It is also true that where multiple overt acts are committed pursuant to what is albeit a single conspiracy, and each overt act constitutes a separate substantive offense, there may be multiple convictions for the multiple substantive offenses. Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632 (4) ( 231 S.E.2d 513) (1976); Strauss v. State, 113 Ga. App. 90 (2) ( 147 S.E.2d 367) (1966). We do not deal with this question either, since it is acknowledged by the state that what we are dealing with here are multiple conspiracy convictions under a multi-count conspiracy indictment.
Accordingly, on the trial of a defendant under an indictment so charging, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove all of such separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment, but the state makes a prima facie case upon its establishment by proof of any one of them.' [Cit.]" Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 634 (1) ( 231 S.E.2d 513) (1976); see Lubiano v. State, 192 Ga. App. 272, 273 (1) (a) ( 384 S.E.2d 410) (1989). Stander nonetheless argues that the variance between the allegations of the indictment and the court's jury charge prejudiced his defense.
"`When an indictment charges a crime was committed in more than one way, proof that it was committed in one of the separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment makes a prima facie case for jury determination as to guilt or innocence. See Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 (4), 615 ( 44 S.E.2d 174); Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 634 ( 231 S.E.2d 513).' Henry v. State, 154 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 653)." Rucker v. State, 177 Ga. App. 779, 781 (3) ( 341 S.E.2d 228).
As recognized in Vann v. State, supra, the statute contained several disjunctive ways or methods that the crime could be committed, and proof of any one would be sufficient to constitute the crime where the accusation was phrased conjunctively. See Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632(1), 231 S.E.2d 513 (1976). ". . .
To the extent that the affidavit addressed matters not apparent from the record, defendant has failed in his duty to show harmful error affirmatively by the record. Roach v. State, 221 Ga. 783, 785 (4) ( 147 S.E.2d 299); Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 639 (9) ( 231 S.E.2d 513). This enumeration of error is without merit. Judgment affirmed. Carley and Pope, JJ., concur.
"When an indictment charges a crime was committed in more than one way, proof that it was committed in one of the separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment makes a prima facie case for jury determination as to guilt or innocence. See Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 (4), 615 ( 44 S.E.2d 174); Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 634 ( 231 S.E.2d 513)." Henry v. State, 154 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 653). Here the indictment alleges that defendant assaulted the victim and that he beat her, etc., all with an intent to rape.
As recognized in Vann v. State, supra, the statute contained several disjunctive ways or methods that the crime could be committed, and proof of any one would be sufficient to constitute the crime where the accusation was phrased conjunctively. See Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632 (1) ( 231 S.E.2d 513) (1976). When subsection (a) (4) was enacted in 1983, the legislature recognized it as a different crime but placed it at the end of the existing statute.
Accordingly, on the trial of a defendant under an indictment so charging, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove all such separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment, but the state makes a prima facie case upon its establishment by proof of any one of them.' Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 (4) ( 44 S.E.2d 174) [(1947)]." Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 634 ( 231 S.E.2d 513) (1976). Accord Henry v. State, 154 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 653) (1980); Vann v. State, 153 Ga. App. 710 (2) ( 266 S.E.2d 349) (1980).
Hence, the multiple count indictment was not improper. See Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632, 636-637 (4) ( 231 S.E.2d 513); Strauss v. State, 113 Ga. App. 90, 93 (2) ( 147 S.E.2d 367). Compare Price v. State, 155 Ga. App. 206, 207 (2) ( 270 S.E.2d 203), rev'd s.c., 247 Ga. 58, 60 ( 273 S.E.2d 854).
See generally Stephens v. United States, 347 F.2d 722 (4) (5th Cir. 1965). Cf. Leverenz v. State, 140 Ga. App. 632 (4) ( 231 S.E.2d 513); Strauss v. State, 113 Ga. App. 90 (2) ( 147 S.E.2d 367). Contrary to appellant's contentions the indictment did not charge a general offense, "but each count charged a particular offense, for the conviction of which the defendant could be sentenced separately ..." Williams v. State, 133 Ga. App. 66 (4) ( 209 S.E.2d 729).