Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG07310410.
Jones, P. J.
Respondent Gordon Leung filed a complaint against appellant Danilo Mayorga seeking to establish a prescriptive easement over certain commercial property that appellant owned. The case was tried to a judge who ruled that respondent was entitled to the easement he sought. Appellant now appeals contending (1) the court’s judgment does not describe the easement adequately, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a prescriptive easement. We agree the judgment contains a minor clerical error and will order the appropriate modification. However in all other respects, we will affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1999, appellant purchased a parcel of commercial property located on International Boulevard in Oakland. The parcel includes the property and buildings located at 4701 through 4737 International Boulevard and the property located behind the adjacent commercial buildings located at 4745 and 4749 International Boulevard. The parcel is roughly rectangular in shape with a panhandle that extends behind the adjacent parcels.
Also in 1999, respondent purchased adjacent property commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard in Oakland. The property consists of two storefronts on International Boulevard (known as 4745 and 4745 1/2) and a separate, freestanding building that is located immediately behind the storefronts (4745R). 4745R has no access to International Boulevard and instead, is accessed via an alleyway that begins on 47th Avenue and that is located on appellant’s property.
Appellant wanted to place a parking structure on the panhandle portion of his property, and in 2006 he obtained permits from the City of Oakland to begin construction. In response, respondent filed the complaint that is at issue in the current appeal. Alleging that he and his predecessors had used the alleyway on appellant’s property for more than 45 years, respondent sought to establish a prescriptive easement over the alleyway.
The case proceeded to a court trial where both parties presented evidence from witnesses who had owned or rented the subject properties in the preceding decades. After hearing the evidence presented, the court ruled that respondent was entitled to a prescriptive easement because he and his predecessors had been using the alleyway on appellant’s property without permission since at least 1972. Accordingly, the court entered judgment ruling that “Gordon Leung as well as the property commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, California, the latter being the rear unit of such property, enjoy a non-exclusive prescriptive easement for ingress and egress, for parking behind 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, for loading and unloading, and for all other reasonably necessary commercial uses for the conduct of business associated with 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, over the alleyway running the from [sic] 47th Street entrance of the alleyway to and including the 48th Street boundary of the properties located at and commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland. The easement found by the court is in favor of the properties located at and commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, California, which are the dominant tenants and against the real property of those real properties located at and commonly known as 4701-4737 International Boulevard, Oakland, California, which are the subservient tenants.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Judgment Describes the Easement Adequately
Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed because it does not identify the easement adequately.
A judgment that affects real property must be as clear and specific as a deed, (People v. Rio Nido Co., Inc. (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 486, 489) and a deed need only be sufficiently definite and certain to enable land to be identified. (Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist. v. Zinzer (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 587, 590-591.) No particular form of description is required and property may even be identified by a descriptive name. (Murray v. Tulare Irrigation Co. (1898) 120 Cal. 311, 315.)
Here, the judgment describes the easement as being located on the property that is commonly known as 4701-4737 International Boulevard in Oakland. The judgment further identifies the easement as being located “over the alleyway [that runs from the] 47th Street entrance of the alleyway to and including the 48th Street boundary of the properties located at and commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland.” We conclude a description that provides a specific location by address and then provides a further description of precisely where at those addresses an easement is located is adequate. The judgment is sufficient.
Appellant contends the judgment is inadequate because it does not contain a legal description of the easement using metes and bounds. Appellant has not cited any authority that hold a metes and bounds description invariably is required and that is demonstrably not correct. Civil Code section 1092 specifically states that property may be granted by its “descriptive name.” Furthermore, many cases hold a deed to be adequate even though property is not described using metes and bounds. (See, e.g., Smart v. Peek (1931) 213 Cal. 452, 457; Burton v. Mullenary (1905) 147 Cal. 259, 263; Murray v. Tulare Irrigation Co., supra, 120 Cal. at p. 315; Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist. v. Zinzer, supra, 51 Cal.App.2d at pp. 590-591.) The judgment is not deficient on this ground.
Having reached this conclusion, we necessarily reject appellant’s derivative argument, that the trial court’s posttrial comments in which it acknowledged that a metes and bounds description had not been provided at trial somehow render the judgment invalid.
There is, however, a minor ambiguity in the judgment. It describes the alleyway on which the easement is located as running from the “47th Street entrance of the alleyway to and including the 48th Street boundary of the properties located at and commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland.” (Italics added.) Both parties on appeal acknowledge that the alleyway in question in fact runs between 47th Avenue and 48th Avenue. We note that appellant did not raise this issue in the court below so he has forfeited the right to raise it as a ground for reversal on appeal. (See Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3.) Furthermore, many cases hold minor clerical errors such as this to be harmless. (See, e.g., Rea v. Haffenden (1897) 116 Cal. 596, 603; see also Hanson v. Goldsmith (1915) 170 Cal. 512, 517; Burton v. Mullenary, supra, 147 Cal. at p. 263.) In the interests of justice, we will order an appropriate modification.
Appellant’s alternate argument on this point is that the judgment is inadequate because it fails to specifically set forth the portions of the alleyway that may be used and the specific uses that may occur.
Again, appellant has not cited any place in the record where he raised this issue in the court below. He has forfeited the right to raise it on appeal. (Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488, fn. 3.) The argument is also unpersuasive. While a judgment affecting real property must be reasonably certain, appellant has not cited any case or statute that holds it must be as precise as appellant suggests. Indeed, in Taormino v. Denny (1970) 1 Cal.3d 679, 687 (Taormino), our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument ruling that provisions of the Civil Code that govern the maintenance of a private right of way in the absence of an agreement were adequate to address any uncertainty that might exist due to the fact the judgment under review failed to specify the defendant’s maintenance obligations. As the court did in Taormino, we note that there is a large body of law that govern easements, how they are to be used, and the limitations on that use. (See, e.g., 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, §§ 407-419, pp. 478-493.) To the extent any disputes over use may arise in the future, we are confident they can be resolved through the application of well-settled law.
We conclude the judge is sufficiently certain.
B. Whether the Easement is Supported by Sufficient Evidence
Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed because the evidence presented at trial was inadequate to support a prescriptive easement.
To establish a prescriptive easement, a plaintiff must establish (1) open and notorious use; (2) that is continuous and uninterrupted, (3) hostile to the true owner; (4) and under a claim of right. (Taormino, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 686.) Whether the elements of an easement by prescription are established is a question of fact for the trier of fact whose ruling will be affirmed on appeal so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. (Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570.)
Here, appellant attacks only one of the elements set forth above. He contends the evidence was inadequate to demonstrate that respondent’s and his predecessors’ use of the alleyway was hostile.
Hostility simply means that the claimant’s use must be adverse to the record owner unaccompanied by any recognition, express or implied from the circumstances, of the right in the latter. (California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1798, 1806.) As the trial court found, there is ample evidence that respondent’s and his predecessors’ use of the alleyway was hostile under this standard.
Yenlin Li owned the property located at 4745R International Boulevard from 1988 through 1999, and he operated a refrigeration business there from 1988 through 1997. Li said he used the alleyway for parking and business purposes at least three times per day without interference and without permission from anyone for the entire time that he owned the property.
Edmundo Estrella operated a meat business out of 4745R International Boulevard for several years beginning in 1997. Estrella testified that he and other persons “always” used the alleyway to operate the meat business and that he never asked for permission from anyone.
Respondent Leung testified that he used the alleyway both before and after he purchased 4745R and that no one ever told him he could not do so until 2006 when he started having problems with appellant Mayorga.
The trial court construing this evidence reasonably could conclude that respondent’s and his predecessors’ use of the alleyway was adverse to the record owner and was unaccompanied by any recognition, express or implied, of the rights of the owner. (California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1806.)
Appellant contends that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it found respondent’s and his predecessors’ use of the alleyway to be hostile given the testamentary and documentary evidence that he presented at trial that showed others who used the alleyway did so with permission. This argument is dually flawed. First, as we have stated, whether hostility exists is a question of fact for the trier of fact whose ruling must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Pratt v. Hodgson (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 401, 404-405.) Appellant has applied an incorrect standard of review. Second and importantly, appellant misconstrues our function on appeal. The issue is whether the court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence, and as we have explained, the court’s ruling is amply supported. The fact that the record also contains other evidence that might have supported a different conclusion is irrelevant. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479; Brookhouser v. State of California (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1665, 1678.)
Appellant raises one final argument on this point. He contends hostility could not be established as a matter of law because “tenants cannot prescriptively acquire an easement unless the premises used by the tenant were expressly excluded from the scope of the lease.” This argument is difficult to understand given that 4745R International Boulevard, which was found by the court to be the dominant tenement, was owned by Li and later by respondent. The property was not leased by appellant to either of them. However, we need not try to sort appellant’s argument out. We find no place in the record where he raised this argument in the court below. Appellant has forfeited the right to raise it on appeal. (Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488, fn. 3.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment filed in the trial court on April 22, 2009, is modified as follows:
On page three, in what is described as “Attachment A to Form Judgment” the first sentence of the first full paragraph is modified to read as follows:
“IT IS ADJUDGED AND DECREED, AND JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED ACCORDINGLY, that plaintiff Gordon Leung, as well as the property commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, California, the latter being the rear unit of such property, enjoy a nonexclusive prescriptive easement for ingress and egress, for parking behind 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, for loading and unloading, and for all other reasonably necessary commercial uses for the conduct of business associated with 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland, over the alleyway running from the 47th Avenue entrance of the alleyway to and including the 48th Avenue boundary of the properties located at and commonly known as 4745 and 4745R International Boulevard, Oakland.”
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Simons, J., Bruiniers, J.