Under all of the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court did not err in permitting the filing of the judgment in this matter shortly after the 60-day period set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.48 had elapsed ( see e.g. Neri's Land Improvement, LLC v J.J. Cassone Bakery, Inc., 65 AD3d 1312; Matter of Loeffler v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 37 AD3d 470; Marzullo v General Motors Corp., 34 AD3d 540; Levine v Levine, 179 AD2d 625, 626). The defendants' remaining contentions are without merit.

CPLR 2004, which vests courts with discretion to "extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown" (emphasis added), was successfully relied upon where the excuse given for the untimeliness in filing a CPLR 3406 (a) notice "amount[ed] to little more than law office failure" ( see Tewari v Tsoutsouras, 75 NY2d 1, 12; see also Tak Kuen Nagi v Sze Jing Chan, 159 AD2d 278). Indeed, neglect specifically characterized as law office failure has been accepted by the Second Department as good cause for a short delay in submitting an order in accordance with 22 NYCRR 202.48 ( see Levine v Levine, 179 AD2d 625, 626).

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the respondent's motion to deem the plaintiffs application for an award of a statutory attorney's fee abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 on the ground that the plaintiff failed to settle an order and judgment within 60 days. The plaintiff set forth a valid excuse for the short delay, the plaintiff's actions were devoid of any intent to abandon her claim, and the record evinces a lack of prejudice to the respondent ( see CPLR 2005; Lawton v Lawton, 239 AD2d 866; Parisi v McElhatton, 209 AD2d 495; Levine v Levine, 179 AD2d 625).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. An evaluation of what constitutes reasonable counsel fees is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court (see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Pena v. Pena, 255 A.D.2d 498; Matter of Bailey, Marshall Hoeniger v. Merzon, 210 A.D.2d 474), which is often in the best position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees (see, Pauk v. Pauk, 232 A.D.2d 386; O'Neil v. O'Neil, 193 A.D.2d 16, 20; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625, 626). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding an attorney's fee in this case.

The Supreme Court's determination that the award of custody of the parties' daughter to the plaintiff was in the child's best interest has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see,Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167; Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89; Bliss v. Ach, 56 N.Y.2d 995). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff 80% of her counsel fees (see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625). The Supreme Court erred in awarding the plaintiff a 10% interest in the defendant's medical practice, an asset which was acquired by the defendant 11 months after the commencement of this action.

Since the defendant agreed that a determination regarding counsel fees could be made upon the affirmation of services, the court was not required to hold a hearing on this issue ( see, Mancuso v. Mancuso, 178 A.D.2d 584; Dawson v. Dawson, 152 A.D.2d 717; Kandel v. Kandel, 129 A.D.2d 617; Janousek v. Janousek, 108 A.D.2d 782). Moreover, the amount of the counsel fee award was not an improvident exercise of discretion ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Weiss v. Weiss, 213 A.D.2d 542; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625).

This is not a proper reason to seek such an award ( see, Sperling v. Sperling, 165 A.D.2d 338). Nor did the trial court improvidently exercise its discretion in requiring each party to bear the responsibility of paying his or her own counsel fees in connection with this divorce action ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Lee v. Qi Wa Chan, 245 A.D.2d 270; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625; cf., Wells v. Wells, 151 A.D.2d 474). The court did not err in requiring the parties to share equally in any late charges or legal fees associated with the mortgage on the house ( see, Barr v. Barr, 210 A.D.2d 192), since it was the responsibility of both parties to maintain the house and keep it in good condition so that it could be sold.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. We decline to disturb the Supreme Court's award of counsel fees, the evaluation thereof being committed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in a "superior position to judge those factors integral to the fixing of counsel fees" ( Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625, 626; see also, Matter of Aronesty v. Aronesty, 202 A.D.2d 240). The defendant wife's inability to pay her entire legal bill does not warrant holding the plaintiff husband responsible for payment where the court found that the wife's counsel prolonged this action in bad faith in order to increase his fees ( see, Matter of Aronesty v. Aronesty, supra). The defendant wife's remaining contentions are without merit.

However, by placing the assets in both parties' names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, the husband evinced an intent to transform the character of the property from separate to marital ( see, Schmidlapp v. Schmidlapp, 220 A.D.2d 571). The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in its award of counsel fees ( see, DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625, 626). The wife's remaining contentions are without merit.

Plaintiff established that she did not intend to abandon her action, that there was "good cause" ( 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b]) for the delay and that defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. Thus, the court properly exercised its discretion in accepting the late submission ( see, Parisi v. McElhatton, 209 A.D.2d 495; Levine v. Levine, 179 A.D.2d 625). Further, there is no merit to the contention that defendant is entitled to an equal division of the marital property.