrimination law.

Sandino Cifuentes was the plaintiff's supervisor. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 96, 104–109, 671 A.2d 349 (1996) (differentiating disparate employment treatment models). Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 46a-60 in this opinion are to the 2011 revision of the statute.

Our courts have looked to federal law for guidance in enforcing our own antidiscrimination statutes, and recognize two methods of analysis for claims of disparate treatment. See Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). Those two methods are (1) the mixed-motive/Price Waterhouse model; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) ; and (2) the pretext/ McDonnell Douglas–Burdine model. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252–56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) ; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 ; see also Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , supra, at 104–109, 671 A.2d 349.

Furthermore, it is well settled that “[w]e look to federal law for guidance on interpreting state employment discrimination law, and the analysis is the same under both.”Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., supra, at 73, 111 A.3d 453 ; Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 415, 944 A.2d 925 (2008) ; Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 637 n. 6, 791 A.2d 518 (2002) ; Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996) ; Walker v. Dept. of Children & Families, 146 Conn.App. 863, 875 n. 8, 80 A.3d 94 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 917, 85 A.3d 653 (2014). We further note that the pretext/McDonnell Douglas Corp.–Burdine framework is not an exclusive means of proving employment discrimination in Connecticut.

Plaintiff brings the present discrimination action against his former employer, alleging that Post unlawfully discharged him on the basis of his race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a–60. Because federal law guides analysis of Connecticut's anti-discrimination statutes, including CFEPA, Levy v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (1996), plaintiff's federal and state discrimination claims will be analyzed together. “Connecticut courts look to federal discrimination law for guidance in determining liability under CFEPA.”

Under this doctrine, in the context of the factual situation in Sullivan, if a rental decision is motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons, one of two methods may be used to determine if discriminatory action had been committed. Id.;see, e.g., Levy v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 671 A.2d 349, 356 (Conn. 1996); Avalon Bay Communities v. Orange, 775 A.2d 284, 308 (Conn. 2001). "Under the Price Waterhouse mixed motive model" analysis, a plaintiff must establish his or her prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a potential landlord's decision not to enter into a rental agreement was motivated by one or more prohibited events, by either direct or circumstantial proof that an adverse rental decision was based on a desire not to rent to Section 8 recipients. Levy, 671 A.2d at 356; accord, Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228) ("Under [the mixed motive] framework, an employee could establish a prima facie case of an unlawful employment practice by demonstrating that discrimination or retaliation played a 'motivating part' or was a 'substantial factor' in the employment decision.");Johnson v. Holway, 439 F. Supp. 2d 180, 223 (D.D.C. 2006) ("Under the 'mixed motive' framework of [Price Waterhouse], a union member may proceed instea