Pertinent here, that element may be proved when the employee is not actually discharged but is "constructively" discharged. Levesque v. Androscoggin Cty., 2012 ME 114, ¶ 8, 56 A.3d 1227. Constructive discharge may be found when, due to the actions of the employer, an employee's "working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [the employee's] shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe, Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).

MAS argues that Ms. Ferrante's constructive discharge claim fails as a matter of law because the Maine Law Court has held that constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action. Id. at 20 (citing Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, ¶¶ 8-9, 56 A.3d 1227, 1229). 2.

Constructive discharge is not a separate cause of action that may be alleged independent of proof of some other form of unlawful conduct giving rise to the termination. Levesgue v. Androscoggin County, 2012 ME 114, ¶6, __ A.3d __. Thus, as counterclaim plaintiff, Dr. Stevens must allege a companion cause of action to prevail on such a claim. Here, Dr. Stevens argues breach of an employment contract, which is a valid companion action to an action for constructive discharge.

Constructive discharge is not a separate cause of action that may be alleged independent of proof of some other form of unlawful conduct giving rise to the termination. Levesque v. Androscoggin County, 2012 ME 114, ¶ 6, ___ A.3d ___. Thus, as counterclaim plaintiff, Dr. Stevens must allege a companion cause of action to prevail on such a claim. Here, Dr. Stevens argues breach of an employment contract, which is a valid companion action to an action for constructive discharge.

[¶ 13] “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, ¶ 5, 56 A.3d 1227. Summary judgment is properly granted “if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

“We review the grant of a summary judgment de novo.” Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, ¶ 5, 56 A.3d 1227. We will affirm the grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff who “presents insufficient evidence on an essential element in her cause of action, such that the defendant would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that state of the evidence at a trial.”

[¶ 10] This case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment in favor of the State defendants, which we review de novo and will affirm “if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, ¶ 5, 56 A.3d 1227 (quotation marks omitted). Because we find that there are no genuine issues of material facts in dispute, we evaluate whether the State defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is properly granted when “the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of [his] cause of action.”

"[C]onstructive discharge does not exist as an independent cause of action under Maine statutory or common law." Levesque v. Androscoggin County, 2012 ME 114, ¶ 8, 56 A.3d 1227. Accordingly, count III of Mahoney's complaint fails as a matter of law.

As this Court has previously acknowledged, "'[c]onstructive discharge' is not a stand-alone cause of action but a way of satisfying the adverse action element of an employment discrimination claim." See Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 332 F. Supp. 3d 316, 353-54 (D. Me. 2018) (citing Levesque v. Androscoggin Cty., 56 A.3d 1227, 1229 (Me. 2012)); see also Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2018) (reviewing a retaliation claim based on constructive discharge). Given Plaintiff's clearly expressed intention to move forward with constructive discharge as the sole adverse action on all of her claims, the Court does not address Defendants' arguments regarding why other disciplinary actions do not amount to timely adverse actions for purposes of Plaintiff's claims.

As this Court has previously acknowledged, "'[c]onstructive discharge' is not a stand-alone cause of action but a way of satisfying the adverse action element of an employment discrimination claim." See Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 332 F. Supp. 3d 316, 353-54 (D. Me. 2018) (citing Levesque v. Androscoggin Cty., 56 A.3d 1227, 1229 (Me. 2012)); see also Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2018) (reviewing a retaliation claim based on constructive discharge). "The constructive-discharge doctrine contemplates a situation in which an employer discriminates against an employee to the point such that his 'working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign.'"