Opinion
Argued May 7, 2001.
May 29, 2001.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated February 17, 2000, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied his cross motion for summary judgment, and (2) from an order of the same court, dated July 18, 2000, which denied his motion, denominated as one for leave to reargue and renew, which was, in actuality, a motion for leave to reargue.
Allan Levins, Brooklyn, N.Y., appellant pro se.
Seyfarth Shaw, New York, N.Y. (Craig P. Pacernick of counsel), for respondents.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO and THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated July 18, 2000, is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying a motion for leave to reargue; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated February 17, 2000, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.
The appellant's motion, denominated as one for leave to reargue and renew, was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue because it was not based upon new facts that were unavailable at the time of the original motion (see, Piacentini v. Mineola Union Free School Dist., 279 A.D.2d 513; McCorvey v. Schoulder, 273 A.D.2d 207; Daly v. Messina, 267 A.D.2d 345). Accordingly, the appeal from the order dated July 18, 2000, must be dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying a motion for leave to reargue (see, Schumer v. Levine, 208 A.D.2d 605; DeFreitas v. Board of Educ., 129 A.D.2d 672).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The challenged statements were subject to a qualified privilege which protects communications between persons with a common interest in the same subject matter (see, Foster v. Churchill, 87 N.Y.2d 744, 751; Hollander v. Cayton, 145 A.D.2d 605). Moreover, there was no demonstration of constitutional or common-law malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege (see, Foster v. Churchill, supra; Thanasoulis v. National Assn. for Specialty Foods Trade, 226 A.D.2d 227; Hollander v. Cayton, supra).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.
O'BRIEN, J.P., ALTMAN, LUCIANO and ADAMS, JJ., concur.