" See also Mirinda v. King, supra; Litcher v. Trust Co. of N.J., 18 N.J. Super. 101 ( Ch. Div. 1952), affirmed 11 N.J. 64 (1952); Brown v. Condit, 70 N.J. Eq. 440 ( Ch. 1905); Levinv. Attorney-General, 136 N.J. Eq. 568 ( Ch. 1945); Martin v.Haycock, 140 N.J. Eq. 450 ( Ch. 1947); Restatement of theLaw, Trusts, supra, § 397, comment g; § 399, comment o; IV Scott, supra, § 397, § 397.3; Bogert,supra, § 438. The line of demarcation between impossibility and impracticability is most difficult to draw. It is one of degree rather than of kind. IV Scott, supra, § 399.4; Bogert, supra, § 439.

Testamentary bequests similar to that contained in the residuary clause of Article Fourth have been held to create a valid testamentary, charitable trust that will be enforced, provided that the Testator has named a trustee to designate the recipients of the bequest. Levin v. Attorney General, 136 N.J. Eq. 568, 569-570 (Ch. 1945). See also Litcher v. Trust Co. of New Jersey, 11 N.J. 64, 78-80 (1952); Brown v. Coxson, 118 N.J. Eq. 114 (Ch. 1935), aff'd 119 N.J. Eq. 86 (E. A. 1935); 6 N.J.Practice ( Clapp, Wills and Administration) (revised 3rd ed. 1984) § 526 at 48; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (2d ed. 1977) § 371 at 84.

A successor trustee can properly exercise the powers conferred by the terms of the trust even though they involve the exercise of discretion, unless the testator manifested an intention that the power should be exercised only by the trustee originally named by him. Levin v. Attorney-General, 136 N.J. Eq. 568 ( Ch. 1945); Mirinda v. King, 11 N.J. Super. 165 ( App. Div. 1951). No intention on the part of the testator to restrict to the original trustee the power to appoint the committee provided for in paragraph 20 of the will is discernible in the instrument under consideration.

It seems, too, that the successor trustee can properly exercise the powers conferred by the terms of the trust even though they involve the exercise of discretion, unless the testator manifested an intention that the powers should be exercised only by the trustee originally named by him. Levin v. Attorney General, 136 N.J. Eq. 568 ( Ch. 1945); 3 Scott on Trusts, 2072, § 397.1. In conclusion, we resolve that the testamentary trust was created by the testatrix for a charitable purpose, and we discover nothing in the will to indicate that the testatrix intended to terminate the trust if the agency designated by her to administer it declined to function or if the specific mode or means of its contemplated performance failed of attainment.