Levit v. Bowers

4 Citing cases

  1. Bennett & Kahnweiler, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co.

    256 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 16 times
    Construing Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 137

    Consequently, it was not unreasonable for plaintiff to have asserted that an oral agreement had been reached and that it had earned its commission when Schwartz Cooper signed the lease. See Harry F. Chaddick Realty, Inc. v. Maisel (7th Cir. 1985), 762 F.2d 534, 537-38; Chiagouris v. Continental Trailways (1964), 50 Ill. App.2d 196, 206, 200 N.E.2d 399; Levit v. Bowers (1954), 2 Ill. App.2d 343, 350-51, 119 N.E.2d 536; Goldstein v. Rosenberg (1947), 331 Ill. App. 374, 375, 73 N.E.2d 171. Although plaintiff was unsuccessful in proving its entitlement to the broker's commission, defendants have not established that plaintiff's cause of action was frivolous or was not well grounded in fact.

  2. Peo. ex Rel. Chicago Nursing Home Ass'n v. Walker

    31 Ill. App. 3d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 5 times
    In Walker, the court stated the duty to negotiate "encompasses a wide range of activities that may require an indefinite process of communication and compromise to take place over an unspecified period of time."

    The petition, however, contained no allegation identifying the specific acts which petitioners claimed to be entitled as a matter of law. Like many words which describe conduct related to affairs of business, the term "negotiate" may be used in many senses. Courts called upon to construe the term have defined it as "[to] hold intercourse or treat with a view to coming to terms upon some matter, * * * to conduct communications or conferences * * *" ( Levit v. Bowers (1954), 2 Ill. App.2d 343, 347, 119 N.E.2d 536). The term has also been defined "to communicate or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter." ( Al Herd, Inc. v. Isaac (1969), 271 Cal.App.2d 749, 752, 76 Cal.Rptr. 697, 699.)

  3. Hess v. Federal Tool Corp.

    205 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    This is what the cases cited by the appellee hold with reference to the contracts there in issue. Levit v. Bowers, 2 Ill. App.2d 343, 119 N.E.2d 536 (1954); Goldstein v. Rosenberg, 331 Ill. App. 374, 73 N.E.2d 171 (1947); Allen v. Estate of Henry P. Allen, 217 Ill. App. 260 (1921); Gruaz v. LeCrone, 45 Ill. App. 624 (1892). [4] It can just as easily be urged from the contract that the parties intended to make the payment of the balance stated therein contingent on sales being made. It is clear that one of the two alternatives mentioned was intended by the parties.

  4. Greenwald v. Marcus

    3 Ill. App. 2d 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954)   Cited 12 times

    A similar distinction is made where the purchaser is approved by the seller. Glatt v. Adams, 226 Ill. App. 321 (1922); Levit v. Bowers, 2 Ill. App.2d 343, 119 N.E.2d 536 (1954); Davis v. Morgan, 96 Ga. 518, 23 S.E. 417 (1895). This does not mean that a vendor is required to accept a purchaser without an opportunity to investigate his ability to comply with the terms of the contract.