Lester v. Trust Co.

10 Citing cases

  1. Aaf-McQuay Inc. v. Willis

    308 Ga. App. 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 23 times
    Upholding denial of summary judgment where fact question existed as to whether dominant partner, who was also a creditor of the partnership, used coercive and deceptive tactics to try to restructure partnership by, inter alia, secretly divesting partnership of one of its businesses

    Mutual departure requires the receipt or payment of money or some other sufficient consideration, however slight, to support a departure from the contractual terms. See OCGA § 13-4-4; Turem v. Sinowski Jones, 195 Ga. App. 829, 829-830 (1) ( 395 SE2d 60) (1990); Southwest Plaster Drywall Co. v. R. S. Armstrong Bros. Co., 166 Ga. App. 373, 374 ( 304 SE2d 500) (1983); Lester v. Trust Co. ofGa., 144 Ga. App. 526, 527 (1) ( 241 SE2d 633) (1978). McQuay does not contest that consideration is a requirement for a mutual departure, and there is no evidence of record that there was any receipt or payment of money or other consideration provided to Willis for a departure from the terms of the Partnership Agreement. It follows that McQuay's affirmative defense of mutual departure failed as a matter of law.

  2. Southern Co. v. Hamburg

    470 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 23 times
    In Hamburg, billing summaries were introduced, but nothing in the opinion suggests that the records were properly introduced under OCGA § 24-3-1.

    "While the truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification, Code Ann. § 105-708 [now OCGA § 51-5-6], nevertheless, truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978)." Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 852(3) ( 278 S.E.2d 689). The conflicting evidence in the case sub judice regarding the truth or falsity of facts underlying defendants' charge that Hamburg acted unethically in exercising his authority as SEI's President and Chief Executive Officer was sufficient to create a jury question. "

  3. Thrasher v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.

    209 Ga. App. 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    "While the truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification, Code Ann. § 105-708 [now OCGA § 51-5-6], nevertheless, truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978)." Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 852 (3) ( 278 S.E.2d 689).

  4. Stalvey v. Atlanta Business Chronicle

    202 Ga. App. 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times

    "While the truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification, Code Ann. § 105-708 [now OCGA § 51-5-6], nevertheless, truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978)." Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 852 (3), supra.

  5. Stone v. McMichen

    367 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    "While the truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification, Code Ann. § 105-708 [now OCGA § 51-5-6], nevertheless, truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978)." Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 Ga. App. 850, 852 (3), supra.

  6. Willis v. First National Bank of Atlanta

    365 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 2 times

    The remaining contentions enumerated by appellant as error concern the legal characterization of the verbal agreement between appellant and appellee after acceleration. Appellant contends the trial court erred by denominating this agreement an executory accord, instead of a "quasi new agreement" such as that discussed in Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978). Had appellant kept the agreement, it would be important that we consider his arguments.

  7. Southwest Plaster c. Co. v. R. S. Armstrong c

    166 Ga. App. 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 16 times

    Such subsequent performance was sufficient consideration to support the "quasi-new agreement" defined by OCGA § 13-4-4 (Code Ann. § 20-116). Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978). Absent any mutual departures from any other contractual provisions, the original lease agreement thus would determine the rights and liabilities of the appellant concerning the diesel-powered forklift.

  8. Williams v. Church's Fried Chicken

    279 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 12 times
    Summarizing tortious interference with contractual relations or potential business relations as the “malicious, wrongful and intentional injury to the business of another” (citing NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1966))

    Appellees, as the parties moving for summary judgment, met their burden of affirmatively negativing Williams' claims and showing that he was not entitled to recover under any theory of the case by evidence demanding a finding to that effect. Cf. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978). Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Banke, J., concur.

  9. Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski

    157 Ga. App. 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming jury verdict of general and punitive damages for libel even though defendants argued that their statements were not false because truth is a factual question for the jury

    Appellants argue that the statements made were not libelous because they were not false. While the truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification, Code Ann. § 105-708, nevertheless, truthfulness is a question of fact for the jury. Lester v. Trust Co. of Ga., 144 Ga. App. 526, 528 ( 241 S.E.2d 633) (1978). Zurawski's testimony regarding the truth or falsity of the statements was sufficient to create a jury question.

  10. Jaraysi v. Sebastian

    318 Ga. App. 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 8 times
    Involving a commercial lease and an express contract of quiet enjoyment

    However, even though the attempt at oral modification of the Lease Agreement may not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, where “a modification of the written contract has been agreed to by all parties, performed by one and accepted by the other, there [can be] a waiver of the provisions of the original contract.” Lester v. Trust Company of Ga., 144 Ga.App. 526, 527, 241 S.E.2d 633 (1978) (Where court determined that Statute of Frauds or a lack of consideration did not bar contract claim because the Bank's acceptance of payments amounted to a waiver of the terms of the original contract during the period of the quasi-new agreement.); B–Lee's Sales, 141 Ga.App. at 872–873, 234 S.E.2d 702.